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PREFACE
The following study attempts to trace the development
of the Soviet press In the years up to Lenin's death* This
formative period was extremely Important since the guidelines
and functions were formulated, and party control established
over the Russian press at this time* For a source of such
importance In revealing the history of Soviet Russia v the
press has hardly been studied In the western world, and no
western source treats the initial period of its creation ade-
quately* In Soviet historiography the situation is only
slightly better* Two studies, A.F* Berezhnol* K lstorll
part1ino-sovotskol pechatl * Moscow, 1956 and partiina la I
sovetskala pechat* v bor'be za postroyeaive sotglallama l
tmawmiaaa* Moscow, 1961 treat the period up tb the second
world war, but pass over the first seven years of the Soviet
press tracing only the bare outlines of Its establishment*
These accounts portray early papers as solidly united in de-
fense of the principles of Leninism and do not indicate the
variety of approaches that were tried or that the party 9 s
control of the press was not always as firm as It would later
become* The reliability of these, the two best Soviet accounts,
Is further undermined by their failure to use contemporary
accounts or even the material published in the press* Local
studies are In many cases more detailed, but their accuracy
ill
La difficult to judge, and they have been used only where
they can be corroborated by other sources*
Fortunately contemporary and primary sources provide a
wealth of materials which reveal a different picture of the
development of the Soviet press and allow the construction of
a more reliable history of the early period. The contemporary
publications, scores of articles and data in Soviet papers,
supplemented by the information in Izvestlla tsontrai'nofto
fcfrtttl" the documentary collections on the press enable
the researcher to see the various approaches that were not
chosen and what obstacles were overcome in the course of pro-
ceeding along the road that was selected. They make it pos-
sible to show that the early history of the Soviet press was
not the product of Lenin and Stalin, evolving remorselessly
along the lines of a preconcerted plan, but one of experiment
and crisis in which the *arty had far less control than Soviet
historiography indicates*
For the most part the present study deals with the organ*
izatlon and expansion of Soviet newspapers. Immediately a
definition becomes necessary* Soviet newspapers for the pur*
pose of this paper are limited to publications commonly and
regularly available to various segments of the Soviet popu-
lation in the years under reference* For this reason neither
the Soviet institutional press nor the many journals of the
time have been considered* For similar reasons Izvestlla
iv
t.entral'nogo k^te£a. which began publication aa a two page
supplement to Pravda in 1919 and subsequently became an Inde-
pendent Journal, has been omitted, although its pages provided
extensive documentation on the condition of the press.
In tracing the development of the papers considerable
effort was made to Illustrate the various deficiencies and
problems which confronted the Soviet press with examples taken
from the printed page. Unfortunately the Soviet papers avail-
able in the United States did not lend themselves to this
approach, and in most cases the errors and defects of the
local press remain vague generalizations, reflected on the
pages of the central papers without revealing the specific
content of the offending publication.
The evolution of the press passed through two distinct
stages. In the initial phase paths and policies were followed
haltingly or led to dead ends, thwarted by circumstances be-
yond the control of the party. In relating the history of
this period the different approaches have been identified and
the reasons for their failure* indicated. Mostly they were
attempts to do too much too soon or at least at the wrong time.
Particularly stressed in this first stage are the efforts of
party and state to control and guide the press . and their
general failg^^ wrm , ftttWfJ^fttm i ix n* the paper
In the second stage, these early approaches have given
way to a firmer attitude at the center. By 1923 the Central
Committee had selected the press policy which it felt best
suited the needs of the state, had chosen the path along which
the press would develop, and began to organize it in conformity
with these ideas. The second part of the paper, then, defines
the new tasks of the press, relates the evolution of new types
and levels of papers, and records the success of the party in
controlling the diverse segments of the whole net*
In addition to describing the infra-structure of the
press, the present study Indicates the functions and tasks
which the party expected it to fulfill* From the initial def-
inition of freedom of the press, through the many refinements
by the party, the thread of the press as a class weapon runs
continuous lv, and this paper attempts to show how this thread
was woven into the fabric of Soviet life, what the party ex-
pected from it, and whether these expectations were gratified*
Finally material is included concerning the Soviet paper
as an institution to show its content and format, how the
staff functioned and where responsibility for It lay. The rab-
selcor movement, which took the place of reporters. Is also
considered from the perspective of a tool which the party
tried to control because of its Impact among the masses.
Since correspondents were Instrumental in delivering the paper
to its subscribers, they represented the logical extension
vi
of the party, capable of making tta influence felt in the roost
backward area of the state*
Two caveats are needed to avoid the Impression that this
is by any standard a definitive study. Its preparation and
many of the conclusions reached showed that a far greater num-
ber of Soviet papers, especially at the lower levels of the
-
net, need to be examined before many of the generalizations
ventured could be considered proven. The few papers examined
for this study represent sequences of a month or more consec-
utive numbers, and there were less than twenty of these, all
at the guberaia or higher level* The Smolensk Party Archives
at the National Archives and the Moscow and Petrograd Gubernla
papers in the Library of Congress provide some light on the
lower levels* The Smolensk Archives are particularly valuable
for the period 1920-1924, while the gubernla papers are equal-
ly so for 1922, the year of the press crisis* Unfortunately
only the Smolensk records give a continuous record of the
local response to central directives and the establishment of
uezd papers* To see if the demands and decrees of the Central
Committee were generally executed, to discover specifically
what facets of the local press drew such frequent complaints,
requires the study of many more titles* Such an examination
would also throw light on the monolithic nature of the press
in 1924 and on the struggle of the Central Committee with
Til.
factions In the party by revealing the different lines pre*
sented in the publications of the local organizations*
The second caveat involves the availability of the exten-
sive literature of the press section of the Central Committee
and other press related institutions. Its major publication.
Kg—*ia pechat'. is available in the United States only for
192S-1928 despite inception in 1921. None of the hundreds of
Blulleteni are available either. These handicaps were over-
come to a certain extent by the press section* s reports in
Izveftl^a tsentrral'nogo komiteta . A similar situation exists
for ROSTA and the rabselcer movement. Only one copy of Af.it-
ftOSTA and no issues of Raboehll-krost* lanskli korregpondent
or its predecessor are In the United States. The absence of
these source* and a variety of contemporary publications, re-
ferred to in Soviet sources, indicate that a vast amount of
published information pertinent to the early years of the
Soviet press remains to be tapped.
vllt
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1PART I
LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER I
THE PRESS BETWEEN
THE REVOLUTIONS
at
February-July
The February Revolution In Russia which ended the rule
of the Tsars also ushered in a period of civil liberties with
the March 2 proclamation of the Provisional Government. The
proclamation of civil liberties was followed three days later
by a special decree on the press
,
revoking the administrative
y&sty tfra4.no volutins £*siii*i*»* Ae 4iM*Mti*ft.*f revising
measures including censorship which the Autocracy had Imposed
2before and during the war* These official acts of the Pro-
visional Government made it possible for nearly any group or
organisation to publish papers subject only to the availabil-
ity of newsprint* presses* experienced press workers and
journalists* But in the first days of the Revolution Petro-
grad suffered from a nearly complete press blackout, and only
1* The dates in this chapter follow the Julian calendar
(old style).
2. Browder, Robert P., and Kerensky, Alexander F.* Eds.* The
Russian Provisional Government 1917 * Stanford. 1961. vol. I*
p* 233| (Hereafter cited as Browder and Kerensky* The £us
?yov Gov ) i Sazonov, I*S., "Presledovaniye bol 9 shevistskol
gazety •Pravda* v 1917 g* M , 0 sovetskol ^ aarubeahnol oechati .
Vyp* III* 1964, p. 85t (Hereafter cited as Sazonov, "Pres-
ledovaniye", 0 soy pechatl ).
2on March 5 did papers return to the streets of the capital.
3
The Bolsheviks like many other groups, prepared immed-
iately to utilize the new civil liberties in the areas of the
press granted in the flush of victory by the Provisional Govern-
ment. The majority of the party's leaders were in exile or
abroad, but the Buro of the Central Committee began to organ-
ise a party paper even before the sanction of the Provisional
Government had been granted, On March 2 it voted to resur-
rect Pravda which had published sporadically from May 12, 1912
until July S, 1914, when it was finally closed by the Autoc-
racy. The Petrograd Committee concurred with this decision
March 3 and agreed to help with the publication.^ Since the
party had no printing facilities, the discussion of reviving
Pravda was academic until the material-technical resources
Mftfi *\*&- . Central <>^*n to o$&tUiu« eufo-
3. Only Izvestiia of the Petrograd Soviet (one edition for
February 26-7) and Russkli ^nvaljd published at all before
March 5. Berezhnol, A.F. , et al. , Bol ' sheylstskaja pechat*
v bor'be ga vlast' sovetov . Leningrad, 1960, p. 10 (Here*
after cited as Berezhnol, et al. , Bol pechat* ). It seems
unlikely that the absence of papers was due to the lack of
enabling legislation, or any other legal basis for publica-
tion, but more likely due to the necessity of organizing
presses at short notice.
4. Antropov, T. , Gageta "Pravda** v bor'be za pobedu oktlabr'-
skol revollutsit . Moscow, 1954, p. 18 (Hereafter cited as
Antropov, Gazeta "Pravda" )| laroslavskll, Em., Trldtsat'
let bol f shevlatskoT^Pravdy" . Moscow, 1942, p. 23 (Here-
after cited as laroslavskll, Trldtsat' let) i Andronov, S.A.,
Boveyoye orushlve partil , "Pravda" 1912-1917 , Leningrad, 1962,
pp. 282-4 (Hereafter cited as Andronov, Boyevoye oruzhlye
partil ) i Berezhnol, et al. , Ibid . . p. 19. laroslavskll
credits Molotov with placing the question of Pravda on the
agenda of the Central Committee.
3for publication could be obtained* The Central Committee
solved the problem on March 4 by seizing the presses and
offices of Sel'skll vestnlk . and on the same day named a
provisional editorial board of three to plan and publish the
first issue.
^
Having solved the problem of physical plant and created
an editorial board* the Central Committee and the Petrograd
Committee brought out the first four-page issue of the re*
stored Pravda, March 5 in accordance with the decision taken
-
at the March 2 session of the Central Committee. In addition
to Its manifesto to the citizens of all Russia, articles
about the fall of the old order and the revolution in the pro*
vlnces, the Central Organ of the party appealed to its
readers for contributions to the * Iron Fund 91 of the worker
press which would enable the Central Organ to continue pub*
5. Zaslavskll, B. , et a£. , "Pravda* . 1917 . Moscow, 1962, p. 9
(Hereafter cited as Zaslavskll. "Pravda* ). Antropov, Ibid *
t
Berezhnol, et al.. Ibid . . pp. 18*9 t Budnykov, V.P., Bol*-
shevlstskala partilnaja pechat* v 1917 godu . Moscow, 1957,
p. 13 (Hereafter cited as Budnykov, Bol part pechat* ). The
three members of the editorial board were V.M. Molotov,
H.I. Kalinin and K.S. Eremeyev. The economic side of the
paper was entrusted to the old Pravdlst K.M. Shvedchikov.
Budnykov names only Kalinin and Eremeyev as editors, using
the familiar "and others" to fill out the board. The Publi-
cation of his work in 1957 undoubtedly accounts for the
omission of Molotov. Apparently the Central Committee had
to seize its own presses because a special commission of
the Petrograd Soviet failed to allot any printing facil-
ities to the party.
4lication.
Following the restoration of Pravda a number of party
papers quickly arose in the major cities of Russia* In
Moscow the Oblast Buro and Moscow Committee had decided
early in March to publish their own organ* The leading spirit
in this venture was M.S. 01 ,minskil who planned the first
issue before going to Petrograd to assist with the publics*
tion of Pravda.^ The Moscow party paper suffered from the
same lack of pollgraphic base and trained journalists that
obtained in Petrograd , but unlike the Central Committee, the
Moscow organization arranged to have its paper. Sotslal-
demokrat . printed on a local press . with the first issue
appearing March 7 under a provisional editorial board of
three. Like Pravda . Sotsla1*demokrat appealed for worker
6. Pravda * March 5, 1917, p. 1. This had been the means for
supporting Pravda in its checkered career before the war.
and it had been fairly successful. The decision to con*
tinue on this basis was taken at the same time that the
editorial board was named. The problem of financial
support was never adequately solved before October
*
since the party press had no revenue from ads* Berezhnol*
et al* . Ibid . . p. 20, claims there were only 100 rubles
available when the first issue came out*
7. Kuznetsov. I., and Shumakov, A. * Bol ' shevlstskaja pechat'
Moskvy . Moscow* 1968* p. 294 (Hereafter cited as Kuznetsov
and Snumkov, Bol pechat* Moskvy)*
8. jbld » | Budnykov. Bol part pechat' . p. 14. The three edit-
ors were 1*1* Skvortsov-Stepanov. A* I* Usagln and N.M.
Lukin-Stepanov.
5support in its initial issues, and explained the role of the
paperi
"The working press — this is the mighty mouthpiece
through which the proletariat raises its voice*
The working paper — this is the organisation of the
opinion of the working class*
Comrades, hand in hand for the work! Support your
paper* Organize [its] dissemination, organize collective
subscriptions 9 give information, gather [money for] 9 the
fund of the worker press** The worker press can exist
only by the friendly, organized power of the whole class*
"
In addition to these two leading party papers, Bolshe-
vik publications appeared in Kharkov, Kiev, Kronstadt,
Samara, Tiflls and Ufa in the two weeks following the first
issue of Pravda , *° All these publications experienced the
same difficulties in initiating and maintaining themselves*
They had no stocks of newsprint, no presses, ink, type, money
or experienced press workers* The owners of the presses for
the most part refused to print party dailies and the few
reactionary presses that were seized in the early days of the
revolution usually proved insufficient to the needs of the
given party organization* But the greatest stumbling block
9, Sotslal-damokrat . March 7, 1917, in Bol'shevlstskaja
pechat' * Moscow* 1961, vol# IV, p. 134,
10* These publications were Proletarll * GqIos sotsial-demo*
krata, Golos pravdy , Prlvolzhskaja pravda , Kavkazskli rab-
ochll * and Vperyodl * In Kharkov and Kiev the papers arose
following meetings of the local party committees which named
the editorial boards* Karnaukh, J. , Po put! aazetv "Pravda* .
Lvov, 1962, pp. 19*20 (Hereafter cited as Karnaukh, Po putl
* Pravda" )# No material is available on the genesis of the
other papers
«
6on the road of the party press was its continuously precar-
ious financial position • Pravda and Sotslal-damokrat were
not the on&y party publications pleading for the financial
support of the workers. And despite the poverty of the source
to which the party press appealed* monetary assistance was
forthcoming, if not cm a great scale # at least in sufficient
quantity to maintain the given publication. 11 A particular
irritation to the Bolsheviks was the failure of soviet
publications to support the party, since neither financial
appeals nor general support for the party line existed in any
of the many Isvestlias which sprang up throughout Russia
£»*i £a *«*m***m^ 4* mmmml^W I Aft ***** i«r%» »**following the February Revolution.
11. Petriakov, G#B. • Corap. , Stranltgy alavnol istorll . vos-
garni^U* a;WO% tfl2^9tf t Moscow, 1962, p. TJ5
(Hereafter cited as Petriakov, Stranltsv slay 1st ) i Antropov,
Gayeta "Pravda". p. 19 1 Karnaugh, ibid . , p. 23, cites the
following appeal in Golos sots lal-demokrata . March 16,
"Remember that on you depends the fate of our organ, that
it can live and develop only through your support. Only
through your support, through your assistance in every way
can the worker paper become as it must become — the leader
of the workers on their difficult path, a lighthouse, which
Illuminates for the masses tile thorny road for the real-
isation Of their ideal. * Figures on financial support
exist only for Pravda in this period. Berezhnol, et al
.
,
Bol peehatV. p. 20, cites the round figure of 16, OTTO
rubles collected for March which is supported by Sazonov,
"Presledovaniye*, 0 sov oechatl . p. 86. Prayda published
a continuous record or its collections from its second
issue in the section "Iron Fund*.
12. The situation was particularly glaring in Moscow and
Petrograd where the Soviets were controlled by the Men-
shevlks and gave the party absolutely no press support.
Berezhnoi, et al
.
, Bol pechat* . pp. 26-7, says the papers
of the TomsK and Pskov Soviets were edited by Bolsheviks,
but does not assert that they were party papers. Bol-
shevik collaboration in provincial soviet publications
7Pravda as the Central Organ of the party Immediately
assuuned the leadership of the small Bolshevik press network
and quickly developed this position by passing judgement on
those papers that called themselves Socialist. By March 11
,
according to Prayda g only two such papers existed, pravda and
13
Sotslal«»dac*okr*t « While certifying socialist papers , the
Central Organ also stated that all publications, once accept-
ed into the Bolshevik family, were free to reprint articles
from the leading party papers without crediting the source,
and both Pravda and Sotslal-damokrat encouraged the exchange
of experience and information between party papers, undoubt-
edly to improve the dissemination of the party line and to
help overcome journalistic deficiencies and inexperience
14
among party papers*
The assertion of Pyavda^s leadership amsumed a unity of
leadership within the party as to the direction of the paper.
Such unity did not in fact exist* As the old Pravdists re-
turned from exile the temporary editorial board which had
manifested a hard line toward the Provisional Government was
is quite possible, since they were less likely to have
adopted a hard line on the split Within the Social
Democratic Party that so clearly existed at the center*
Control of any of these papers is very unlikely however*
13* Pravda. March 11, 1917, p. 1*
14* Ibid * i Sotslal-demokrat . March 30, 1917, in Bol*
ahevlatskaia pechat 1 * vol* IV, pp# 136*7.
replaced by a new five member board Including Stalin and
Kamenev which had a less critical posture toward the Provl-
15
3tonal Government. The new editorial board was prepared
to support the existing government In so far as It struggled
against reaction and counter-revolution, but It abandoned
the slogan "Down with the war" as unsuitable. 16 Apparently
this quick change In the direction of the paper did not go
unchallenged, since the transformation was discussed at
sessions of the Central Committee March 15 and 17. At the
latter meeting sHe Central Committee reaffirmed an earlier
decision that all actions of the editorial board had to be
unanimous or referred to the Central Committee In cases
where differences among the board arose over particular arti-
cles. The Petrograd Committee then discussed the direction of
15. Browder, and Kerensky, The Rus Prov Gov , vol. Ill, pp.
1205-6 i Trotsky, Leon, The History of the Russian Rev-
olution, vol. I , New YorkT 1932, pp. 237-90 (Herearter
clted as Trotsky, Russian Rev ). Trotsky states that
Stalin, Kamenev and Muranov removed the old (provisional)
editors for being too far to the left. The new editorial
board was composed of Stalin, Kamenev, Muranov, Kalinin
(held over from the old board) and Lenin's sister Maria,
In place of Molotov.
16. Pravda . March 16, 1917, p. 1. Soviet historiography of
the change In editorship of the Central Organ places all
blame for deviation from the hard line on Kamenev and Is
silent on Stalin's role In this shift. The editorials In
#s 8 and 9 are attributed to Kamenev although unsigned
while Stalin's article "On War" (signed) Is not consid-
ered. Furthermore Stalin Is usually credited with strug-
gling against this tendency. Three more recent works
have Indicted Stalin as well. Andronov, Boyevove
oruzhlve parti1. 1962, pp. 299*300 1 Kamaukh. Po outl
»?ravda" . 1963. p. 41| Burdzhalov, E.N. , "O taktlke
/
9the Central Organ, March 16, and supported the paper's general
line. 17
While the Central Committee confirmed the new party line,
local organizations continued to establish new publications
that were duly certified by the Central Organ* But it would
be a mistake to assume that these papers arose in response to
some co-ordinated plan from Petrograd. Rather the opposite
was the case. Their appearance resulted from the particular
circumstances in the individual locality which combined a
handful or more of party adherents » frequently an old Prav-
dist, and the material-technical means for carrying out such
a venture, not from any directive by the Central Committee
or any plan by Pravda . In fact Pravda '
s
leadership for these
publications, except on paper, is extremely problematical,
since the limited number of copies on the one hand, prevented
speedy delivery to the capital for approval, and the chancy
transportation situation on the other, made it unlikely that
the Central Organ would reach local party organizations for
their leadership once the parent paper became aware of the
bol*shevikov v Marte - Aprele 1917 goda M t Voprosy istorll .
1956, #4, April, pp. 45-6.
17. Zaslavskii, " Pravda* , p. 33{ Andronov, Ibid . . p. 301.
Since none of the Soviet Historians have recorded appeals
to the Central Committee about articles, it seems unlikely
that there was any real dissension within the new editor-
ial board over the shift in direction of the Central Organ.
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existence of its offspring.
The fr&aework then of the Bolshevik press at the end of
March and tine beginning of April was not tightly knit. Only
a handful of papers existed, weakly connected, if at all, with
the nominal leadership of the party press, constantly in want of
funds to secure their financial base, but drawing on a part
of the population which could barely provide the needed money.
Further the very center of this press, supposedly providing
leadership and guidance for the local publications, had just
done a volte face after its first six Issues, and given quel*
ified support to the Provisional Government which it had init-
ially attacked.
This position was quickly and sharply changed at the be*
ginning of April* Lenin* s return to Russia from Switzerland
had the same impact in the Bolshevik press that it had within
Che party. The "April Theses'1 provoked heated discussions in
party meetings which inevitably spilled over into the press
after Lenin's cooptatlon into the editorial board of Pravda,
18. The issues of Pravda offer supporting evidence for this
lack of ties by comparing the date of certification in the
Central Organ with the first date of issue. This compar-
ison reveals, not surprisingly, that proximity to the cap-
ital resulted in rapid certification while the more re-
mote publications took longer* Thus Sotslal-demokrat wait-
ed three days and Golos pravdy only two for certification,
while Proletarll of Kharkov required seven days. Pravda .
March 12, o. It 16, p. It 17, p. 1. Another instance
of this failure of communication is shown by comparing
Che lists of approved party papers printed in Pravda
and Sotslal-demokrat * March 30* The Moscow paper
approved aix publications (Pravda . Sotslal-demokrat, Golog,
pravdy, Proletarll. Sota^ai:3emqkrat, of Saratov and j?££v-
li
April 5, and the publication of the theses in the Central
19Organ April 7* The Immediate response to the theses was
"Our Differences* by Kamenev April 8, after which the Cen-
tral Organ returned to the path which Molotov and the pro-
visional editorial board had charted in the first six issues*
The publication of the "April Theses" in the Central Organ
was followed by a series of reprints in the localities in
line with the instructions issued in March by Pravda for the
reproduction of articles. But the absence of a greater
number of references to reprints of the theses indicates that
the whole family of Bolshevik papers was not ready to make as
rapid a change as Pravda had or did not support the new line
21
of the Central Organ* In Moscow apparently the theses
olzhskala pravda ) while title Central Organ certified eight
papers (Sotslal-deraokrat* Golos praydy. Iushnll rabochii .
Llstok peterburRskogQ komlteta evrelskol RSDRP , Nashe
zhltta . Zabakallskll rabochii ) » Pravda and Sot sla
I
-
demokrat . March 30. 1917. p. 1
.
19. Andronov, Boyevove orushiye partll . p. 310| Pravda.
April 7, 1917
, p. 1.
20 * Pravda . April 8, 1917, p* 1. According to Zasiavskii,
"Pravda* . p* 41, Lenin reacted to Pravda 's conciliatory
line immediately upon arrival at the Finland Station
when he asked Karaenev "what are you writing in Pravda ?
We have seen several lssuse and healthily upbraid you.*
From the Memoirs of F* Raskolnlkov in Proletarskala
rovollutsila . #1, 1923, pp. 221-2.
21. Another possibility, of course, exists. This is that
they didn't find out about the theses or receive them
until so long after their publication in Pravda that
their reprinting was no longer reasonable. The number
of reprints is impossible to estimate without being able
to see the various party papers. Andronov, Boyevoye
12
were published only after some opposition within the Moscow
organization was overcome, and the failure of Qelea sotslal-
domokrata to reprint the "April Theses" suggests even stronger
opposition in Kiev to the abrupt change in the party line
22
which could not be overcome at the time.
Whatever the nature of the response in the party press
to the lead set by Pravda in printing the theses, the new
line had been established and the leadership of the Central
23Organ rested in the hands of Lenin. Whether the local
party branches followed Pravda 'a line or not, a new tone
had been set at the center and the party now turned to the
mere prosaic tasks of expanding its press base.
oruzhiye parti
i
. p. 310, lists the following six papers
as reprinting the theses i Sotslal-demokrat . Proletarll .
rabochU, JfrvkofskU rabocfrU* VperyodJ and
.
rabochll i Berezhnol. et al .. Bol pechat' . p. 57
sts the same group with the exception of Baklnskil
rabochll . Both have the ambiguous "and others" after
their lists. Karnaukh, Po. putl "Pravda" . p. 43, cites
and Zvegda as reprinting the theses April 13
25. The total number of party papers at the end of April
was about twenty. Taking all the cited papers gives a list
of eight, meaning that less than half the party net pub-
lished one of the most important documents of the revolu-
tion despite the impact that it made in Prayda .
22. Budnykov, Bol part pechat 1 . p. 42, cites the opposition
of Rykov and HogIn in Moscow, and that of Piatakov and
Bosh in Kiev.
23. There is no evidence of the excommunication of any papers
certified by Pravda for failure to reprint the theses or
for any other deviations once they had been certified.
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The particular task facing the Central Committee and its
publication, Pravda , was the purchase of a new press* On
April 13 9 the Central Organ appealed to its readers and
supporters to gather 75,000 rubles for new presses, since
those of Sel'skll vestnlk were inadequate for the expanded
24format and circulation planned for Pravda* The original
request asked for the collection in five days, and though the
request was endorsed by the Petrograd General City Confer-
ence of Bolsheviks April 14, the deadline was not met. At
about the same time Sotslal-demokrat made a similar appeal to
its readers t basing its request on the need to expand format
in order to print more worker letters and the many articles
15
on questions of the day* The provincial press took up
the call for financial assistance and recorded their collec-
tions in the sections "Iron Fund of the Worker Press 9 •
However the success of the campaign was not achieved iramed-
Whether tills indicates that the other party papers came
into line or that the center was net sufficiently in*
formed about their content Is impossible to determine
.
but the former is more likely*
24 • Pravda * April 13* 1917, p< 1* Two other reasons were
given i the need to fight the slanders of the bourgeois
press and the desire to publish a small popular paper
called Rabochil i soldat . The success of the appeal is
indicated by the failure of such a publication to appear
25 • gftalal-demekrat, April 7, 1917 in Bol'shevlstskala
pechat* . vol. IV . p. 140.
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lately but over an extended period of time* since Pravda was
unable to purchase and equip its new presses until June. 26
Contemporaneously with the efforts to expand the phys~
leal plant and circulation of the party dailies, proceeded
the construction of a press apparatus worthy of the name,
including preparation for expedition, dissemination and
subscription* One of the most important steps taken inBBSygg " < me I KJPOT MHil Wl SH i sii|men jun«g
these areas was the creation of a Press Buro by the Central
Consulttee, fulfilling * need for such an institution that had
27been expressed at the 7th "April* Conference of the Party.
The Frees Buro, run by Molotov, had a twofold responsibility!
26* The establishment of the new printing office, Irud * is
festooned with such a variety Of data that only the fact
of its existence is sure. Budnykov, Bol part pechat' *
pp# 69-70, states that 75,334 rubles were gathered in
the first week of the appeal, but for some reason the
party waited until June When 140,000 rubles had been
gathered and another 130,000 was taken from the "Iron
Fund% to equip Trud. Saxonov, *Presledovanlye" , 0
soy pechatl * p* 95, supports Budnykov on the latter two
figures, but does not mention the success of the first
week. Bereshnol, £t al. , Bol oechat' * p* 72 , reports the
success of the original campaign by press day (May 12),
but Indicates that the owner of the press raised his
price, and a more expensive press had to be purchased*
This account is supported by Andronov, Boyeyove oru&hjye
oartll * pp# 291-3, but neither he nor Berezhnol mention
the final price paid for Trud » Most likely the original
deadline was not met and the price of the press did go
up* This would explain the much higher figures cited by
Budnykov and Sazonov to purchase the press in June*
27* One© again the precise date for an event Is obscure*
Berezhnol , et al., Ibid * * p* 75, puts the establishment
of the Buro after the 7th Conference! Antropov in Gas-
eta *Pravda% p* 23 t places It, in passing, with the
material on the party press in March and April i Port*
iankin, I*A* t Sovetskala voyennala pechat' * istorlcheskll
15
leadership and guidance* On the one hand It distributed
articles and Information on questions of the day to party
papers in the capital and provinces , while on the other , the
Buro was meant to strengthen the leadership of Bolshevik
organisations by providing them with theoretical materials.
To do this the Buro published Its own periodical , Blulleten*
bluro pachatt , the first Issue of which appeared June 15.
For the many party organizations which had no publication, the
Blulleten* was used as a substitute and supplement to the few
party papers that might have reached their area.
The Press Buro might provide guidance and leadership
for local periodicals If they received Its instructions and
information, but the heart of the party press problem lay
in the area of dissemination. Equally Important and In-
timately linked with the question of dissemination were the
expedition of and subscription to party papers. All three of
ocherk. Moscow, 1960, p. 8 (Hereafter cited as Portiankln,
Sov vovep oechat' ). dates Its creation in April.
28. W'frfviStfkala I»r\fftln|la pgffigdlcheaka^a pechat', gart*
Nolabr' 1917 . Moscow. 1951, p. 13 (Hereafter cited as
Bol part pechat 9 )i Rub period pechat* . p. 235| Berezhnol,
Ibid . , pp. 75-6 1 Antropov, Gaaeta "Prayda", p. 23.
Destined to appear three times per week, the Blulleten'
published four issues (June 15, 19, 26 and July 1) and
then stopped. There is no indication of the reason for
the cessation, but the destruction of Trud in the aftermath
of the July Days probably made It impossible to continue
printing the Blulleten 1 . Nor is there a direct link be-
tween this Press Buro and the future press agencies of the
Soviet Govemmenti ROSTA, Press Section Central Committee
or Presf Buro of VTslK, since this buro was dissolved In
August.
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these functions represented individual facets of the seme task*
getting the party publication from the press to the reader
,
and the party tackled them at the same time*
Part of the responsibility for these services rested at
the center and part at the local level. As the press appar-
atus was created after the February Revolution, a section of
the physical plant of a paper was set aside for an expedition
office, responsible for preparing the individual paper for
distribution (dissemination) throughout Russia. Dissemina-
tion involved the delivery of the paper to individual or
collective subscribers, secured by the local organization
throughout the area of its jurisdiction. Thus subscription
and expedition were matters over which the party had direct
control while dissemination by post or mail was the respon-
sibility of the Provisional Government. If all three parts
worked as intended, papers would have flowed smoothly from
presses to readers. But it had become apparent even in
March that none of these services was functioning well. The
Central Organ of the party lost over half its circulation
in Petrograd and this was unsatisfactory. In May to rectify
the situation Pravda appealed to all party committees to
create raion sections for the Central Organ without which
29dissemination would suffer. While the response to this
appeal was not overwhelming, special measures were taken in
29. Pravda
. May 25 f 1917, p. 1.
17
Moscow* the Ukraine and the Donbass to facilitate the sale
30
of the party press*
At the same time Pravda inquired why there were not
80,000 subscriptions to party papers when, according to the
All-Russian Conference of the party, all members had the obli-
gation and responsibility to subscribe to a party publication*
The Central Organ had stated this duty even more specifically
earlier in the month in another notice to the party i "Every
party organization must organise the extensive dissemination
of the Central Organ — Pravda , Every member of the party
est be a subscriber to Pravda , Every member of the party
must organize collective subscriptions to Pravda ," 32 The
Central Committee also helped in its own way by sending
experienced Pravdists from the capital to aid struggling local
33
Bolshevik papers.
30, Budnykov, Bol part pechat 1 . pp. 89-90 » In Kharkov and Lu-
gansk all party members were ordered to distribute the
party press, Karnaukh, £o. putl "Pravda" . pp. 29-30.
31. Pravda . May 19, 1917, p. 1*
32 » Pravda . May 2, 1917, p, 1, On the same day Soldatskala
pravda . the organ of the Military Organization of the
Central Committee, had appealed to its readers to organize
cooperative societies for the distribution of the paper.
floldatakaia pravda . May 2, 1917, in Bol * shevlstskala
pechat' . vol. IV, p. 174.
33, Astrakhan, Kh,M. , and Sazonov, I.S., "Sozdaniye massovol
bol' shevlstskoi pechati v 1917 godu" , Voprosv istorii . #1,
1957, p. 91 (Hereafter cited as Astrakhan and Sazonov,
"Sozdaniye massovol pechat
i
M
) , write that the Pravdist
V,A. Tikhomirov was sent to Kazan and helped organize
Rabochll in that city, while la. srman was dispatched
by direct order of the Central Committee to Tsaritsyn
18
The effect of all this activity is difficult to determine.
It is clear that the number of Bolshevik papers grew larger
following Lenin's return and the circulation of the party
press increased, since there is no record of any periodical
suspending publication until the July days* But the question
of dissemination makes recourse to statistics an unreal ex*
erclse* since the means of dissemination lay in hostile hands.
The Provisional Government controlled the postal-telegraph
agencies and the Menshevlks controlled the railroad unions*
Neither was well disposed toward dissemination of the party
press* In one case 4,000 copies of Prayda , destined for
general dissemination in the Caucasus were confiscated by
34
the Tiflis Menshevlks* But a more likely cause for the poor
dissemination of the party press was the breakdown of trans-*
portatlon and communication within Russia due to the dis-
locations of war and the chaos of revolution* Whatever the
reason » the Bolshevik papers were not regularly distributed
although some areas fared well* while others were simply
overwhelmed by a sea of larger papers published by Menshevlks •
Socialist Revolutionaries, Kadets or other groups*
where he helped with Bor'ba . The editors of Toyarishch
acknowledged the assistance of the Central Committee in
creating their paper in the second issue*
34* Sazonov. "Presledovaniye" , 0 sov oechati * p. 92*
35# Sed^maia (aprel' skala) vserossllskala konferentslla
RSDRF (bol'shevtk) . protokolv * Moscow* 1958. passim*
Examples of the problem of attempting to obtainan accu-
rate picture of dissemination is found in Soviet ac-
Attempts to disseminate the party press within the army
net with similar mixed results* In the Ukraine the twofHI |IPt' *«*v me*r m^eaiAziaa* waiiw mx j«.> 9 juu
papers designated for regiments of the Southwest Front
passed quickly out of existence in June* On the other hand
Qkopnala pravda . which began publication at the end of April
on funds gathered by soldiers of the Novoladozhsk Regiment*
wes extensively disseminated by regimental committees and at
paper kiosks* while the commander of the Rumanian Front
noted the Influence of both Pravda and Qkopnala pravda in
the 675th Infantry Regiment* Generally the party press
was officially banned at the front and ordered confiscated
and burned where it did appear * or simply did not reach the
37front for unknown reasons* The impact of all the party
counts of the press* Karnaukh. Po put! "Pravda* * p. 23,
claims 200 copies of Pravda reached Lugansk regularly
while Berezhnol, al» . Bol oechat' * p* 66 , reports that
the Lugansk delegation to the 7th Party conference stated
that no copies of the Central Organ reached its area.
36* Karnaukh, Ibid * * pp. 22-3| Grazkin. G.D#» " Qkopnala pravda*.
Moscow. I9587~pp. 89*90.
37. Grazkin* Ibid . * p. 90| Sazonov. «Presledovanlye" » 0 gov
eechatl . p. 92 t Budnykov. Bol part pechat* , p. 108. cites
materials from the archives which report that the sol-
diers of the XIth Army drew their ideological leadership
from Pravda and Soldatskala pravda* He also states that
the Coninander-ln-Chief of the Northern Front had prohi-
bited tide sale and dissemination of Bolshevik papers,
p* 105. Pravda . April 29. p. 2, recorded the absence of
any proletarian papers at the front in the Minsk area,
while according to Berezhnol. et a^. . Bol pechat* * p* 66.
some of the delegates to the 7th Conference reported the
irregular and innaccurate delivery of the Central Organ at
various fronts. The party military press at this time
consisted of Qkopnala pravda . Soldatskala pravda . Volna
and Golos Oravdy. Soldatskala pravda was designated as
20
publications on the Russian scene, thus, was probably not
very great and when their circulation, estimated at 300,000
for April and May, is considered, such a small impact is not
38
surprising.
Within this context of a slowly expanding Bolshevik press
net there remains the curious incident of the attempt of the
Petrograd Committee to organize its own paper rather than
participate in the Central Organ of the party. This question
was raised by Molotov and Tomsky within the Petrograd
Executive Commission and then discussed at an extraordinary
session of the Petrograd Committee on May 30. Lenin opposed
the idea of a separate publication because it would waste
party press resources and divide the party's strength. He
stressed the continuity of the interests of the Central Com-
mittee and the Petrograd Committee, but tabled two resolutions.
Adoption of the first would have permitted the publication of
a separate paper for the Petrograd Committee, while the second
tine Central Organ of the military organizations of the
RSDRP(b) by the Conference of Front and Rear Organizations
at the end of June. Vaeaoiusnala komaunlstlcheskaia
(bol'shevlk ) v rezollutsllakh 1 reshenllakh
t konfagentsil 1 plenumev TaK . part X , Moscow,
. 248.
38, This figure is obtained by totaling the circulation of the
various party papers in Rus period pechat* . but it is in-
exact since many party publications were not dailies.
Perhaps a more meaningful figure would be 200,000 copies
for Pravda. Sotslal-demokrat and Soldatskala prayda, as
these were the main party dailies. This means Chat the
average provincial publication had a circulation of about
5,000 copies.
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would have alioted snore space within the Central Organ for
convince the Petrograd Committee of the error of its ways
and had to appeal over its head to the district organizations,
asking them to discuss the question of the second paper, and
repeating the arguments he had used before the Petrograd Com*
mittee* The proponents of the second paper also appealed to
the local organisations, but at this level Lenin succeeded in
obtaining a majority decision in favor of the second res©*
iutlon, and no local party paper appeared in the capital. 40
The expansion of the party met was desirable apparently only
so long as it did not detract from the power of the Central
Organ*
As the final step in the guidance of its net the Central
Committee and the Central Organ held consultations with local
party members when they were in the capital and began a press
section in Pravda which analysed the contents of the various
party publications, noting their strengths and weaknesses and
attacked the press of other parties and groups, revealing
39. Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich, Sochinenlla . 3rd Ed., vol. 20,
pp. 447»9 (Hereafter cited as Lenin, Soch ) t Andronov, Boy-
evove oruzhive partil . p. 323.
40, Lenin, Ibid . . pp. 455-7 i Andronov, Ibid . . pp. 52-3 and 327
i
Budnykov, Bol part pechat' . p. 53. The arguments used in
this discussion antedate arguments that will recur after
the seizure of power as Molotov based his position on the
need to satisfy a layer of readers between the lowest who
read Soldatskala pravda and the leading ranks of the work-
local affairs* 39 In this case the party leader was unable to
22
their true aims and counter-revolutionary tendencies*
July•October
By summer the tone of the Bolshevik press had become
Increasingly strident. Accusing the Provisional Government
of being merely a continuation of Capitalism and calling for
the unity of the working class around the slogan " Bread , Peace
and Land", the party press led by Pravda continuously attacked
the government. All party papers propagandised for the dem-
onstratlon June 18 which brought thousands into the streets*
And the crowds that began to gather in the capital July 2
were encouraged by the party press* which called for all power
to the Soviets. These demonstrations which the party was
unable to control and which severely pressed the Provisional
Government
,
inevitably led to reaction by the government and
brought down on the party press, which had been instrumental
in inciting the masses* full scale repression* arrests and
closings.
First to feel the weight of reaction to the July Days
was Pravda . whose offices were destroyed by a mob after they
had been closed by the government. This occurred just after
41. Grazkln, the editor of Okopnala pravda . relates a trip
to Petrograd for consultation with party leaders in June
during which Sverdlov criticised his paper for being nar-
rowly provincial and filled with exclusively local materi-
als, unrelated to the general tasks of the party. Grazkln,
G.D., " Okopnala pravda". Moscow, 1958, p. 85.
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Lenin had Left the editorial offices early in the morning of
July 5* All the collaborators and press workers found in the
offices nere arrested, the copies of the paper then ready for
expedition were thrown into the Molka, and the editorial doc*
uments and papers, seized or destroyed. Despite the destruc-
tion, on title next day Llstok pravda was able to appear in
Pravda'
s
place, since the presses of Trad had not been
affected by the previous night's activity* This edition
was the first and last for the substitute Central Organ as
„ 42
Trud was rased July 6.
In the days following the closing of Pravda and during
the course of August the Provisional Government closed many
43
other party papers, forbade the distribution of all party
periodicals at the front, and on July 12 gave the Ministries
of the Interior and War the right to close publications,
advocating military disobedience or appealing to violence and
42. Naaarov, A.I., Oktlabr' 1 knisa . 1917-1923, Moscow, 1968,
p. 33 (Hereafter cited as Okt 1 knlfta )t Budnykov, Bol part
oechat' t pp. 13l-3i Zaslavskil, " Pravda" . p. 124|
Sassonov, " Presledovanlye"
, 2 gov oechatl . p. 100|
Berezhnoi, e£ a£. , Bol pechat' . pp. 123ff. | Rabochll i
soldat . July 267 191/7 Estimations on the damage run
from 100,000 to 150,000 rubles. The standard Soviet
version of the closing states that Pravda was destroyed
by Junker8 and Cossacks under the direct orders of
General Polovtsev, Commander of the Petrograd Military
Okrug. They then tell how the presses at Trud were razed
and I.A. Voinov killed distributing Llstok flravda .
43. Fourteen different party papers were closed in this period.
The Central Organ alone was stopped on four different
occasions, ftus period pechat' . pp» 231ff.f Bol part
pechat' . passim.
$ oro<P»ee*fli*e tfoe vwrttwi tAd AO&HSi^vflEf^
Appar* few
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t ii44irmi
civil war, and hold their editors responsible* The only
major party paper that escaped the reaction was Sotslal-
Aanokrat (Moscow), but this was not the fault of the Commls-
ear of the 2nd Army who telegraphed Kerensky July 20, appeal*
Ing for the closing of the Moscow paper *.** which Is In no
way Inferior to the paper Pravda . Is disseminated In an
Importantly greater number than before, fully replacing
45 :
Pravda***3
The suppression of these papers was no small matter to
the party* Particularly difficult to surmount was the loss of
both Central Organs with their circulation of about 150,000
copies dally* Equally Important was the destruction of Trud *
since the financial means to replace the presses was not
available, and the owners of other presses were even more re*
luctant to publish party papers In the aftermath of the July
Days. In addition to the physical destruction end the official
closing of various papers, the reaction to the July Days
manifested Itself In another Important wayi decline In the
number of contributions, which affected all party publics-
44. Browder and Kerensky, Rus Prov Gov * vol* III, p* 1436|
Astrakhan and Sazonov, ••Soadanlye massovol pechatl",
p. 133| Andronov, Boyevoye oruzhlve oartll * p. 375.
The decree closing; Pravda was not published until July
15* Browder and Kerensky, Ibid . * vol* II, p. 979.
According to Berezhnol, et a£. , Boi pechat* * p. 126,
the Provisional Government also forbade the sending of
party papers by mall*
45* Kuznetsov and Shuxnakov* Bol oechat* Moskyy * p* 334,
Berezhnol, & a£. , Ibid . * p* 128. says Sotslal*»demokrat
was not Closed oeeause the workers and soldiers would
not allow It* Apparently this was one of the few ln»
J
;
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tions* The destruction of the leading party papers was
felt much more at this time by the local organizations than
it would have been in March when they were so poorly connected
with the localities and did not provide leadership and guid-
ance
Because of the importance of the Central Organ to the
local organisations and the working masses , the Central
Committee immediately tried to restore Pravda and reestab-
lish the other papers which had been closed. In the meantime
Sotslal-demokrat served as the dfi facto Central Organ of the
party* a situation that only hastened efforts to revive a
real Central Organ # since the Moscow paper was far removed
from the seat of power and could never adequately give timely
information on events in the capital* The attempts by the
Central Committee evolved along the same lines that had been
taken in March and encountered the same difficulties t lack
of funds 9 presses and material-technical support. Nor were
there any reactionary presses available for seizure* and the
stances when the local soviet supported a party paper
since the Moscow Soviet at its July 15 session protested
the closing of Sotalal-demokrat . Shestoi s^ezd RSDRP
(bol f shevlk) * protokolv . Moscow* 195S. p* 58 and footnote
p. 410 (Hereafter cited as Shestol s"ezd )
46* SotBial-demokrat i #s 111 and 113, July 19 and 21 In Bol '
shevlstskala pechat* . vol* IV t pp. 154-6 1 Karnaukh, go
put! "Pravda" . p» 29*
aenitt-SMi- JtC-.mrsisa Teeffir*M* .era! I f tm__ttm_MiTty* a* the
47. Astrakhan and Sazonov, "Sozanniye Massovoi Pechati".
p* 92$ cite letters of the local organizations which state
that the loss of Pravda made their situation difficult*
Beresshnol* et al* * Bol pechat' * p. 129 cites similar
materials*
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response to appeals for funds was not immediate. After a pro*
tracted search for a new press proved fruitless * the Central
Committee decided to restore the presses at Trud although this
would be a costly and time consuming process. Following the
decision * but before the renovation was completed In mid*
August* the leader of the Military Organization* Podvoiskll,
was able to purchase a press on which the new Central Organ
of the party* Rabochll JL soldat # appeared July 23.
Many of the other closed papers had an easier time re*
opening. Golos pravdy * the organ of the Kronstadt Committee*
closed July 13* came out the next day as Proletarskoye delo .
while Okopnaja pravda * reappeared two days after Its closing*
July 23* as Okopnyl nabat . On the other hand Soldatskala prav-
da did not resume independent publication until August 13*
49
when It appeared as Soldat . The papers that reopened
quickly were those whose presses were not destroyed* and by
48t Okt 1 knlfta * p. 33| Zaslavskil* » Pravda " . p. 130| Ber*
eshnol* et al. * Ibid . . p. 130i Sazonov* "Presledovanlye"
*
£ gov pechatl . p. 104f Astrakhan and Sazonov* Ibid . . p. 96.
Rabochll 1 soldat was confirmed as the Central Organ of the
party at a plenem of the Central Committee August 4 and
an editorial board of five* Including Stalin* Sokolnlkov*
Mlliutln and representatives of the Petrograd Committee
and the Military Organisation* was selected. Protokoly
tsentral'notto komiteta RSDRP(b) . Avgust l211l£^ElLl2l^»
Moscow* 1955, p. 4 (Hereafter cited as Protokoly TsK).
49, Rua period pochat* . pp. 239* 259*60* 268| Soldatskala prav*
da was merged with the reopened Central Organ due to the
paucity of press resources available to the party at the
end of July* but with Trud restored in August* it re*
sumed its own path.
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the and of July most of the closed publications had been re-
cfHttlf*1*** —It—HM - Ifc** .«*» totrtl or%e* *tght In
This restoration coincided with the Sixth Congress of the
Party, July 26 - August 3, at which not only the press In
general, but the Central Organ specifically were discussed,
and the extent of the party press net In the provinces clearly
delineated* The question of the party papers was first
raised by Sverdlov In the Organizational Report at the third
session of the Congress, July 27. In his report Sverdlov
stated definitely the role of the Central Organ
i
"The Central Committee through Pravda realizes the
Ideological leadership of all the party. In Pravda
comrades find the answers to all theoretical ques-
tions. "50
It was not necessary for members of the Central Committee to
visit each local organization and report on Individual ques-
tions since their views were published In Pravda . From the
articles In the Central Organ all party organizations would
obtain material to respond to the events taking place In
Russia, The two week hiatus In the appearance of the Central
Organ was passed over In silence, but Its Incidence of dell-
very In the provinces was one of the questions posed In a
pre-congress questionnaire sent to local party organizations*
The answers of the sixty nine responding groups show that only
50. Shestol s"ezd
. p, 37.
2o
twelve received any party publication from another city or
organisation, suggesting that the Central Organ might in
theory be the source of all information and attitudes on the
Issues of the day, but very few party members were able to
make use of this source. 5i
The report of the Moscow Organization at the fifth
8ession» July 2&, set the tone for the condition of the
party press in the local!ties
•
11We publish a daily paper SotclaL-danekrat . which is
printed in 50 , 000 copies* But the size or the publication
is too small, and therefore It is impossible to make
It exhaustive not only in the sense of all-Russian
Information, but even for purely local. To expand the
size of the paper we need our own press. Up to this time
we have been printing at a private press » seized at the
beginning of the revolution, from which they have tried
to expel us every day. Several days ago a compulsory
collection was [madeJ for the party press, and we hope
that we will be successful In realizing the purchase
of our own press. 11 52
Other party organizations reported the weakness of their
papers or that their publications had been closed in the days
53following the July demonstration. But the most revealing
fact about the extent of the Bolshevik press net was that
only one third of the reporting party group s had their own
3i» Ibid * . pp. 317-90, passim. The evidence here is not con*
elusive since only one party conraittee stated that it did
not receive any party publications while the rest simply
did not answer the particular questions.
52. Ibid . . p. 57.
53. Ibid . . pp. 50-1, 72, 76, 78.
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» 14-35
publications
i
By the end of the Sixth Congress the Central Committee
had a more accurate picture of its press net, a picture of
very limited dimensions which revealed that most organisations
were weakly connected with the center and their publications
existed generally on local efforts. Outside the capital and
Moscow there were few party papers and fewer still benefited
from the guidance of the Central Organ or had the material-
technical means necessary to publish a paper capable of making
an impression even en the local scene. The absence of finan-
cial backing is continually mentioned as the reason for the
failure to expand format and circulation, and the reaction to
the July Days lay behind this unwillingness to support the
party press* By the end of July, although the worst of the
situation had been overcome with the reopening of the
majority of closed periodicals , the former circulation of
the party press had not been restored, nor had an influence
commensurate with the expectations of the party 1 s leaders
54. Ibid
. , pp. 317-90, passim. Question thirteen asked
whether the local group had its own publication. The
positive reply of only twenty three organisations does
not indicate only twenty three papers since seme groups
had more than one, so the exact number of party papers is
in doubt. The Congress Press Report names thirty seven
papers, but Budnykov, Bol part pechat' . p. 138, and
Zaslavskil, "Pravda*, p. 142, say this figure does not
include some local publications. Only seventeen party
groups could report the predominance of the party press
in their areas.
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been attained*
The period following the sixth party congress saw a
steady accretion of strength to the party press, despite
further closings of the Central Organ by the Provisional
Government • as new publications arose in hitherto unrepre-
sented areas* No sooner was the party congress over than the
government on August 10 suppressed Rabochil 1 soldat * This
time only three days elapsed before the Central Organ re-
appeared and on that same day, August 13, a new Central Organ
for the party 9 6 military organizations began to publish In
56
the form of Soldat * The reestablishment of the leading
papers for both workers and soldiers sparked a steady stream
of correspondence from local party organizations to the Cen-
tral Committee which revealed an Increased demand for the
Central Organ and other leading party papers and a more con*
si stent penetration of the party press to the provinces.
The party also continued its campaign for the support of
57
Bolshevik papers and their dissemination In the localities*
55. Astrakhan and Sazonov. "Sozdaniye Massovoi Pechati", p* 96,
states that the circulation of the Central Organ fell to
50.000 at the end of July* The press report of the sixth
congress cites a figure of 85.000. Shestol s»ezd « p* 150*
56. Protokoly TsK . pp. 20-4f Bol part pechat* * pp. 8-14.
The new Central Organ was called Proletarll . Strictly
speaking Rabochil I soldat had been the Central Organ
of the military organizations . but it had been made the
Interim Central Organ of the party as well.
57. Pereplska sekretarlata TsK RSDRP(b) s mestnyml partiinvml
orftanizatsllami * vol. I, Moscow. 1952. passim (Hereafter
cited as Pereplska TsK )* Some messages indicate that
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The restoration of Trud , which added a major printing plant
to the presses secured by the military organization in
July* materially aided the campaign for increased dissemination.
Then on the 20th of August the Central Committee discussed
the question of the Central Organ with the idea of Improving
its content* The decision was taken to expand the editorial
college and divide the paper into twelve sections covering
58
areas of importance to the party* This reorganization mark-
ed the first attempt to delineate the content of the party
press except in the most general terms. Previously party
publications had had no fixed format and varied from issue to
issue depending on the needs of the day* Now the Central
Organ of the party was given definite sections which should
59have permanent places in the format of every issue* The
change in the editorial board of the Central Organ was
the requested periodicals did not arrive, but quantitative*
ly they are declining* A typical example of the appeals
used in the dissemination campaign, quoted from Donets
proletarll * August 28, is in Karnaukh, Po putl " Pravda" *
p. 33* The real push in this area would come at the
beginning of September when the Kornilovshchina offered
more fertile ground for expanding the circulation of the
party press*
58* Protokoly TsK, vol. I, p* 26. The sections and their
editors werei Trade unions • Glebov, Production - Vlad-
imirov, Literature * Lunacharskii, Municipal * Uritskii,
Political Reports • Manuilskii, Current Events - Kharakan,
Party Life • Sverdlov, Around Russia * Joffe, Soldier
Life * Menzhlnskll or Nevskil, Press Section - Nevskll,
Plant Factory • Skrypnik, Foreign Life • Uritskii.
59. The format created by the Central Committee August 20
has changed little since that day. During NEP certain
revisions were attempted to attract readers, but these
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reflected In the provinces where similar changes occurred.
At the same time the Central Committee took steps to protect
Its publication from the harrassment of the Provisional
Government by moving Its presses to the Vyborg worker district
where they would be more Immune to physical attack. The
financial condition of the paper was then entrusted to
Sverdlov with the aim of ending the chronic monetary crisis. 61
The Ink was barely dry on the reorganization of the
Central Organ when the Central Committee Initiated an In*
tensive campaign for dissemination of and subscription to
Its paper and the party press In general* The first step
In this campaign was a directive by the Central Committee pub-
llshed In Proletarll August 24.
* Comrades!
The party Is concerned that the dissemination of
Its Central Organ should be established on a suitable
level* [It IsJ the duty of local organizations to take
were ephemeral* In the days following the seizure of
power all the party press conformed to this model If It
had not already done so, while the governmental press
took Its lead from Izvestlla .
60* At least In Moscow at Sotslal-demokrat this expansion
was done to protect the paper from the government and per-
haps even to swamp antl-Lenlnlsts on the board. In this
case the Moscow Committee set up a narrow and wide board
at the end of August with the former running the paper.
Kuznetsov and Shumakov, Mob bol pechat' . pp. 362-3.
61. Berezhnol, £t a^. , Bol pechat' . p. 175| Mutovkln, N.
»
" Soldatskala pravda " v oktlabr'skol revollutsll . p. 22
(Hereafter cited as Mutovkln. " Soldatskala pravda " )t Sazon-
ov f "Presledovanlye" , 0 soy pechatl . p. 104. These pre-
cautions were well taken since the Provisional Government
closed Rabochll . the latest Central Organ, September 2*
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upon themselves the organization of the extensive
dissemination of the CO*
The CC orders all organizations of the party to
oblige all their members to become continual subscribers
to the CO.
The CC appeals to all members of the party to assist
in the most extensive dissemination of the party paper
through the organization of collective subscriptions
in factories
,
plants, workshops , barracks etc.
Let not one member of the party remain away from
active work on behalf of the CO" 62
Not content with a simple appeal in the Central Organ, the
Central Committee then dispatched a circular letter September 1
to local organizations 9 defining the proper apparatus for
dissemination and explaining the necessity for such a campaign.
••We have already appealed in our Central Organ to all
organizations of the party to place dissemination of the
CO on a suitable level. It is possible to do this by
separating from the composition of the local organization
some group which is charged with all relations with us
on matters of the Central Organ.
We have been forced by the separate closings of our
paper, which make it impossible to establish correctly
the dispatch of papers, to propose to you the organ-
ization mentioned above. ...
The group which you designate should take upon itself
reception of individual and collective subscriptions. •• •
The realization of our plan for the organization of
dissemination of the Central Organ is considered uncon-
ditionally necessary, since this Is the sole means at
the present time for the extensive dissemination of our
directives and the ideological leadership of the move-
ment and therefore, dear comrads, we ask you to take all
but the presses remained unscathed and the new Central
Organ i Rabochil put 1 , appeared the next day,
\J HIHf 57* m^Hfltflflrfr to the aacoM?
62. Proletary., August 24, 1917 p. 1. Zaslavskii, " Pravda ",
p. 156, claims that this appeal was sent as a letter to
all party organizations, but the Central Committee cor-
respondence does not contain a copy.
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measures for Its speedy fulfillment*
Two other communications from the Central Committee expressed
the center 9 8 concern over the lack of exposure for the rest
of the party press throughout Russia and requested detailed
accounts of the status, periodicity and financial condition
64
of local party publications.
The response to these appeals and Instructions was an In*
creased demand for not only the current Issues of the Central
Organ of the party, but also for complete sets. At the same
time special dissemination groups were set up attached to the
local party committee which In turn distributed more and more
copies of the party press.
^
But probably the greatest boon to the expansion and dis-
semination of the party press at the beginning of September
was the Kornllovshchtna which provided an air of respectability
for Bolshevik papers through their posture as defenders of the
revolution from military reaction* From a position attacking
the government at the end of June to that of protecting the
63. Pereolska TsK . vol. 1, pp. 33-4. According to the
Journal of Central Committee documents, 415 copies of this
letter were sent to local organizations September 3 and
another 100, September 4.
64. Ibid . . pp. 37 and 57. Only five replies to the second
communication are available, from Moscow, Rostov-on-
Don, Samara, Helslngfors and Ivanove-Voznesensk. With
the exception of Moscow, all reported deficits for their
papers. Ibid . . pp. 258, 263, 268, 294, 354.
65. Ibid . . passlm i Astrakhan and Sasonov, "Sozdaniye massovol
pechatl", p. 96| Zaslavskll, "Pravda", p. 178.
QH EBM —* Ebe t*i>-
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revolution could only redound to the credit of the party
press* and the growth of its circulation oust be partially
66
explained by this turn of events. In terms of the number
of party publications . the Kornilovshchina aided the Bolshe-
viks in obtaining majorities in various Soviets and with them
control of their papers which soon reflected the party line. 6^
The measures of the Central Committee and the course
of events combined to give the party a much stronger press
net than it had had at any time. Their impetus would con-
tinue until the seizure of power in October and insured the
recovery of all the ground lost during the reaction that
followed the July days* The Central Organ of the party had
increased its circulation and, with its presses safe in the work,
er district of Vyborg, was secure from physical destruction.
In the provinces the party press net was expanding steadily
66. It is impossible to determine whether the press campaign
or the Kornilovshchina was responsible for the growth
of the party press* Most likely the new air of respecta-
bility made the press campaign more effective than It
otherwise would have been*
67. The majority of the soviet papers that fell to the Bol-
sheviks did so in September or later. The two most im-
portant were Izvestl^as in Moscow and Minsk* At about
the same time anti-Bolshevik socialist papers in Kostroma*
Nishnyi Tagil and Vladivostok became party. Martselei,
S.V., Pechaf sovetskol Belorussli * Minsk. 1961, o. 54
(Hereafter cited as Martaelel* Pechat * Belorussll )
|
Berezhnoi # et a^. * jJo^ pechat' * pp. 250-1* lavestlla of
the Petrograd Soviet resisted takeover until the revolu-
tlon. but in October an evening paper* Rabochtl i soldat *
controlled by the party, also began to appear as an organ
of the soviet. Trotsky, Lev Davidovich, Sochinenlla *
vol* III, part 2, Moscow, 1925, pp. 16-7 (Hereafter cited
a* Trotsky, Soch ). By the time of the seizure of power
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both in terms of circulation and number of papers.
On the other hand two factors must be born in mind to
keep thie picture of the party press in its proper per-
spective. In the first place the total circulation of the
party and Bolshevik controlled soviet press at this time
M
|
amounted to only about 600 * 000 copies* This circulation Ties
insufficient to meet the requirements of the whole country.
A second consideration is that the demand for the Central Organ
of the party can in no sense be equated with the actual dis-
tribution of the paper since there is no evidence that all
copies sent from the center reached their destination.
In the days following the Kornllovshchina the party
began to consider the question of peasant papers in order
to fill an obvious gap in the party press. First afield in
this area was the Moscow Organization which began to publish
Derevenakaja pravda three times per week from October 4. This
was followed by the first edition of Derevenskala bednota
at least 35 soviet papers were controlled by the party.
Anlsimova, P., "Vtorfct vserossiiskil s"ezd sovetov",
Krasnyj arkhlv . #5 (84), 1937, pp. 12-134, passim .
68. Astrakhan and Sazonov, "Sozdaniye aassovoi pechati",
p. 98* Berezhnoi, a£. , Ibid . . p. 203.
69* Both these caveats are open to the same argument,
namely that the revolution was made in the cities of
Russia where the party press was strongest. However
in Moscow the liberal paper Russkove slovo was printed
in 350rO00 copies alone which indicates that even in the
cities the party press was relatively weak. Vertinskii,
N.3., Oazeta v Rossll i SSSR XVII-XXyv. Leningrad, 1931,
p. 133 (Hereafter cited as Vertinskii, Gazeta v Rossll ).
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October 12, published by the Military Organization of the
70(Antral Committee. The two papers set for themselves the
tasks of reflecting the way of life in the village and under-
took the explanation of the counter-revolution.^ The party's
peasant papers were quickly integrated into the press net and
disseminated to local organisations, but their effect must
have been limited in the time remaining before the October
Revolution since the party had little experience, connection
or organization among the peasants for whom they were destined.
By early October with the Provisional Government less
and less able to respond in a meaningful way to the problems
confronting Russia and with the strength of the party increas-
ing, the Bolshevik press turned to the question of an armed
uprising in the capital. The role of the press in the prepar-
ation and realisation of the seizure of power, of course,
varied from place to place* in Petrograd and Moscow where
the press was strong and the Bolsheviks a majority in the
soviet, party publications played an important role in
designating the targets for the uprising and acquainting
70, At the end of June, the Minsk Soviet had published four-
teen issues of Kreat'lanakala sazeta . edited by Frunze,
before it was suppressed by the Provisional Government.
It did not reopen so the Moscow and Petrograd peasant
papers are the first continuous party publications for
the peasantry.
71, fterevonskala pravda . October 4| Derevenskela bednota.
October 12. In BoPshovlstskaia pechat' . vol. IV. pp.
210-2 and 204-5.
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their readers with the tactics for seizing these targets.
The Central Organ of the party Included a whole series of
articles during October calling for the armed overthrow of the
Provisional Government and explaining the procedures of
revolution and the barricades. Sotslal-demokrat adopted a
similar line. 72
By the middle of the month the Provisional Government
evoke from its lethargy to the seriousness of the situation
that was developing in the capital and tried to take steps
to prevent the uprising. The foremost target for preventive
measures was the Central Organ of the party which continued to
outline the steps necessary for taking power. During the
night of October 23*4 the government decreed the closing of
RabOchll out' and the central military paper SoIda
t
.
hoping
to forestall any Bolshevik coup by silencing the party
mouthpieces. This order was executed with the usual smashing
73
of stereotypes and the confiscation of copies on hand.
But the situation in the capital had changed since the last
suppression of the Central Organ in September. When the
72. Probably only the Moscow and Fetrograd party papers
printed their own articles on the uprisingt while the local
papers reprinted materials suitable for their area.
Budnykov, Bo I, part pechat
»
. p. 176, records a number of
reprints of Lenin's "The Crisis Ripens" in Rabochli out'
October 7.
73. Budnykov, Ibid . . p. 182| Bereshnoi, et a^. , Bol pechat* .
p. 241 1 Andronov, Bovevove oruzhlve partil, p. 443
1
Sasonov, "Presledovanlye" , O sow pechatl . p. 108.
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Central Committee heard of the closing, it reported the event
to the Military Revolutionary Committee with instructions to
reopen the papers immediately* This was duly accomplished
and Rabochil put' appeared October 24 in defiance of the Pro*
visional Government's decree* The Military Revolutionary
Committee then issued its own decree opening both revolutionary*
papers* ordering their press workers to continue printing the
papers $ and entrusting the protection of the Central Organs to
74
reliable military units* The failure of the Provisional
Government to forestall the moves of the party and the revolu-
tionary Military Committee was its last chance to prevent the
seisuee of power* since on the 25th the party stopped defending
its own papers and began to requisition those of the opposition
in preparation for the establishment of its own regime.
74* KPSS v boy; by za pobedy yallko^ okt^abr'sko^ ^otslal-
TsticKeskoi revollutsll 1917 . Moscow. 1957. p. 115 (Here-
after cited as KPSS y bor'be ) j Budnykov # e£ e£. 9 Ibid *
,
p* 183| Sasonov. IblcL , pp. 10S-11G* quotes a decision
of the Central Committee "... to despatch quickly to the
press a guard and to attend to the timely publication of
the next number of the paper1* after receiving the news
of the closing of the Central Organ. Apparently another
attempt was made to close Rabochil put* following a decree
of the Provisional Government suppressing all seditious
papers and ordering soldiers and citizens to assist in
the execution of the decree* The attempt to fulfill this
order during the night of October 24*5 was unsuccessful
due to the guard posted by the Military Revolutionary Co»*
mlttee which defended both publications.
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CHAPTER II
THE SEIZURE OF P OWE R A If D THE
£ S T A B L IS B M mi o F T H E
SOVIET P R E S S
The Suppression of the Opposition Press
The failure of the Provisional Government to forestall
the Bolshevik seizure of power during the night of October
24-5 (November 6-7)* ensured the overthrow of the Kerensky
Government and the February Revolution* One of the initial
steps in this coup was a decree of the Military Revolutionary
Conenittee closing the so-called counter-revolutionary papers
as soon as the party had taken the initiative* The party
followed this measure with another decreet) dated October
27 (November 9), signed by the Chairman of the Soviet of
Peoples* Commissars (SNK). Lenin 9 entitled "Decree on the
Press** This readi
"In the grave decisive hour of the revolution and the
days immediately following it* the Provisional Revolution-
ary Cossaittee had to adopt a series of measures against
the counter-revolutionary press of various shades*
Immediately on all sides there arose cries that the
new Socialist power had violated • by such a measure , the
1* The dates in this chapter are given first according to
the Julian calendar and then according to the Gregorian
until February 1 (14) when the Gregorian wss officially
introduced by the Soviet Government*
2« Lenin o pechatl . Footnote 1# p. 74&t Budnykov, Bol part
pechat'
, p* 1S8, lists the following papers which were
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basic principle of its program, encroaching on freedom of
Che press*
The worker and peasant government calls the attention
of the population to the fact that in our society, behind
this liberal screen actually is hidden the freedom for
the propertied classes to seize in their hands the lion's
share of all the press, [and] unhindered to poison
the minds and confuse the consciousness of the masses.
Everyone knows that the bourgeois press is one of
the most powerful weapons of the bourgeoisto. Especially
at the critical moment, when the new power, the power
of the workers and peasants, is only being consolidated,
it is impossible to leave this weapon in the hands of
the enemy, at a time when it is no less dangerous than
bombs and bullets. Therefore provisional and extra-
ordinary measures have been taken for the supression of
the filth and slander in which the yellow and green press
have flooded the young victory of the people*
As soon as the new order is consolidated all
administrative measures on the press will cease, full
freedom for it will be set up within the limLts of re-
sponsibility before a court, according to the most
extensive and progressive legislation in this area.
Considering, however, that the restraint of the
oress even at this critical moment is admissable only
within limits absolutely necessary, the Soviet of Peoples'
Commissars decrees
t
1. Only the following organs of the press are
subject to closing! 1) those which appeal for open
opposition or defiance of the Worker and Peasant Govern-
ment f 2) those spreading dissension by means of a clearly
slanderous distoriion of the facts i 3; those appealing to
acts of a clearly criminal, i.e. punishable by law,
character.
2. The closing of organs of the press, provlsionall;
or permanently, will be realized only by decree of the
Soviet of Peoples* Commissars.
3* The present position has a temporary character
and will be cancelled by a special law at the beginning
closed by the decreet Nashe obshcheve delo . Rech* . Novove
vremia . Vechernveve vremla . Russkaia volla . Blrzheyvye
vedomostl. NarodnaTa pravda
.
~2hiyove slovo . Den' * Gazeta-
General Position on the Press
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of norraal conditions of public life.*
The reaction to this SNK decree was strong and immediate
throughout the non-party press, accusing the Bolsheviks of
curtailing freedom of the press and demanding the rescision
of the press law. The reaction was so strong that Pravda .
which had begun to appear again October 27 (November 9)
under its old name, was compelled to explain and justify the
party 1 s action.
"No one more than us values the free oral and print*
ed word, no one better than us knows the value of this
freedom, since no one has been forbidden this freedom to
such a degree as we have been forbidden it.
But when the bourgeois conspirators and Social*
democrats want to use freedom of the press to attack
revolutionary freedom — when they need freedom of the
press, in order to support Kerensky in the struggle
against the Soviets mm the bulwarks of all revolutionary
freedoms v we sayi in the interest of revolutionary free-
dom, iron by the people, the Interests of the bourgeois
and social traitors' press must be subjugated. To leave
such freedoms to Kerensky and Co. would be to betray the
revolution." 4
In this way the party defined freedom of the press in terms of
the safety of the revolution, and papers which jeopardised the
creation of the new order would be closed. Of course, the
3. Valkom, S.N., Ed. . Dekrety sovetskol vlastl . vol. I, Mos-
cow, 1957, pp. 24-5 t (Hereafter cited as Dekrety sovetskol
vlastl ) t the decree was then published in Pravda and
Izvestlla . October 28 (November 10), 1917.
4. Pravda . October 29 (November 11), 1917, p. 1. The reac-
tion to the party* a attack on the non-party press must
have begun as soon as the Military Revolutionary Commit-
tee closed the first papers, since the second paragraph
of the decree refers to the cry that arose.
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definition of those terms remained the province of the party.
Acting on the strength of the "General Position on the
Press" and the party* s interpretation thereof* SNK forbade
the publication of all those papers which had been closed by
the Military Revolutionary Committee in the October Revolution.
But the question of the press was not settled so easily,
since Oven some of the Bolsheviks were genuinely concerned
about the suppression of non-party papers and the definition
of freedom of the press. Their anxiety and that of the Left S.
R. * 8, who had agreed to participate in the new government, was
sufficient to have the question of the press discussed at the
fifth session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of
the Soviets (VTsIK) November 4 (17).
In the stormy evening VTsIK session at the Smolny, the
Bolshevik Iu. Larin immediately raised the question of the
press. Amid hoots and hisses, he demanded that the measures
taken against the press should be modified, since the period
of revolutionary struggle, which justified their existence, he
passed. In the debate that followed the introduction of
5. Dekretv spvetskoi, vlast^, vol. I, p. 539.
6. Reed, John, Jen Days that Shook the World . New York, 1935,
p. 267 (Hereafter cited as Reed, Ten Pays ) i Okt i kniga,
p* 55 | the latter indicates that at the VTsIK session
October 27 (November 9) the Left S.R. *s had accepted the
text of the decree on the press without demur. Reed says
Larin' s resolution was greeted by thunderous applause even
ffom parts of the party, pp. 267-8. Lenin o pechatl . foot-
note 1, p. 748, says Nogin, Riazonov and other Bolsheviks
supported Larin, while Reed, Ibid . , cited" Riazonov and
Lozovsky as members of the party supporting the resolution.
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Larin f s resolution, the Bolsheviks at first attempted to defer
discussion of the question. When the Executive Committee vetoed
this procedure, the party read its own resolution, stating that
the suppression of the bourgeois press was necessary not only
in the period of struggle but also during the transition from
the old to the new* Having extended the time in which suppres-
sion of the non-party press was necessary, the Bolshevik frac-
tion then proposed the confiscation of newsprint and presses
by the Soviets t which would apportion these resources to poli-
tical groups and parties in proportion to the number of their
constituents. The Bolshevik resolution concluded!
"The re-establishment of the so-called 'freedom of the
press 9 i.e. the simple return of presses and newsprint to
the capitalists — poisoners of the minds of the people,
would be an intolerable capitulation to the will of capi-
tal, the surrender of one of the most important positions
of the worker and peasant revolution* i.e. a measure of
unquestionable counter-revolutionary character.
Proceeding from the above exposition, the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee categorically rejects all pro-
posals which aim at the restoration of the old regime in
the matter of the press, and unconditionally supports the
Soviet of People* • Commissars in this question against the
pretensions and importunities , which are dictated by petty
bourgeois prejudices or direct subservience to the inter-
ests of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. M '
7. Reed, Ibid . * p. 266| Pekrety sovetskol vlast! . vol. I, pp.
43-4. In the text of this resolution published in Pravda,
November 5 (18), the first sentence of the last paragraph
begins i "The Central Committee proposes to the Bolshevik
fraction of the Central Executive Committee categorically
to reject.. ••'* According to Reed, Ibid., p. 269, the reading
of the Bolshevik resolution was interrupted frequently from
the floor, and the party was immediately compared with the
Black Hundreds. An alternate draft resolution, prepared by
Lenin, is printed in Lenin o pechatl , p. 591.
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After the reading of the two resolutions Trotsky and Lenin spoke
in favor of the Bolshevik resolution* The Peoples 9 Commissar for
Foreign Affairs stressed the need to confiscate the presses and
newsprint of counter-revolutionary papers as the property of
society and to strike the press monopoly from the hands of the
bourgeoisie* It was unthinkable that periodicals should exist
o
without the support of the population* Lenin summed up the
arguments for the Bolshevik faction* To tolerate the existence
of bourgeois papers , he said, was to stop being a socialist.
regis* Win i.irmly consolidktfW so che mDOCW* ^Qm tne nmmr
* Those who say 9 Open the bourgeois papers 9 do not understand
that we are going full speed toward socialism* After all the
o
Tsarist papers were closed after its overthrow. " And Lenin
certainly intended to see the bourgeois press accorded the same
treatment , now that its revolution had been in turn overthrown* ^
After the party 9 s leader had spoken* his views were attacked
by other fractions, but when the vote was taken, the Bolshevik
8. Trotsky, Soch * vol. 3, part 2, pp. l04-5f Reed, Ten Days ,
pp. 269*70* Reed gives a slightly different version of
Trotsky 9 s speech, but the content is the same*
9# Lenin o pechatl * p* 592*
10* The non-party press had been warned that this would be
the attitude of the Bolsheviks in September, when Lenin
had written that a Soviet Government would close the
counter-revolutionary papers, confiscate their presses
and institute a Government monopoly on advertisements*
Lenin o pechatl * p* 582, "Tasks of the Revolution" f in
Rabochli Put 9 * September 26-7 (October 9-10), 1917.
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resolution was adopted. 11
The passage of the party 1 s resolution at the fifth
session of VTsIK laid down the fundamental law of the new
Soviet state for the press , a lew which has never been repeal-
ed. Under this statute the definition of counter-revolution-
ary activity and the establishment of the new regime were
the criteria, first in deciding whether a given publication
could freely publish and second , In determining when the new
regime was firmly consolidated so the "Decree on the Press*
could be repealed. Using these two criteria the party has
resolutely defined the acceptable press as that emanating
12from party-soviet institutions.
The decree on the press delimited the theoretical
aspects of freedom of the press • but did not create an
apparatus for its enforcement or attack the foundation of the
bourgeois press — its financial base. Both of these problems
were dealt with in subsequent legislation. In the draft
11# According to Reed, Ten Days , p. 271, the vote was 34-
24 in favor of the Bolshevik resolution and 22-31 against
Larin's. The former figures are cited by the editors of
both Trotsky's and Lenin's works, but the editors of
Trotsky's works show 23-29-2 against Larln (vol. 3,
part 2, p. 403) a figure which is supported in Okt i,
knlga . p. 57.
12* This definition had been applied also within the area of
the acceptable press to insure conformity to the party
line, however, other measures are usually employed to
keep the party-soviet press in line* See chapter 9.
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resolution which he had not tabled at the VTsIK session,
Lenin had written*
"As the first step ... The Provisional Worker and
Peasant Government should name a Commission of Inquiry
to disclose the links of the periodical press with
capital, the source of their means of revenue ... and all
the economics of the paper in general, * 13
This sentiment pervaded Trotsky 9 s declaration and the Bol-
shevik resolution adopted by VTsIK, and it was partially real*
ized when the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars passed a decree
introducing a state monopoly on advertisements In the per-
iodical press October 30 (November 12). This stature for-
bade the publication of ads in any publication except organs
of the Provisional Worker and Peasant Government and trans-
ferred all offices and institutions connected with the pro-
cessing of ads to the state. The execution of this decree
was initially delayed, however , as the question of advertise-
ments was again discussed by SNK November 15 (28), and only
three days later did the Commissariat of the Press announce
that the decree on ads would become legally binding on
November 22 (December 5).*^
13. Lenin o pechatl . p. 501.
14. The original draft of the decree was prepared by Lunachar-
sky and revised by Lenin before submission. Both the
original and revised drafts are in Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti ,
volt If PP» 54~6. The decree was published in Pravda
""
and Izvestila . November S (21), 1917. On the day of Its
coming into force the Commissar for Press Matters was in*
structed to close all papers which appeared on the 22nd
with ads.
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Striking directly at the source of the economic power of
the non-party press as seen by the Bolsheviks, the decree was
intended to deny it income from ads. Those papers which con-
tinued to publish advertisements would be closed. Not that
ads were to be completely eliminated from the press , but
they were to be controlled by the state 9 and local advertising
offices would be created to insure their proper management. As
Lenin later explained!
"The decree which established a Governmental mon-
opoly on advertisements also assumed, that private enter*
prise papers would remain as a general phenomenon
, that
an economic policy would remain which demanded private
advertisements , a system of private property would re*
main **» a whole series of private businesses would re*
main which would need advertising, advertisements. Such
was and only could be the idea of the decree on the
monopoly of private advertisements. "15
This meant not the curtailment or the end of advertising, but
merely an exchange of the beneficiary of the money accruing
therefrom and a great diminution of the power of the non-
party press from the loss of such revenues. As this money
flowed into party coffers, its press would inevitably grow
stronger and eventually supplant the non-party press. Sup-
pression would not have to be meted out to those papers
that did not breach the regulations of the "General Position
on the Press" since they, like the state, could be expected to
wither away.
The new government *s position was further elaborated in
Lenin, Vladimir IlHch, Polnoye sobranlye sochinenil .
vol. 40, p. 200 (Hereafter cited as Lenin. Pol sob soch )
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an article In the Central Organ of the party, which explained
the need for the monopoly on ads In terms of forcing the hour-
geolsle to obey the Soviet Government and of showing non-party
papers that they would not be tolerated if they attacked It.
And Trotsky i In a speech to the Grenadiers* Regiment* violently
denounced the accusations of strangling the free word*.
M Freedom of the press! What do the advocates of the
bourgeoisie mean by this slogan* ...Bourgeois freedom of
the press means the monopoly of the capitalist In theft*
dissemination of the Ideas of the capitalist class,
poisoning the peoples 9 class consciousness and polluting
the peoples* conscience by the refuse of bourgeois
thought. . Where does freedom of the press for the
masses begin? It begins at that moment when they receive
for their own disposal the material tools of printing . •
along with the stocks of paper. We the Soviet power,
look at the matter of freedom of the press In such a
manner, that we consider ourselves obliged, first of all,
to strip from the hands of the bourgeois class the monopoly
. . • ol publication and put the means at the disposal of
all the people* * • .
*
Advertisements were only a weapon In the hands of the capital*
1st press, a means to Impose tribute on the masses* The
liberation of the prems must begin with the monopoly of ads,
and Trotsky had no doubt what the outcome of the struggle for
freedom of the press would be.
"Our struggle against the bourgeois paper men,
against the monopolists of the printed work. Is concleved
by Philistines of the streets, as a struggle against the
free word, but the true masses of people, clearly under-
stand, what is the task for the victory of the first
elementary conditions for a true peoples* freedom of the
press* Every press which was created by the peoples'
labor and the stolen capital of the people, every press
which we take from the hands of the bourgeoisie and trans-
16* Pravda, November 24 (December 7), 1917, p* 1*
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fer to the hands of the Soviets of Worker and Peasant
Deputies, is a stone In the construction of real free*
dan of the press. Despite all the baiting and all the
opposition, we will carry this task to an end and in
place of those paper houses of tolerance, which now
create the power of capital in the name of profit,
there will be created true organs of free human thought.
The decree on ads aroused the same sort of response that
had greeted the decree on the press, and the Petrograd
Society of Editors protested against it to SHE, 18 But
the party remained unmoved by the outcry, continuing to en*
force the decree even though it did not produce the expected
results. The failure of the non-party press to get the new
press legislation rescinded, only caused them to shift their
struggle with the Soviet Government to a new area. Rather than
stop publication, the various bourgeois papers continued to
appear with or without ads, changing their names, when they
were closed as Pravda had before October, and reappearing on
the following day. They persisted in attacking the new order
and didn't concern themselves overly about remitting any
19
money realized from ads or about the decree itself.
17. Trotsky, Soch . vol* 3, part 2, pp, 125-7j Pravda . #202,
November 3TT(December 13), 1917.
18. Okt 1 kniga . p. 59.
19. Trotsky, Soch . vol. 3, part 2, p. 127. Four years later
at the 7th Moscow Gubernia Party Conference Lenin indicat-
ed how naive the party had been when it talked about a
monopoly for ads, since there could be no ads in a period
of desperate struggle. It remained only a paper decree.
Lenin, Pol sob soch . vol. 40, pp. 201-2.
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The apparatus for executing and enforcing the decree on
the prase was set up when It became obvious to the party
that this place of legislation would not be self•executing*
The Peoples* Cosmissariat of Justice took the first step in
this direction , December lb, in a decree which created a
special Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press attached to the
Military Revolutionary Committee with the power to fine,
suspend or close a publication and confiscate its presses. 20
Through this Tribunal the party intended to realise firm con-
trol over the non-party press, but its early proceedings
showed just the opposite tendency* The reason for this
failure to correspond to the intention of the party is not
hard to find, for in constituting the Tribunal, the Peoples*
Commissariat of Justice had appointed X,Z. Shtenberg, a Left
20* lurfco, A. I., "Sosdaniye material 'no-tekhnicheskoi bazy
partllnol i sovetskol pechatl" , in Mishurls, A.L.,
Us&kk&a$smHimt* aecu»t * v ^-ioo ]mSM m aeyoitei*
stvo sotslallzma . Moscow. 1964. p. 42 (Hereafter cited
as lurko, HSosdaniye baay sovetskol pechati" ) i Ckt i
, . U Cha dacraa was published la Qaseta
vrsmanoao rabochego i *ti—t?"1 TMfcjlff ayavitel'stva .
December 19, 1917 (January 1, 1913). In Partlinaja i
*
y. bpr'bo ga postroveniye sotsialigna
cow, 1961, p. 19 (Hereafter cited as Part[OSCOW
bor'be ). the date for the establishment
is incorrectly given as January 20 (Feb-
ruary 2), 1918. Shchelkunov, M. , "Zakonodatel'stvo o
pechati", Pachat' 1 revollutslla . 47 (4), 1922, ?. 179,
states that the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission also
set up subsections in the provinces and collected papers
to cheek their contents for conformity with the actual
course of events. If they corresponded to reality, they
were tolerated, otherwise the writer of the offensive
article or the editor of the paper was called to account
before the Revolutionary Tribunal. This is not sub-
stantiated by other sources.
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to direct its activity. He used the authority of the
Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press not only against the
counter-revolutionary papers, as was stated in the Justice
decree, but also frequently against party periodicals. 21
Such a situation was intolerable to the party, and after the
party press complained about their treatment by the Tribunal,
its activity was reconsidered at a meeting of the Soviet of
Peoples' Commissars, January 24 (February 6), 1918,
At this session the responsibilities of the Tribunal
were redefined to give it jurisdiction over attacks and offen-
ses against the people and infringements of legislation on
the press. A Commission of Inquiry was created within the
Tribunal of the Press composed of three members elected by the
Soviet* This Commission could penalize papers and
editors anywhere from a simple fine to the loss of all po-
22
litical rights for breaches of the press laws. The in-
stitution of the special Commission within the Tribunal,
having greater powers and composed of members who were more
responsive to the party's attitude toward the press, success-
fully by-passed Shtenberg and the Tribunal was able to carry
21, Qkt 1 knl a . p. 60| Smirnov, I.S., fa istor11 stroitel'-
jtva sotsl^U^cheskpl kul'tury v. ?ervyl perj,g& sovetskpl
vlasti . Moscow. 1952. p. 78 (Hereafter cited as Smirnov,
jg {.gtorii stroltel'stva ). Both of these sources agree
that the penalties which the Tribunal could Impose were
too light to be effective.
22. Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti . vol. I, pp. 432-4.
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out Its assigned task until Its dissolution In May 1918.
Two other acts of the new government assisted the party In
suppressing the opposition papers* These were the nationaliz-
ation of banks which destroyed the financial base of many
non-party papers and the nationalisation of presses In
February 1918. which gave the Bolsheviks far better control of
23publications In general*
By early 1918 then the party had passed the necessary
legislation and created an apparatus to deal with the non-
party press. Yet that press did not disappear* Non-party
papers continued to eke out a shadowy existence, tolerated
so long as they were not openly hostile to the new Soviet
Government* but subject to Immediate closure or requisition*
The Imperfections of the system* the Inability of the party
to enforce Its legislation effectively, and the crlterlons
that allowed other papers to publish so long as they did not
distort the facts or attack the government. Insured the con-
tinuation of publications other than the party's after the
October Revolution* Those papers that Insisted on attacking
23* lurko, "Sozdanlye basy sovetskol pechatl", P* The
nationalization of the presses was particularly helpful
since the pollgraphers* union was still controlled by the
Menshevlks who had passed a resolution at the 2nd All-Pus-
slan Conference of the union calling for freedom of the
press* Nationalization limited the trouble which this
union could cause by attaching Its presses to the state*
Only In the fall of 1918 did the Bolsheviks gain control
of the union* Okt I knlga * pp* 66-7*
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the government were closed, and while they might reappear
under new titles, they could not hope to survive for any
length of time without adopting a less hostile attitude toward
24
the party and its policies.
The end of this period of toleration began shortly after
the Soviet Government shifted from Leningrad to Moscow in
March 1918. Lenin spoke for the closing of the remaining
bourgeois papers on March 14 at the 4th All-Russian Congress of
25Soviets. His views on the subject were undoubtedly colored
by the great number of non-party papers that continued to
publish in Moscow. The Soviet of Peoples' Commissars took up
the question of the 18th and discussed a report by Sverdlov
concerning the closing of the bourgeois press. This discussion
led to an SNK decree entrusting the fate of these papers to
the Moscow Soviet, the Commissariat of Justice and the Head
of the Extraordinary Commission for Fighting the Counter-revol-
ution <Cheka) # Felix Dzerzhinsky, with the aim of closing such
24. The best case in point would seem to be Gorky's Novala
ghlzn* which openly attacked Pravda by saying that It lied.
Lenin tried to silence the paper by demonstrations and
strikes at Its printing plants, cutting off its supply of
newsprint and attacking the publication in Pravda . all to
no avail. Lenin was reluctant apparently to order the
closing of the paper since Gorky was a friend and well-
known revolutionary figure , but when all the other measures
had failed, in July 1918, he ordered Novala ghlsn' closed.
Wolfe, Bertram 0. , The Bridge and the Abyss . New York,
1967, pp. 70-4.
25. Lenin o pechatl . p. 596.
55
periodicals and bringing their editors before the Revolutionary
Tribunal. The suppression must have moved ahead slowly, since
Lenin had to reiterate the need for closing anti-Soviet publi-
27
cations in May, But under the influence of this prodding,
the silencing of the opposition press continued and by the end
of 1918 it had disappeared in those areas of Russia controlled
by the new Soviet Government* The suppression of the remain-
ing non-party papers was only the logical conclusion of the
chain of events which had started with the closing of the first
Petrograd papers by the Military Revolutionary Committee in
October (November) 1917 and was institutionalized by the decree
on the press. The haphazard and uncertain way of dealing with
various non-party publications until the spring of 1918 could
never be satisfactory. The uprising of the Left S.R.'s in July
only speeded up a process which had already begun and offered
26. Dekrety sovetskol vlastl . vol. II, p. 569| Okt i knlsa .
pp. 64-5 i Smirnov. £z istor11 stroitel' stva . ppT 80-1.
The Decree on the Press had been applied very mildly In
Moscow and by far the greater part of the bourgeois press
had continued to publish after the revolution. This per-
missiveness went to such an extent that after November 8
(21) 9 when the local press law was enacted, any paper re-
gardless of direction could publish unobstructed.
27. Lenin o pachatl . p. 599. * Thesis on the Contemporary Po-
litical Situation"
,
May 13.
28. An indication of the magnitude of this task is the fact
that one hundred and fifty papers were closed in Moscow
under the SNK decree. Berezhnoi, <gt al. , Bol pechat' .
p. 254| Okt 1 knjga . p. 65.
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the opportunity to deal ruthlessly with another part of the non-
party press which had been tolerated because of the participa*
tion of that group in the Government* Nor did the Constitution
of the RSFSR
,
promulgated July 10 , offer any amelioration from
29
the drive for complete suppression*
The Establishment of the Soviet Press
The creation of the party-soviet press began partiallytwo aiamma* ^ *»« tM f*m&S vorkar* of she silenced
in March 1917 with the restoration of Pravda and partially
after the October Revolution when the party took control of
most of the Soviets throughout Russia and added their papers
...
to its embryonic net. In both cases the party after the
seizure of power was able to proceed from an already created
press base complete with presses and a certain number of
qualified press workers*
In the area of the party press the process of expanding
its size, begun before the coup, recieved an additional im-
petus October 25 (November 7) with the requisitioning of the
presses and offices of Russkaia volia by the Military Revo*
29* Article 14 of the Constitution read. "With the goal of
securing for the workers real freedom of expression of
their opinion, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic abolishes the dependence of the press on
capital and places in the hands of the working class and
peasant poor all the technical means for the publication
of papers, brochures, books and all other press works
and guarrantees their free dissemination about all the
state. 1* Nikolayev, N.M. , Ed., Zakony o pechati , p. 197
(Hereafter cited as Zakony o pechati
57
lutionary Committee, an action which had been planned before the
uprising. The first issue of the Central Organ on these
presses appeared in an expanded edition of 200,000 copies,
and on the 27th It began to appear under its old name Pravda .
Following the example of Pravda other party papers returned
to publication under their old names and received the presses
of those papers which the Military Revolutionary Committee
31had closed* In most cases the press workers of the silenced
papers agreed to help print the respective party papers,
while the editorial staff and contributors refused, thus
extending the problem which had plagued the party press
between the revolutions and would continue to plague the
party-soviet press throughout its formative years i the lack
of a trained cadre of journalists to help produce its papers.
At the same time that these party papers returned to publica-
tion under their old names, and strengthened by a more power*
30. Sbornlk bo 1 ' shevl stskala pechat* . Moscow, 1945, part 2,
p. 7i Petrlakov. Stranttsy slay 1st , pp. 330*1. To insure
no Interference with this measure the Military Revolution*
ary Committee detached units of the red guards to protect
the premises.
31. Pravda . maintained the subtitle Rabochll put* until October
30 (November 12). Also returning to publication under
their old names were Soldatskala pravda , Qkopnala pravda
and Golos praydy . The presses of the closed papers
Reyh* and ben* were allocated to Soldatskala pravda and
Derevenskala bednota respectively, while those oi
BIrghevyye vedomost
1
were subsequently requisitioned for
the Naval Military Revolutionary Committee. Okt i, knlga,
pp. 52-3.
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ful technical base, Izyeatlla . which had eluded the control
of the party before the revolution , was now taken over by the
Bolsheviks to be edited by In. Steklov, a former Menshevik
editor of the paper, who had joined the party shortly before
the seizure of power* In Moscow and in the provinces the
seizure of power also meant a rapid expansion of the Bolshevik
press net as soviet papers were harnessed to the party, and
new party papers appeared on the presses of closed publica-
32
tions«
Despite the rapid strengthening of the party press and
its increased circulation in the first days of the seizure of
power » the disruption of transportation and communication
greatly hampered the delivery of papers on any regular basis.
Because of this the Central Committee decided to print special
bulletins ff informing local organizations of the course of
events at the center* The first was printed and distributed
October 29 (November 11) and was succeeded by seven more
33issues with the last one appearing November 7 (20)* After
the eighth bulletin the Central Committee returned to the
dissemination of leading party papers as the vehicle for pro-
32. Mishuris, A.L. , Pechat* rozhdennala oktlabram. Moscow,
1968, p. 7.
33. Protokoly TaK . p. 235 and footnote 228, p. 288f KPSS v
bor'be . footnote 27, p. 524. The texts of the eight
issues are printed Ibid . , pp. 235-45 and 80-9. The bulle-
tins were sent to local party organizations as the
opportunity allowed, since papers were not reaching the
localities by ordinary means.
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viding local organizations with the necessary Information.
At the same time, to Increase the stream of Information about
the revolution. It began to publish a two-page evening edition
of the central Orgen of the perry. 34
Unfortunately! the party could not fully utilize the
rapidly expanding press net until its expedition and dissemin-
ation apparatus had been reorganized to handle the greater
number of papers and copies and until the means of dissemin-
ation rested firmly in the hands of the new worker and peasant
government. In the days before the revolution the party
press had been mostly disseminated by railroad although at-
tempts had been made to use the posts. With the seizure of
power the party encountered even more resistence from the Men-
shevik controlled railroad unions than it had met between
February and October t and the Central Committee had to order
railroad officials not to place any obstacle In the way of
delivery of Bolshevik papers. The situation in the Postal-tel-
egraph agencies was no better despite central control as de-
35
lays and even sabotage of paper delivery occurred.
34. The first evening edition appeared November 2 (15), and
it continued to appear until March 20» 1916* Izvestila
also had an evening edition, Rabochll 1 aoldat . which
stopped publication in February 1916.
35 • Perepiska T»K« vol* II, passlm t lurko, "Sqzdanlye bazy
sovetskoi pechatl", p# lo| Berezlinoi, af«^ fiol pecnat* ,
p. 256. lurko notes an attempt by the press workers of
Petrograd to form a poligraphers 1 syndicate which would
have demanded high wages from the Bolsheviks for contin-
uing to print their pirtrlddlealfc****** whether the local
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Simultaneously with the rapid growth of the party and
its press f the seizure of power increased the demand for
party literature of all kinds, particularly the central lead-
ing papers. This taxed the small expedition facilities at
the center beyond their capacity and Indicated that a good
part of the Inability to deliver party papers to local organ-
izations lay In the expedition offices of the central papers
which simply could not respond to the provincial demand and
were unable to cope with the greater number of copies that
the dlsseH&ttafcien of theeMactty ptees and later
poured from the recently seized presses.
It was Impossible for the party to deal with, much less
rectify, all the deficiencies of the delivery system at once*
Nevertheless Initial steps were taken In several directions by
the end of 1917. Before the Central Committee considered
what could be done about expedition and dissemination, It
had to determine the extent of the net which these functions
would service. This Information was gathered by means of
37
a questionnaire sent to local committees in November.
36. The published correspondence of the Central Committee in
late 1917 attributes the irregular delivery of the press to
faulty expedition at the center. Pereplska TsK, vol. II,
passim. A contributing factor undoubtedly Is the chaotic
transportation situation. Okt I kniga makes the In-
creased demand from the localities the reason for seizing
the presses of the opposition, p. 46.
37. Pereoiska £sK, vol. II, pp. 59*63. The November question-
naire was a more extensive version of the circular sent
out before the 6th Congress. The questions of relevance
to the press were #s 13-8 which asked whether the local
organization had its own publication, how great its
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While the Central Committee digested the replies , it began
a series of measures at the center and in the localities to
insure dissemination of its press and provide subscriptions to
publications of local and central origin. The Central Committee
reminded party members that they were obliged to subscribe
to and disseminate the party press* Readers were encouraged
to write to the papers and pass on their copy of the various
publications to others when they were through with it* In
areas where the party could enforce its decisions, kiosks
were set up for the dissemination of the party press and later
the Souvarin railroad kiosk system was transferred to the
state. At the center the Central Committee dealt directly
with the expedition office and corrected its defects to satisfy
the demands from the provinces. At the same time the Central
Committee instituted a press briefing at the Smolny for editors
of the Petrograd papers. Trotsky held the meetings with the
editors every afternoon at three , Imparting information for
circulation was. what other parties had papers, their
circulation, what other party papers were received, and
what type of paper was most disseminated in the area. Only
the reply of the Lugansk Committee is printed, but other
communications from the provinces indicate a prolifer-
ation of party or party controlled publications.
38. Derevenskala pravda , October 26 (November 8), p. If
Pravda , November 14 (17), p. 1; November 17 (31), p. Ij
lurko, "Sozdaniye bazy sovetskoi pechati", pp. 21-
4 i Andronov, Boyevoye oruzhlye partil, p. 460. The Sou-
varin net eventually became the dissemination system for
Government papers such as Izvestlja .
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publication on the domestic and international scene.
The measures taken by the party were meant to solve the
problems connected with the delivery of publications. The
institution of a press briefing began the serious consid-
eration of the effective and correct distribution of infor-
mation to the various branches of the party-soviet press.
But Trotsky's briefings only served the Petrograd papers.
Steps were taken to serve the provinces with the creation of
a Press Buro, attached to SNK, in November and by converting
the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, which had served the Tsar and
the Provisional Government as a news agency* into an instru-
40
raent of the new government* According to Soviet historians
the Telegraph Agency supplied tendatious information to pa*
pars and was unable to satisfy the informational demands of
the Soviet press* The inability or disinclination of the
agency was unacceptable to the party and it was taken over
39. Protokoly TaK , pp. 15iff.| Pereoiska IsK* vol. II, p. 49.
Berezhnol et a£* , Bol pechat 1 . p. Z59. The decision to
brief the capital* s editors was taken at a session of the
Central Consnittee November 29 (December 12). At the same
session the editorial board of Pravda was reorganized
with the new board consisting of Sokolnikov. Stalin
.
Trotsky and Bukarin. The session also considered ending
the evening edition of Pravda in order to create Krasnaja
gazeta , a paper to serve local needs* This decision was
not taken. In January 1913 f Krasnaja gazeta began to
appear under the editorship of Volodarcsky without
curtailing Pravda .
40. Martselei, Pechat* Belorussil . p. 130| Okt I kniga. p.
130. This Press Buro should not be confused with the
Press Buro attached to the Peoples' Commissariat of
Internal Affairs which was charged with fighting slanders
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by the state In December as part of SNK.*1 Under state aegis
,
the Telegraph Agency apparently did not perform any better,
since in 1918 the Press Buro and the Agency were united into
a new information buro called the Russian Telegraph Agency
42(ROSTA)« The local branches of each organization became
branches of ROSTA with the task of preparing and distributing
information for the party-soviet press.
The effect of all these measures on the condition and
success of the party-soviet press is difficult to assess since
the source material is so limited* Soviet studies on the con-
quest of power in the localities, the correspondence of the
Central Committee and the few histories of local or area
press provide only a partial picture. Generally, party
strength and the control of the local soviet can be equated
with the ability of the party press to develop in a particular
city.
In Moscow where Sotslal-derookrat was firmly established
and where the party controlled the soviet, the Bolshevik press
continued to function without interruption. At the beginning
of 1918, following the nationalization of the presses, a
and Insinuations in the bourgeois press apparently as a
supplement to the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Press.
The Chief of the Press Buro attended SNK sessions and his
report of these meetings was published in the papers.
41. Martselel, Ibid . . pp. 130-lt lurko, M Sozdaniye bazy
sovetskoi pechati% p. 46| Smirnov, Ig istoril stroltel*
stva . p. 93.
42. Dekrety sovetskoi vlastl . vol. Ill, pp. 296-7. L.S.
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city-wide Institution was created to regulate and distribute
this resource. Similar regulatory institutions were begun
in other major centers of Russia.^3 In Ivano-Voznesensk,
northeast of Moscow, the party paper Nasha zvezda, which had
ceased publication just before the October coup, reopened as
Rabochtl gorod » the organ of the local soviet. It led a
very difficult existence at first, since a larger non-party
paper dominated the city until It was closed late in December.
Analogous situations developed in Chellablnsk, Ufa, Samara,
Pskov and Voronezh as Bolshevik controlled soviet and party
papers arose, initially on insecure foundations, were some-
times suppressed by counter-revolutionary forces, but ul-
timately survived as the opposition papers were closed and
their resources appropriated for party publications.^
Roughly speaking then, party papers appeared through
the efforts of the local party group In the larger centers
and managed to- suppress anti-Soviet publications without aid
from the Central Conanlttee. But as the local periodicals
Sosnovskll was entrusted with ROSTA's leadership. The
Press Euro and Telegraph Agency had first been trans-
ferred to VTsIK on June 26 after a series of discussions
starting in April. Ibid . . vol. II, pp. 486-7.
43. Mishuris, A. L. , Pechat* roahdennala oktlabrenu Moscow,
1968, pp. 6-7.
44. SevastHanova, T.M. $ Pervye bo1 ' shey1 stskiye gazety v
Voronesne, Voronezh, 1959, pp. 67-72 t Chugayeva, D.aT,
Ustanovlenlye sovetskoi vlastl na mestakh v 1917-18
aodakh
.
Moscow, 1959, pp. 313, 401-3, 427, 505-8.
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arose and acquainted the center with their existence , the
measures taken by the Central Connittee to improve dissemin-
ation of the party presa came into play* requests from
local organizations for guidance and copies of the leading
party papers were met most frequently by sending the latest
issues or complete sets of Fravda , Soldatskala pravda and Per
45
evenskala bednota . However , the number of inquiries from
the Central Committee to the local groups, asking whether the
requested copies had arrived, shows that the center did not
know exactly what reached the provinces although the acknowl-
edgements for the receipt of the central papers was far
greater after October than for the period before the revolu~
46
tion. Those organizations which received the party's
leading papers were instructed to use the information therein
as a guide for dealing with the questions of the day, espec-
ially with respect to the Constituent Assembly, the war and
45. jPereplska TsK , vol* II, passim . The number of references
in trie correspondence from the Urals and central Indus*
trial areas to Sotsiai-demokrat suggest that the Moscow
party paper was widely disseminated as well*
Ibid . i a more specific generalization is untenable be*
cause of the incompleteness of the source. There is no
indication of how many local organizations wrote to the
Central Connittee about their press. There are, however,
two striking features about the printed communications
t
first the total absence of any references to closing
opposition papers, and second, the frequent use of the
phrase "we hope you receive them" in letters from the
Central Committee, which further indicates the frailty of
the dissemination apparatus.
66
the agrarian problem* In this way the party*soviet press
played an Important role in insuring the conformity of the
local periodical with the line laid down at the center by
the Central Committee, and the sending of copies of the local
paper to the center enabled the party to check that conformity
in detail. 47 mi or*ftaI in the foraer eaoital 48 I til
At the start of the new year there were no dramatic
changes in the party* s posture toward the press. The party-
soviet net continued to develop locally and at the center
,
but it became more and more difficult to secure the material
resources for publication because the German armies were over*
running the areas which produced newsprint t and the stocks
available to the party were near exhaustion. In addition to
discomfiting the party-soviet press » the German armies posed
a major threat to the security of the Soviet Government. This
threat was sufficient to cause the Central Committee to trans-
fer the capital to Moscow, and along with it the Central Organ
of the party and the paper of the Petrograd Soviet , Izvestila .
The initial decision was taken at the session of the Central
Committee January 9 (22), 1918, but the papers did not appear
t
1S65# p. X«t TtiKJtIr cited
47. After the seizure of power Pyavda no longer certified party
publications on its pages, but each party and soviet organ-
ization was required to send several copies of Its pub-
lication to the Central Committee. Presumably these
papers were approved on the basis of their content, and
if they were not satisfactory the local organization was
told to correct its line.
in the new capital until March 16. The departure of the lead*
ing party and soviet papers forced the Bolsheviks to reshuf*
fie the party-soviet press In both Moscow and Petrograd.
ffotslal-demokrat . which had published uninterrupted since
March was united with Pravda . and Petrosradskaja pravda replac-
48
ed the Central Organ In the former capital. Izvestlla was
In turn united with Its Moscow counterpart, while Krasnala
49gageta replaced It as the organ of the Petrograd Soviet.
The reshuffle at the center coincided with the further
expansion of the press net in the provinces* But the new
members of the Bolshevik newspaper family, due to the scar*
city of publication materials, lack of financial support,
the advance of the German armies or counter-revolutionary
activities of the Whites often ceased publication soon after
48. frotoko^y TsK . pp. 165*6. The Central Committee named
Bystrianskit, Smilga, and Zinoviev as the editorial
board of the new Petrograd party paper, while Stalin and
Sokolnlkov became the editors of the transferred Pravda .
Upon moving to Moscow the leading party and soviet papers
occupied a four story building at 28 Tver Street. The
presses were on the fourth floor, Pravda 's offices on the
third, Izyest11a*
3
offices on the second, and the exped-
ition offices on the street floor. M.I. Ul'ianova
aecretar' " Pravdy" . Moscow, 1965, p. 184 (Hereafter cited
SecretarT " Pravdv").
49. Mishurls, A.L., Pechaf roghdennaia oktiahrem . Moscow,
1968, p. 19. Actually Izvestlla also inherited Gaaeta
vremennoAO rabochego A krest'lanakoao pravltal'stva . which
had ceased publication March 19 by SNj£ decree. lavestlia
then became the official Government paper. Dekrety
aov^takol vlastlj vol. I, pp. 570*1.
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initial publication* The insecurity and material weakness
in the localities soon began to manifest itself at the center
as well* The dissemination apparatus* which the party had
tried valiantly to create immediately after the revolution
and which had just begun to achieve some results, broke
down completely* Both Ieves111a and Pravda suspended their
evening editions. At the first session of the 7th Party
Congress* March 6* Sverdlov in the Organizational Report
indicated that Pravda actually circulated only in Petrograd.
Its copies were declining*, the provinces rarely received the
Central Organ t its delivery had become almost Impossible due
to the transportation situation i and financial support was
51
chronically lacking* If this was the condition at the center
in the most important and powerful party publication* the
50* Martselei, Pechat' Belorussli * pp» 86*8 lists eight party
paper* arising at this time in White Russia* Mlshuris*
A*L*# Pechat* rozhdenaala oktlabrem* Moscow, 1968, pp. 19-
23 , cites twenty eight publications founded in various
parts of Russia at the beginning of 1918* Vertinskii.
Gageta v Resell , p* 135* states that most of the Bolshevik
papers begun in early 1918 folded from a lack of trained
journalists or were content merely to reprint telegrams
and articles from the central party papers*
51* Sed'raol a" ead rossliskol koagainistlchsslcoi gartll,
stenoitraflcheskll otchyot * o«»8go Marta . 191G . Moscow.
1923, pp. 5-6. Sverulov indicated that soxe 450,000
rubles which Pravda had sent to local organizations*
presumably for their papers , was already considered lost*
He gave the Central Organ* circulation as 85,000 just
before the Congress* By mid year this had declined even
further to 30.000 while lavestila's stood at 35,000 and
Bednota . the Central Committee's peasant paper, printed
50.000 copies. Smirnov, 1% istoril stroitel'stva . p. 91|
Vertinskii, Ibid *
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situation In the provinces must have been considerably worse.
It was at this tine, with the number of papers and cir-
culatlon falling, that the party took the first real steps to
define the tasks of the party-soviet press, before the rev*
olutlon the Bolshevik press had concentrated Its venom on the
Provisional Government. In the October days and the months im-
mediately thereafter It had published the decrees of the new
government, defended the worker and peasant regime as a
governmental publicist! or attacked Capitalist as the main
52
enemy of the proletariat. The party had paid attention to
the direction of the press only in terms of examining it for
counter-revolutionary tendencies and had left the positive
aspects of coverage and distinctions between the various types
and levels of papers for consideration at a later date. Until
March 1918, the Individual editor was responsible within the
limits of the acceptable party line for the content and con-
52. Stekiov, lu.M. t Vospominanlla JL publltslstika , Moscow,
1965, pp. 120>1 g"lCrasnala gaseta . #8. January 21 (Feb-
ruary 3), 1918, Orlsltt&lly Gazeta vrcmeiinoro rabochefto
tor the publication of official acts and decrees, although
all party and soviet publication© printed the most Im-
portant ones. The demise of Gazeta left only Izyestiia
as a governmental periodical and it had to explain policy
as well as polish decrees. Under such circumstances SNK's
decision of November 1917, obliging soviet papers to pub-
lish decrees, was extended to all publications, Smirnov,
i£ letorll stroitel* stva . pp. 81-92.
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centration of his paper, and most publications were devoted to
the politics of the revolution and its aspects abroad. Lenin,
as the spokesman for the party attacked this orientation
dlreetlyi
% * The Soviet press has devoted excessively much
space and attention to details of policy, to Individual
questions of political leadership, by which the capital*
ists of all states try to divert the attention of the
working masses from the really serious deeply rooted
questions of their life* * » • The task is to change the
press from an organ predominantly reporting the political
news of the day into a serious organ for the economic ed-
ucation of the mass of the population* It will be
necessary to strive and we are striving for the press •
which serves the Soviet masses, to devote less space to
questions on the personal composition of political
leadership, or on political measures. • •• In the very
first place must stand the questions of labor in their
immediate practical position. The press must become the
organ of the working commune in this sense, that it
exposes just what the leaders of capitalist enterprise
are trying to hide..*. The main means must be the press,
revealing the defects of economic life* .
. ,
ruthlessly
branding these defects, openly revealing all the ulcers
of our economic life and, thus, appealing to the public
opinion of the working masses to remove these ulcers*
Let us have ten times less paper material (possibly it
would be fine, if it were one hundred times less), which
is devoted to the so called topic of the day mm but let
us have disseminated in the hundreds, thousands and mil-
lions of copies a press, which acquaints the population
with the exemplary condition of affairs in some labor
commune of the state which outstrips others* ...
Up to this time we still find ourselves under the
definite influence of the old public opinion of the
bourgeoisie* If [we] examine our papers, [we] are easily
convinced that an excessively great place is still de-
voted to questions , which were set up by the bourgeoisie
—
- questions which it wants to divert the attention of
the working masses from the concrete political tasks
of socialist construction* We must change mm* and we
will change — the press from an organ of sensation,
from a simple apparatus for reporting political news,
from an organ of struggle against bourgeois lies mm
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into a weapon acquainting the masses with how to set
tip labor In the new era. "53
The press would become the weapon of worker competition in
vJhich the black list would be used to indicate those enter*
prises which failed to respond to the new forces in the state.
In Lenin's view Soviet papers had gone off in the wrong dir-
ection and it was necessary for the party to recall them to
the tasks of restoring the economy of Soviet Russia and con*
strueting the new worker and peasant society. The self- tan-
posed task of extirpating the counter-revolution must be
abandoned for more important work. Unimaginative duplication
of central papers must end, and the conditions of local
economic enterprises must become the focal point of the
press. Implicit in this guidance was the idea that the central
leading party and soviet papers would handle political
news while the rest of the Bolshevik press detailed the events
and battles of socialist construction, pointing out the sue-
cesses of the new economic order and revealing the slackers.
Thus by the spring of 19IB certain trends and the sketchy
53, Lenin £ pechati . pp. 585-8, "The Original Draft of the
Article 'The Foremost Tasks of Soviet Power 1 * , March 23,
1918,
54* In the revised but basicly similar draft Lenin added the
further thought that the party must "... create a press
that will not entertain and fool the people with politi-
cal sensation and trivialities, but trhich will submit
the everyday questions of economic life to the peoples 9
judgment and assist in the serious study of those
questions." Pravda . April 28, 1918, pp. 3-5.
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outline of the party-soviet press had emerged in response to
activities at the center and in the localities. Basically this
press was worker oriented* existing predominantly in the major
55
cities and industrial areas of Russia. ^ Numbering about
seventy five publications at the time of the seizure of power,
the net had rapidly expanded as new party papers were created
from the means confiscated by local organizations and as
56the soviet press came under party control, then contracted
in response to the shrinking area controlled by the Bolsheviks
and the scarcity of press resources* The party, unaccustomed
to working from a position of power, encountered entrenched
opposition to Its posture on the press In both non-party pub-
lications and in the services which enabled the press to reach
its readers. All of these problems were dealt with In an ad
hoc manner, partially based on the treatment meted out to the
party press before the revolution, suppressing or attaching to
governmental bodies as the case demanded* Such unpremeditated
-
.
55* Only Moscow and Petrograd had peasant papers at this time
and they were locally oriented* To a certain extent the
party 9 s military papers can be considered as peasant
periodicals, but even granting this, the overwhelming
majority of the press and by far most of its circulation
were destined for the workers*
56* According to Mishurls, A*L. , Pechat' rozhdennala oktlabrem*
Moscow, 1968, p* 18, the party-soviet press at the beginning
of 1918 numbered 563 titles with a circulation of about two
million copies* There are no other figures to substantiate
or disprove these statistics*
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measures, particularly In a revolutionary situation, ware
effective only as emergency acts, but taken as a whole traced
the outline of the party's attitude toward the press.
In the provinces the papers that arose were tied very
tenuously with the center. Stronger and more extensive than
similar ties forged before the revolution, these links were
still rudimentary. The Central Committee had no assurance
that guidance, provided in the Central Organ of the party,
would reach Ufa and Smolensk to say nothing about party
organizations further afield* 57 The poorly developed technical
base for the party*soviet press, even with the seizure of non-
party presses, made it difficult for the center to supply the
localities with sufficient copies of its papers and for the
local organizations to satisfy their readers, and so nearly
impossible for the Soviet press to cover adequately a given
area* When these considerations are added to the problems of
transportation and coonunication within Russia, the task con-
fronting the Bolshevik press after October had been far from
overcome by the various measures which the party had taken*
The attempt to define the role of the press came at a
time when such a definition was becoming increasingly academic*
57* The third volume of Central Committee correspondence
gives ample evidence of failure of papers to arrive in
the provinces and requests for copies of local papers from
the center* There are also frequent reports of the post
failing, ffyypleka Jsjt, vol. HI,
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As spring ripened into summer. anti-Soviet forces closed
many local papers and the lack of financial and technical
resources forced others to cease publication. The process
of shrinkage, begun early in 191S, would continue during the
Civil War as the outlying periodicals were eliminated or forced
to live a shadowy illegal existence in hostile territory* The
papers in the area remaining under party control were hardly
able to benefit from the final closing of the non-party
press « and the only part of the press which could hold its own
and even expand during the next eighteen months would be the
military* The history of the Soviet press in the Civil War
largely a chronicle of increasing difficulties that
could not be solved and an account of the militarization of
the press*
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CHAPTER III
THE TIME OF PREOCCUPATION
AMD EXPERIMENT! THE
SOVIET PRESS DURING
* * 1 GJLJ I b f hJL
The period from mid 1918 to the end of 1920 marks a
time In which the Bolshevik press attempted various sol*
utions to its many problems* In every phase of the Soviet
press measures were taken or overlooked which precipitated
situations that had not been foreseen* The weakly developed
press base, created in the relatively peaceful days and months
following the seizure of power* did not allow the anticipated
expansion of papers* Increasing preoccupation with the pro-
blems of waging war pre-empted the attention of the party's
leaders, and the secondary figures who ministered to the needs
of the press frequently worked at cross purposes to each
other? rarely could bring the weight of the party behind
such decisions as they took, and lacked the prophetic powers
necessary to select the road of development that would satisfy
the state's press needs. Two aspects of the situation daring
the Civil War particularly inhibited the Soviet press i the
party's neglect except in the military sphere, and the
scarcity of material support. These two circumstances made
the history of the press during the Civil War a chronicle
of attempts to solve problems that the party's leadership
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was less concerned about than the questions of war, and which
probably defied solution because of the chaotic situation
within the Soviet state.
The major factor affecting the Soviet press during the
Civil War was the nearly total absence of newsprint. The
shortage of paper, already felt in the spring, continued
throughout 1918 despite attempts by the party to ration and
rationalize Its use* This scarcity, which affected all areas
of the press, was directly related to fluctuations on the
battlefield which cut the center off from paper producing
areas (domestic and foreign) and to the scanty reserves of
paper that had been accumulated at the center In case outside
supply was stopped.
Although there were Indications in the summer that news-
print was not abundant, official recognition of its scarcity
came at the first congress of journalists in November 1918,
when in reply to a proposal for uncontrolled proliferation
of the press, Kerzhenstev noted that there was not even enough
newsprint for the capital's papers* A similar lack of paper
represented one of the main obstacles to the publication of
periodicals in the provinces, * However, there is no indi-
cation that the congress proposed any steps to rectify the
situation, and by the end of 1918 the crisis had become acute.
According to Pravda, paper was insufficient for all the
1. Pravda . November 13 and November 21 | Izvestila . November
15, 1918, passim.
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necessary publications* and in Petrograd and Moscow some
papers had suspended printing while others had been curtailed/
No area of the press escaped* The central papers were
forced to limit their formats. Izvestiia , reduced to a four
page edition at the end of 191o, became a two page publication
in 1919* Pravda managed to continue at four pages into the
spring of 1919, but then also curtailed its pagination to two.
The absence of newsprint forced editors to use any available
paper thus producing a range of formats, which varied from
four to eight columns in width with a comparable range in
size.
In the provinces the situation was even worse* Izvestila
noted at the beginning of 1919 that because of the paper
shortage, a whole series of provincial papers had to restrict
3
either their format or periodicity. In the Ukraine Zvezda,
while touring the country in an effort to find a permanent
home until the German armies departed, consistently changed
its make-up to take advantage of existing stocks of paper.
In Petrograd the crisis became acute at the beginning of 1919.
tCrasnala gazeta was printed on wrapping paper, and whole pages
appeared blank due to poor Inks. Scarcity of paper limited
circulation, and finally forced the Gubernia Committee to
reduce officially the circulation of all Petrograd papers.
2 » Pravda , December 21, 1918, p. 1, fourth lead article.
3. Izvestila, January 29, 1919, p. 4.
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In an attempt to maintain its influence on the workers and
limit the impact of its curtailed circulation, Krasnaia gaaete
refused to accept individual subscriptions and limited
dissemination to collective orders at factories, institutions
f-ftles no su<sh e^luttJipsi %a^£ £or*^&?diigi *z*4 it U Ate im~
and Red Army unitn.
By March the situation had become so critical that the
question was raised in the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars*
After discussing the problem on March 8 f SNK promulgated
a decree on the distribution of paper which instituted
newsprint rationing for the old and new capitals by curtailing
the number end circulation of papers in the two cities*
Petrograd was restricted to two papers, circulating up to
400,000 copies daily, but limited to four pages* In Moscow
Golos tyudovoRO krest
*
ianstva , the peasant organ of VTsIK,
was restricted to 30,000 copies and two pages, as was Ekon*
omlcheskala zhlzn* on four pages. Pravda was limited to a
circulation of 150,000, while Izvestlla could print up to
400,000 copies* All papers were prohibited from expanding their
5
format If they did not realize the allotted circulation*
Two days later the Soviet of Worker and Peasant Defense
4* Rappeport, M.L. , Deflat' let qb bovevom pogtu i istori
1
"Krasnol gagetv* . 1918-19287 Leningrad, 1928, pp. 54-8
(Hereafter cited as Rappeport, Desiaf £g£).
5. Dekretv sovotakol vlastl * vol* IV, pp. 640-2* "Decree
on Distribution of Paper March 8, 1919" • Infractions
would be taken before responsible revolutionary tribunals*
A similar decree had been promulgated November 19, 1918,
but apparently was ineffective* Ibid * * pp* 555-7.
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ordered the collection of waste paper of all sorts and its
delivery to paper industries to help overcome the shortage.
^
Curtailment and rationing provisionally solved the pro-
blem at the center and in the old capital, but in the local-
ities no such solution was forthcoming, and it is not im-
probable that no solution was available for the provinces.
The disruption of transport and the vicissitudes of the Civil
War made distribution of paper on a regular basic to the pro-
vinces difficult, and given the scarcity at the center,
extremely unlikely. Supply by infrequent agit-prop trips to
the local area was equally insufficient and unsatisfactory.
The provinces, left to shift for themselves, could not over-
come the crisis, and more papers had to close or curtail
their activities.
Even in Petrograd and Moscow the figures adopted by SlfK
were found unrealistic and further cuts were made in their
press during the summer. ^ Toward the end of 1919 both Pravda
and Izvestila had become two page papers, a condition from
which they had still not recovered by the end of 1920.
Similar fates overtook Ekonomicheskaja shizn* and the two
Petrograd papers, Krasnala gazeta and Petrogradskala pravda ,
although the latter were curtailed to two pages later in 1919
6. Ibid . . p. 478.
7. Igveatlla tsentral* notto komiteta rossllskoi komraunlstl-
cheskol partil (b). #4, July 19, 1919, p. 2 (Hereafter
cited as %z TsK).
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and resumed four page publication in the fall of 1920. By
the 8th party conference in December the situation had not
improved, and Krestlnskil in giving the Organizational Report
would state, "the paper hunger prevents expansion of circula-
SftesoiAS li*t~« ntt aJC Mm a
tion with respect to the demand for the paper . ..." In the
final analysis the newsprint crisis could not be solved
during the Civil War, despite these efforts because party
and state had all their attention focused on the war.
Another factor contributing to the difficulties of the
Soviet press was the apparatus servicing the various papers.
But in the case of the dissemination system and other institu-
tions concerned with distribution of the press, the apparatus
established during the Civil War remained largely unchanged in
the early twenties, even though it functioned imperfectly.
Atf^v tftnlwd^l A**^*^ of Tuantfi Pojphat* and
The creation of the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) by decree
of VTsIK September 7, 1918, which institutionalized the pre-
vious amalgamation of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency and the
8MK Press Buro, established a central information service for
the RSFSR. By the end of 1918 telegraphic reportage in the
8. Voa'mala konferentslla RKP(b), prptokoly. Moscow, 1961,
p. 27. Pravda's circulation at that time was 215,000.
9. £ partllnol i sovetskol pechatj, obornlk fokuqentov, Hos-
cow, 1954, pp. 180-1 (Hereafter cited as p. Pfrt i sov
pochatl ). Prokhorov, E. p., "Rossliskoye telegraphnoye
agentstvo 1 pervyye shagl sovetskol ^hurnalistskoi perlodiki
U919-1921gg.)", in Mlohuris, A.L., Ed., Partllno-spvet-
afcala Pachat' v period bor'by za s^rqiteystvo sotsial^-
» p. 33, states that ROSTA was also choseima > Moscow. 19^4. . sen
to solidify the ties with the local press. After its first
8L
press and even some longer articles world bear the interpola-
tion ROSTA, much in the same way that AP and UPI are used
today*
To assist in disseminating publications, postal -telegraph-
ic agencies were put at the disposal of the press in the fall
of 1918 and a central agency of VTsIK for the supply and dis-
semination of works of the press (Tsentro Pechat 9 ) was created.
Like ROSTA, Tsentro Pechat 9 soon established subsections
attached to gubernia and uescd executive political committees
(Ispolcoms). This distribution system was confirmed November
23, 1918, by the Presidium of VTsIK in a decree that united
all dissemination activity under Tsentro Pechat 1 , and named
V.D. Bonch-Bruyevich to head the agency* In the spring of
1919 dissemination of non-military papers from the center to
the Red Army was included in the duties of Tsentro Pechat 9 and
from June 1, a special section in the agency controlled dis-
semination of the press to the fronts** 1
congress in 1919, took upon itself the realization of the
party line in the press. Shortly after its creation ROSTA
began to publish an instructional sheet, Aglt-ROSTA . which
advised and instructed the provincial press on its tasks,
failures and direction*
10. Dekretv sovetskol vlastl . vol. IV, pp* 52-3i lurko,
"Sozdaniye bazy sovetskol pechat!" . pp. 25-7. At its
first congress, December 1*2, 1916, the workers of
institutions disseminating the press confirmed this decree.
Izvestlla * May 16, 1919, p. 2t Pravda . May 25, 19l9 t p.3.
This section distributed only the party-Soviet press to
the Red Army apparently* It is uncertain whether it
disseminated army papers from one unit to another*
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But like eo much else during the Civil War execution of
a defined role remained beyond the ability of the assigned
institution. From all Indications the confusion of the Civil
War prevented any of the Institutions serving the press from
fulfilling their designated functions except In the limited
area controlled by the Soviet Government. Other factors
influenced their performance. The Postal-Telegraph Agency
still harbored many who did not support the Soviet government.
According to Pravda » "Our post works ... poorly. All the
provinces groan that they receive neither letters nor papers.
The post works so badly that the majority of provincial Soviets
refuse to send papers since the papers that are sent all too
often are not received at all or are received with great
13delay. Unlike the papers, the distributing institutions
were not affected by the papers crisis , but the dissemin-
ation apparatus suffered particularly from the fortunes of the
Civil War. Outside the central core continually controlled by
the Bolsheviks It maintained a tenuous existence and could not
12. In a session of the Smolensk Gubernla Committee, May 7
1920 , It was noted that Tsentro Pechat 9 material did not
reach Smolensk and It was necessary for the local press to
create Its own material. Smolensk Party Archives . WKP 6.
13. Pravda . October 11, 1918, p. 1. A similar complaint over
Vardln f s signature appeared In Pravda . October 27, which
reported that the Vitebsk Soviet received only 2 or 3
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be relied upon to perform its duties* . , .
leadership and Control
Confronted with these two basic problems, the new Soviet
Government nevertheless tried to proceed with the formulation
of guidelines for its publications and construction of a press
net* For the most part it was a frustrating period of trial and
error, and the few achievements were quickly discarded when
new conditions and tasks confronted the state with the coming
of peace in 1921, umxA
Leadership of the press during the Civil War was exercised
not unilaterally by the party, as it had been before and
immediately after the revolution. The trend established soon
after October, which saw the Soviets take charge in certain
areas of the press, continued. This should not be taken to
mean an abandonment of control of the press by the Bolsheviks,
but rather its theoretical guidance by the party* with the
execution and control devolving upon VTsIK as the institution
issuing the legislation. - m&AVHm** ri • » *
The position expounded by Lenin in April on the tasks of
the press had remained the blue print from which guidance was
drawn and it was refined in September by another major
article entitled "On the Character of Our Papers*. Again
the party leader expostulated against the great space devoted
to political twaddle and the scant attention paid to the con-
struction of a new life. Political information should be
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condensed Into short telegraphic notes Instead of perpetuat-
ing the habits of bourgeois papers* What the Soviet press
needed was more economics * a careful gathering and studying
of the facts of socialist construction, to show the people
what was happening within the state. The chief function of
the press was the education of the masses In this vein through
14
concrete models and examples from all areas of life*
This second statement became the focal point for a
series of articles In the central papers by lesser party
figures who In the waning days of 1918 discussed the role of
the press* Lenin had posited the Idea of a press responsive
to the demands of a society changing from capitalism to social
Ism* laroslavskll replied to this ldea t that While the press
had become the proponent of socialism among the masses*
papers were not reaching the people . and the party should
start by Improving the vehicle before Its delivery*^
Kerzhentsev took up the same thane, complaining that Soviet
papers were worse than the former bourgeois sheets* They were
all from the same mold and copied one another without relief i
there was no difference between a worker and peasant paper or
between a central or provincial dally* It would be better to
curtail the number of papers and Improve the quality of those
remaining* The latter could then be reconstructed along
14* Lenin o pechat
1
> pp* 600*2*
15* Pravda . September 24, 1918, p. 1, fifth lead article*
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various lines according to type, 16 But not all members of
the party shared Lenin's view on the press, and the belief
was expressed on the pages of Izvestlla that papers had no
right to criticize deficiencies of the Soviet system. 17
The difference of opinion at the center and the obvious
contrast between what the center wanted and what the localities
could deliver led to demands for the convoking of a confer*
ence of pres3 workers. Provincial editors and their staffs
claimed that the time had come for a discussion of the problems
confronting the press and that the Initiative for such a
meeting should come from the center, Steklov, the editor
of Izvestlla. responded to this feeling by placing the
question In his paper for public discussion, suggesting the
time of the 6th Congress of the Soviets, since many editors
would be participating in that meeting. 18 Apparently the
provincial demand was confirmed by the rest of the press and
the first congress of Soviet journalists convened in Moscow
16, ££|vga, October 6, 1918, p. 1, fifth lead article. This
reflects the same idea that Molotov had used in vain
to secure a separate paper for the Petrograd Committee In
May, 1917. It was still premature in 1918, but with the
change to HEP it would become party policy.
17, Izvestlla. October 17, 1918, p. 2. This thesis was firmly
rejected by Ol'minskii (Pravda, October 26, 1918, p. 1,fifth lead article) and by M. Ligina ( Pravda . December 31,
1918, p. 1, fourth lead article) who stated that defects
of the system had to be discussed in the pros3.
18, Izvestlla . October 23, 1918, p. 2.
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on November 13 , with such party dignitaries as Radek, Karoenev
19 in A* nitre*
and Kollontii in attendance.
The congress began with a reiteration of the demands
expounded by Lenin In his articles on the press. As Radek
put it in his report to the congress "... the Soviet press
must on the one hand exhaustively illuminate the construction
of the new life and on the other «•« It must have sufficient
courage to show all the deficiencies of the new state appar-
atus. 0 This theme was generally accepted by the meeting,
although the idea of criticism aroused a certain hesitancy
in Steklev, since the difficult situation during the Civil
Mar prohibited full exposition of the state's deficiencies.
Despite Steklov's qualms the congress resolution on Radek 9 s
report recognized the need for full and free criticism of
general policy and specific acts or defects in local and cen-
tral institutions* As a hedge against the abuse of this
privilege, the resolution insisted that the relationship
between the press and local organs of Soviet power be institut-
ed and regulated by the local party organization. The right
to criticize obtained as long as this criticism was, in the
words of the editor of Bednota . Sosnovskli, prudent.
19. The material on the congress which follows is taken from
reports in Igvestlla . November 14-7 , Krasnala esseta.
November 16. pass£tn7 and Vardin (MgeladsSe) Illarion V. f
Sovotakaja pochat*\ sbornik etatel . Moscow. 1924, pp. 126*
30 (Hereafter cited as Vardln, Sov pechat' ).
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Having delineated the competence and role of the Soviet
press i the congress turned to Its leadership* In the pre*
October period the Central Committee had led the press* How*
ever the more extensive paper net and the preoccupation with
the war precluded a similar arrangement In 1918. For want of
other alternatives the congress created a Tsentro Soviet of
the All-Russian Union of Soviet Journalists , which would lead
and direct the press. Behind this idea lay the desire to
combine and coordinate the several agencies and institutions
which had hitherto shared responsibility for the press, in*
eluding the functions of the Central Committee, Tsentro Buro
of the Soviet press
,
NKV0, SNK and ROSTA. As the resolution
of the congress stated, Tsentro Soviet would **.* resolve
questions on the organization of all the Soviet press and
designate the general principles of its activities . . . * , in
addition to taking upon Itself the protection of the needs of
journalists.
Finally the congress considered the problem of the press
net, over which two points of view arose* Steklov defended the
position that there should be two types of papers t leading
and popular, the one in the language of and intended for lead*
Ing workers and peasants, the other for the masses, abridged
and written in popular language* Sosnovskii saw the question
in a different light* He felt all traces of the bourgeois
past and influence had to be eliminated, and the Soviet paper
transformed into a publication for the simple mouzhik or
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proletarian. In the end the congress supported Steklov** posi-
tion and ordered the preservation of leading and mass dailies
,
at the same time proposing the creation of those papers in
centers where they did not exist.
The resolutions adopted by the congress were meant to
control and organize the press, but in most cases they were
unrealistic* With the exception of the emphasis on criticism
which remained an integral part of the state # s press program,
all the other proposals 9 came to naught* In the area of lead*
ership, the attempt to unite all aspects of the press under
the aegis of the union of journalists meant the loss of any
direct party control and guidance, and the merging of party
and trade union activities in a totally new and untried
institution* The congress was undoubtedly ri xht in its
appraisal of the need for a single central authority, but
Tsentro Soviet was not the answer* and it never functioned In
20
this manner*
The decision on the types of papers was equally un-
realistic, since the demands of the Civil War and militariza-
tion of the press in support of the Red Army prevented the
realisation of even such general distinctions until the
preoccupation with the war passed, and peace provided the
background for differentiation in the press* The papers
20* The three sessions of Tsentro Soviet show very limited
participation and few accomplishments • Igvestila * Decem-
ber 3, 26 and 31, 1918, passim .
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that existed during the hostilities were either agitational
sheets, printed for their shock value and to encourage and
arouse the population in support of the Soviet Government, or
Red Army papers destined for soldiers and sailors. In such
conditions distinctions between leading and popular papers was
not possible or useful. The concentration on agitation at
the expense of propaganda, cultural activity, education and
economic construction and the crisis in the supply of news*
print forced curtailment rather than expansion of the press
net, thus precluding the creation of new papers and even
preventing the transformation of existing papers into leading
and popular sheets*
The apparent preoccupation of the party with other matters,
evidenced by the convocation of the congress through soviet
rather than party institutions, was further revealed at the
3th party congress, March 1S-23, 1919. At the first session
Osinskli, replying to a statement by Lenin that the press
expressed the views of the Central Committee, notedi
"Such an explanation would be possible to recognize
as correct only if the CC led the party press* But this
is not [the case} and has not been* I am one of the
editors of the Central Organ Fravda , and X must state,
that no leading orders have been received from the Cen-
tral Committee* The Central Committee has not led the
Central Organ. "21
Osinskli* s views were supported within Pravda by Men 'shot,
another member of the staff, who stated that while the
2l * Vos'mol s»ezd a RKP(b) . protokoly . Moscow, 1954, p. 27.
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Central Committee considered this situation normal f he
22personally believed it was a mistake* Sosnovskli's general
report at the sixth session also dwealt on the deficiencies
of party leadership , showing that the connection between the
party and the masses was a direct function of the press which
was weak throughout the country* In fact many party organisa-
tions had no idea of how to deal with the press or how impor-
tant It was. These revelations and accusations were instru-
mental In determining the general theme of the congress reso-
lution on the press , which ordered local party committees to
take measures for its improvement and reminded party members
of the value of the press as a weapon of propaganda, agitation,
23
organization and as a means of influencing the masses.
Apparently the decree of the congress was ineffectual or
poorly executed 9 because within two months the whole range of
press questions was re-examined at the second congress of
journalists* Unlike the first congress, the second was undis-
tinguished in its leadership and even less notable in its
results. The demands of the Civil War prevented many editors
from attending the congress, and the party leaders were in-
volved in far more important matters. The failure of the
22. Pravda . March 21, 1919, p. 1, third lead article. The
Petrograd Committee also felt that it had no ties with
its paper and that it was trying to rectify the situation.
23 * Vog'mol e^ ezd . RKP(b) . protokoly . Moscow, 1959, pp. 295-6
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first congress was admitted by the dissolution of Xsentro
Soviet* In its place the congress ceiled into existence a
new unions TsokcsMShur, based on party organizations instead of
functioning through trade unions and Soviets* The new union
consisted of a Communist Union of Journalists and its Central
uammlttoet supposedly parallel to and linked with the party
structure at all levels from the central to the local committee.
Once again the congress placed responsibility for all press
24
activities on its new creation*
Like its predecessor Tsekomzhur failed to provide either
leadership or direction for the Soviet press. The party never
accepted the new union or recognised its status* The fifteen
man Central Committee was unable to meet regularly during the
Civil War and at its final meeting after the 9th party congress,
it could only lament the critical condition of the press and
25
the disorganised state of its journalists* iy
The lack of central leadership and the absence of a
concerted policy beyond the general task of criticism made
the functioning of the press more and more difficult as the
Civil War intensified and then merged with the Polish War in
1920. Scarcity of newsprint only aggravated this condition. As
the press became the province of lesser lights within the >r
24. Izveatiia . May 15, 1919, p. 2| Vardin, Sov pochat*. pp.
25. Vardin, Sov. Pechat* . P» i32.
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party hierarchy, the quality and quantity of papers within
Soviet Russia declined* The 9th party congress in April, 1920,
noted tills fact, but could only repeat the already time honored
phrase about paying more attention to economics* It did not
undertake the formulation of resolutions to deal with the
decline of the press, other than appealing to all institutions
26
to raise the production of newsprint*
For the better part of the Civil War then, the press re*
mained an orphan, directed only in the most casual way from
the center* Only toward the end of the hostilities did
the party return to its guidance. As usual the vehicle for
the new initiative was an article by Lenin which recalled the
press to the task of economic construction* Emphasis this time
would be on production propaganda* While Pravda and laves ti la ,
curtailing their reportage devoted to politics and expanding
their coverage of production, would nominally lead the cam*
paign, in this case another paper, Bedaeta * would be the single
leading organ of production propaganda* It was, unlike Pravda
and Igvestlla * a mass popular paper, which could unite the
urban and rural proletariat. This leant it was accessible to
those people immediately concerned with construction and
would have greater influence among them. The only danger in
so utilising Bednota ley in quality control of the appeal
26 » Pwlatyj a"ezd RKP(b) , Mart-Aprel' 1920 * Moscow, 1960,
pp. 416-7 f Smolensk Party Archives* WKP* 254* All further
references to the Smolensk Archives are Indicated by WKP
numbers*
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and its editors would have to control its standards.
Lenin* s article marked a watershed In the history of the
Soviet press. Previously the press had been exclusively an
instrument of agitation in a time of extreme crisis* Mow
the press was called upon to transfer its attention from
military affairs to the problems of reconstruction , end inevit-
ably to HEP. It marked the end of the militarization of the
press, the end of party preoccupation with more important
matters, and the point at which the creation of a press
apparatus within the party was begun to lead and direct the
press and determine its role within the Soviet state. Before
this change can be documented it is necessary to consider
what press net the party had at its disposal.
The Press Ret
The Soviet press net at the start of the Civil War was
weak and poorly established in terms of quality, extent and
circulation, yet it was far better than at any time before and
than it would be at any time up to the end of 1920, Nor are
the reasons for the decline from this modest level hard to find.
The ebb and flow of the Civil War destroyed newly created
papers at an alarming rate. Scarcity of printing supplies,
especially newsprint, forced the curtailment of format and
periodicity, and many times even stopped publication. Finally
27. L«nln o pechatl . pp. 630-1.
1
the demands of the Civil War stripped party committees and
Soviets of their most experienced cadres including those with
publication experience and the publications devolved into the
hands of inexperienced party members or poorly trained work-
ers^...
»'ir-u ftftr -r afsar Mil of iHsniriiii ted irnSskiifT »•*
In the middle of July, 1918 "... it was difficult to say
anything satisfactory* • . " about the 150 to 200 papers publish*
28ing in the Soviet part of Russia* The absence of original
articles was total, and it was impossible to tell from what
area of the country a paper came because there was rarely any
material of a local character in it. Statistics, official
notices, telegrams and reprints were the usual fare In the
provinces* Evan the central party and soviet organs suffered
In part from this dryness of material, a situation that drew
frequent complaints. Ekonomlcheskala zhlzn* was accused of
leading a conspiratorial existence without being a real paper.
The editors of the White (Belo) Russian paper Zvezda report-
ed a lack of collaborators, poor articles on trite themes and
stated that "
.
. . up to this time it is ridiculous to note that
not a single local paper has even one reporter, we have no cor-
29
respondents, the sections of our papers are led only so-so,"
28. Pravda . August 15, 1916, p. 1, fifth lead article
29. Quoted from Zvezda . October 4, 1918, in Zernltskii, M.
,
"Belerusskala gazeta *£Nttsa • v 1918 soou". Voprosy
zhurnallstlki . Issue 1, 1960, p. 48 (Hereafter cited
as Zernltskii, "Gazeta •zvezda'").
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Papers failed to generate interest in the economy and even
after Lenin's appeal did not reveal the deficiencies of state
apparatus or unmask corruption and slackers* Provincial publi-
cations especially drew fire for their drab, colorless appear*
ance with page after page of decrees and protocols of mar-
30ginal use to the population* These defects were summarised
in the resolution of the 8th party congress on the press*
* 1) The general weakening of the party press during
the aivil War *•• has been harmfully reflected in the
composition of our party and soviet press* The general
shortcoming of almost all our party and soviet publications
is the separation from local and frequently from general
political life* The provincial party and soviet press al-
most completely does not illustrate local life, and mater*
ial on general questions is selected in a very clumsy man*
ner* Long boring articles are printed instead of those
that resound with simple language in short signed articles
to the leading questions of general and local life* Some-
times whole pages are filled with decrees instead of that
which expounds by simple accepted language the most impor-
tant of them* They print fully a variety of decrees and
instructions from different enterprises and institutions
instead of material to set up a living chronicle of local
llfe."3l
The congress explained these deficiencies by the flight of the
best party literary personnel to Government work and suggested
that local organisations would be well advised to rectify the
situation by designating special comrades for press work and
by paying special attention to the masses for which their
papers were predominantly destined* At the center Pravda
30* Pravda * January I5 f 1919. p* 1. fifth lead article.
3-» VPs' tool s»egd RKP(b) . protokoly . Moscow, 1959 t p. 436.
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would devote its attention to the question of party construe-
tion and lead the provincial press*
The congress might well have directed its attention to
other endeavors • Its concern was wasted, even at the center*
as the confusion of the Civil War made correction of these
problems beyond the power of the party* Before the congress had
adjourned Izvestlla was accused of being bourgeois* of attempt-
ing to become a socialist Times * an accusation that was answer*
33
ed sharply by Steklov. Instead of improving, the quality of
the press seemed to respond inversely to any attention paid
to it* Trotsky complained about this to the printers
i
"Comrade printers, our printing technique is terrible*
Whole series are so blurred that you can't make out a
single line* the number of misprints, jumbled lines are
innumerable* To the person who for ten years has become
accustomed to reading papers and understands a phrase
from two words, it is difficult often times impossible to
decypher the idea of our paper articles* "34
Even the most widely read papers Bednota. Ke—mar and Golos
trij***wftmo kflrestHanstva were distinguished by their poor
printing* and their content remained unresponsive to the
exhortations of the congress* In the village the peasantry
didn't read papers because provincial writers did not know
32* Ibid* * pp. 436~7.
33
- Pravda . March 26* 1919* p* 1* fifth lead article.
34* Trotsky* Soch . vol. 21, p. 243. "For the Quality of the
Press***
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how to write for the countryside. Articles were too long, on
the wrong subjects and in a Language unrecognizeable to the
35
muzhiks # Vardin summarized the situation at the bth party
conference.
* Beside the insufficient circulation of papers, it
is necessary to say 9 that our papers are very bad . . .
.
Even Izvestlla TsIK does not have a continual cadre of
collaborators , to say nothing about the provincial press.
In this sense the decision of the VHIth congress, which
recoiaMtfided paying attention to the press 9 has remained
only a decision. M 36
In the more urban areas where a superior party organic
zation existed and the congress decree should have achieved
results 9 the press remained reproachable. Party and soviet in-
difference hindered the development of the press and diverted
it from the road to perfection* According to Pravda . the over-
whelming majority of provincial editors and journalists
,
despite the attention of the ttth party congress and the second
congress of journalists, were not devoted to the basic tasks
37
confronting the local press. The problem of rallying the
masses to the paper , which had been established by the journa-
lists , was not carried out at all, and local press workers and
35 « Igvestlia . June 25 f 1919, p. 4.
36. Vos'mai* kenferentslla RKP(b) . protokolv . Moscow. 1961 ,
p. 34* A footnote indicates that in the verbatim record
Vardin added *It is necessary to carry out the wish, that
the CC pay attention* that our party press has a reserve
staff of paper workers. Without papers we are killing
ourselves. w
37 « Fravda . August 15, 1919, p. 1, third lead article.
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party committees were enjoined to realise these pronouncements.
In the provinces and closer to the center in the did
capital, examination of papers revealed that even in the
major centers the press was unsatisfactory. Deficiencies
elaborated at the 8th congress had not been eliminated. The
ilth General City Conference of the Petrograd Committee found
that its organ, getrosradskaU pravda
. did not lead with its
articles* Local papers had no instructions to follow and did
not discuss the questions of the day in terms of local needs.
The party paper should be a leader, the lively, clear mouthpiece
of the party, interesting, rich in information and not Just
a collection of bourgeois articles.^8
Yet for all this self-flagellation the resolution of the
city conference on the press offered no better solutions than
had been taken at the 8th party congress, enjoining the
Petrograd Committee to designate ... Individual comrades
39for work wholly in its organ." Indeed one commentator in
the old capital compared the character of the Soviet press un-
favorably with pre-revolutionary papers, a picture which
press workers and editors of the period corroborate.^0
38. Petrogradskala pravda . November 27, 1919, p. 2.
40, Lltovskil recalls that papers were bad technically in
their presentation of material, proofreading and make-
up, Kotlyar and Rappeport remember blank pages, sensa-
tionalism and dull format. Lltovskil, o. , Tak 1 bylo .
39. Ibid .
Moscow, 1951, p. 14.
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By 1920 the worst was over, passing with the crisis
period of the Civil War, and the continual cry about the
quality of format and content of the press began to subside,
but not disappear. Rather concern began to be voiced about
expanding format and developing new sections. In Smolensk,
Petrograd and Moscow consideration was given to preparation
of youth columns, expansion of sections devoted to worker
life and information on the life of women in Soviet Russia.*1
With the decline in the military pressure after the height of
tiie Polish attack a turning point was reached for the condition
of the press just as it was in terms of the direction from
the center and for the extent of the press network.
The extent of the press net during the Civil War is far
less clear than its condition. In those years the character
and extent of the paper net were the subject of widespread and
fairly continuous debate. The days immediately after the revo-
lution had witnessed a proliferation of Bolshevik periodicals
as nearly every party committee took upon Itself the task of
publishing a paper. The seizure of numerous soviet sheets
augmented this party net. 3y early summer of 1918 this teo
Kotlyar, A., (Pseud), Newspapers Iff the USSR. New York,
1955, pp. 2»5 (Hereafter cited as Kotlyar. Newspapers ).
41. WKP 6 and 7 have a variety of materials on setting up
new sections and columns In Rabochll put* . In Petrograd
the youth coition began in the spring in Krasnala gageta
and in January, 1921 in Petrogradskala oravda . while the
women 9 s section began to appear every sixth issue at the
end of the spring, ftone of these innovations survived the
press crisis of 1922.
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rapidly expanded net had been severely curtailed by the
activities of the Whites and Germans* This trend undoubtedly
continued during the Civil War with battlefield fluctuations
responsible for the rise and fail of innumerable publications.
The stripping of local literary talent and the preoccupation
with fighting the war undoubtedly accounted for the demise of
other papers. If Sosnovskll's figure of 150*200 papers is
taken as a starting point, then certain patterns emerge*
Consideration was given inter alia to the number of
papers that should exist in the press net* The experience in
the heady post-October days had been toward extensive prolif-
eration* In the spring of 1918 the advance of hostile forces
or the lack of sustaining power on the part of the publishing
net had removed many of these dallies* Uncontrolled prolifera-
tion also began to meet resistance within the tanks of the
party for the same reasons that Lenin had used with the
Petrograd Organization In May 1917* A report of the delega-
tion of the Don Soviet Government made the point in the follow-
ing manner t "To multiply newspapers with the shortage of
staff is shameful and inexpedient* It is necessary to recast
42
and improve existing [papers]. M The idea of a restricted
press net emphasizing quality rather than quantity was not
accepted* however, until the first congress of journalists
"rtten proliferation was abandoned*
42* Sbomlk bol* shevistskaia oechat' * part 2, p. 15.
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Initially at the congress uncontrolled expansion was
proposed with the idea of creating a vast network of papers
for town and country. This proposal was attacked by Kerzhen-
tsev on behalf of the congress presidium.
"To create hundreds of new papers in all corners
of Russia means, in place of the organization of the
Soviet press on rationally begun lines, to organize
confusion, since it is more reasonable, rational,
especially in the absence of paper and • • . technical
means to curtail the number of existing papers and at
the same time to Improve their quality and cheapen them. "43
The congress supported Kerzhentsev* s stand against prolif-
eration, but at the same time prophesied future developments
by referring to the time ahead when every uezd and village
would have its own paper. The lack of newsprint and the
emphasis on quality rather than quantity defeated the idea of
massive proliferation, and the principle of curtailment
became the conscious objective of the party* A similar feeling
was expressed within the Smolensk party organization.
"The strivings of our local comrades to create in
every nest in every city their own paper ... with the
absence of those cadres of literary workers among our
party must be shed. Ours is not an individual uezd or
city party, but a party of the whole oblast ... and must
have its expression on a paper reflecting the power,
harmony and organization that at the present time can
be fulfilled only by an oblast paper. M44
Proceeding from the determination to Improve quality, the
party approached the realization of this aim from two direc-
.f
,
rav?a » November 21, 1918, p. 1, sixth lead article.
44. WKP 2.
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tlonst At the center and in the more responsible and larger
city organizations , various publications were suspended.
VTsIK had already taken steps along this line during the
fall of 1918 by closing Vestnlk bluro voyennykh kotaalssarov
and Ftnansy £ narodnoye khozlalstvo . other papers had to
curtail their format or stop publication of their evening
edition**"* In Saratov the local committee decided to dis-
continue Its Red Army publication and combine three uezd
papers Into one* To Improve and assist the remaining publica-
tions, the center , as it had done In the months before
October, dispatched experienced press workers to local
46papers*
Toward the end of November a commission , created by SNK
to consider what kinds of papers should be closed, reported
the need to preserve In the large centers still under
Bolshevik control three types of publications, a soviet,
party and popular paper. The provincial centers would be
served by a single political paper | similarly the Institutional
press would be sharply curtailed. But realization of this
program was beyond the power of the party. Many of the Im-
portant centers could barely support one publication. The
Smolensk Committee recognized the need for printing Zvezda ,
45* flkt X knlga . pp. 135-6| lurko, "Sozdanlye bazy sovetskol
pechatl "
, p. 16.
46. Verzhbitskil, N. , Zap! ski starogo zhurnallsta , Moscow,
1961, pp. 169-71.
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but it had been driven out of the city by the Germans.
Forced to live a shadowy existence dependent on unreliable
technical and monetary support, it suspended publication for
various lengths of time.^'
The initial shakedown of the press net, aided by the
course of the Civil War continued into 1919 and soon threat-
ened to surpass the limitations which the center had suggest-
ed. One report on the press in the localities noted the
extreme scarcity of periodicals In the provinces.
••Many uezd organizations have had to stop the
publication of their own papers, (sometimes without
damage to the situation, that Is the local organs are
not always distinguished by good condition) many guber-
nlas have begun to curtail the size of their papers. *4S
The report then related the closing of all uezd papers In
Novgorod Gubernia and the combining of their editorial boards
for a single gubernia paper. In other gubemlas the endemic
shortage of newsprint forced suspension of papers or limitation
of their size regardless of the plan at the center. Golos
bednota In Kursk and Izvestlla of the Petrograd Soviet went
under for this reason, while ail the rest of the Petrograd
press was forced to reduce Its format. The program for se-
lective curtailment was thus speeded up and perhaps pushed
beyond the Intended limits by the lack of press resources.
i
-
47. Zernltskll, "Gazeta »Zvezda* M
, pp. 44-Cj Martselel, Pechat
*
Belorussll. pp. 101-3.
48. Iz TsK . #4, July 9, 1919, p. 2.
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The one area which did not conform to this trend was the
military press. Before October only a handful of military
papers had existed attached to party organizations. Follow-
ing the revolution a limited flowering of these publications
occurred along with the general proliferation of the press,
but this growth was not sustained despite the creation of the
Red Army in February, 191&. The onset of the Civil War
aroused concern at the center for this type of paper and spark-
ed a discussion about the place and need for special Red Army
publications.
In the first months of the Civil War no action was taken
to delimit a net of Red army papers, although a variety of
them sprung up in various units of the army. By the spring of
1919 this haphazard development had resulted in a situation
that caused Izvestiia to say that the Red Army was living without
its own press, and at this sta^e the Red Army press seemed to
suffer from the same problems that afflicted other Soviet
AO
papers. Only the subject matter was different.
At about the same time the question of a special Red
Army paper, corresponding to the central organ for the party,
Soviets and peasantry, was raised. The journalists* congresses
and the 8th party congress had not considered the question or
even paid any attention to the problems of the military press,
so there was no guidance from those sources. During the first
49 » Izvestiia , April 13, 1919, p. 1, third lead article.
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months of the Civil War Kraaaala arm!la , created in September
1918 and discontinued in November, had served in the capacity
of a central military organ, but the center felt no need to
create another. Since workers, peasants and soldiers all
belonged to the same family no special periodicals were needed
for the Red Army. "We must cease publishing special Red Army
papers* There must be only worker and peasant* * Anyway the
fronts didn 9 t read papers and the newsprint shortage was so
acute that the state could not afford such publications,"*^
Theory at the center however clashed radically with
practice in the field. As the worker and peasant press
contracted, the military press expanded* For in the years of
the Civil War the Soviet press became increasingly militarized.
All the central papers initiated Red Army columns that assumed
important and large positions in the publication. The basic
content of the press became more and more war oriented, as
was natural in a period when military events rather than
economic construction meant the life or death of the government.
On the other side of the coin, hand in hand with the expansion
of the Red Army went the proliferation of military papers. No
special decision was taken in favor of these publications nor
was the sentiment in Izvestlla repudiated, but they continued
to appear in ever greater numbers, responding to the army * s
need for papers and providing a natural tool among the soldiers*
50, Ibid * . Hay 4, 1919, p. 1, fourth lead article*
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Published by the political section in the individual unit
or by the revolutionary military Soviets for the purpose of
informing and educating the masses of the armies
,
military
papers were controlled in theory by the party through its
political commissars in the Red Army* To assist these publics*
tions, a special military press section was created in the
Revolutionary Military Soviet to supply them with a continuous
stream of xoaterlals*
The military publications that arose in the early days of
the Civil War were short lived generally, a situation that
probably contributed to the initiation of Red Army columns
and supplements in the rest of the press * But by the end of
1913 or early in 1919, even as Izvestila wrote against special
army papers* a network of front, army and division publications
was being decided on. This decision was implemented early in
1919, and by the summer twenty (me army level papers existed
in addition to two fleet, two special army group and several
division publications* 51
Initially they were subject to the many mistakes that
^^^i
plagued the rest of the Soviet press. Frequently they did not
reflect the life of the soldiers and many published only polit-
ical articles rather than articles concerning the life of the
52
Red Army* By the end of the Civil War, however, the
51. Portiankin, Sgv voyea oechat* . p# io.
52. Fravda, June 15, 1919, p. 3.
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majority of these mistakes had been corrected and all the
larger amy units had been provided with papers. If at the
end of 1918 there were only ninety Red Array publications 9 by
the end of the war there were one hundred seventy military
papers. Some of the more Important of those were Krasnvi
kavalerlst , Kraanyl baltllakli flot . Soldat revollutsll at *
Tsaritsyn and Krasnvi. voln of the 11th Array on the Astrakhan
Front*
In the course of its development the military press had
to create an apparatus to organize, direct and distribute its
papers* Before the establishment of the Political Board of the
Revolutionary Military Soviet, to which publication activities
were attached, supplying of the Red Array with various papers
and literature was done by several institutions. The most
important of these was the military section of Che VTsIK pub-
lishing house. Other material was secured through the cul-
tural-education section of the All-Russian Buro of Military
Commissars and the several other publishing houses. In 1919
the Rewoyensoviet created its own literary-publication section
to unite all these sources, and to support this merger, the
Soviet of Worker and Peasant Defense obliged Glavbum to desig-
nate monthly fifty per cent of all types of paper for the Red
Army.
53. Berezhnoi, A.F. , Furmanov i Zhumalist . Leningrad, 1955,
p. 74.
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This arrantamont helped distribute papers to various
units. It was assisted by the travels of armored trains
which served as command vehicles. Almost all of these trains
had print shops which produced literature and papers for
the area through which they were passing and distributed
military publications to the troops* Closely analogous to the
military train publications were the papers printed on agi-
tation trips by high party members during the Civil War* There
were at least five trains and one steamer of this type, or-
ganised by VTsIK, which in the period 1918-20 completed twenty
4*l£ ability to dive; 'the meet up to date t»
expeditions around the territory held by the Bolsheviks.
Uiued up to* the first years of SE?# uwiniU| twelr con*
Kalinin led eleven of these trips, printing papers whenever
the occasion or opportunity demanded. On the twenty wagon
*October Revolution 91 one full car was devoted to the press com*
plete with editorial board, presses, papers and inks. At each
city or important center it published a two page, twenty
five by forty centimeter paper, concentrating mainly on current
events and the military situation. In areas which had their
own papers, the facilities of the train would be used to assist
the local publication which was usually very weak. Where no
55paper existed, the train published one*
54. Kleandrova, V.M. , Organizatslia ^ formy detatel 'nostl VTsIK
(19l7-l92>4gg. ), Moscow, 1968, pp. 89-90. Sergeyev, B.
•Agitpoyezdki M.I. Rallnina v gody grazhdanskol voiny*,
Krasnvl arkhlv . #1 (86)* 1938, pp. 93-168.
55. Vershbitskil, N. , Zaolskl starogo shuraalista . Leningrad,
1955, pp. 182-91.
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On one trip to the eastern front following the rout of Kolchak
in 1919 Kalinin gave the following description of its publi-
cation activities*
•••On the tour a paper was published. This tour
paper had a small format, the type of our central Bed-
nota , had very great success especially among the red
army e6chelons, which took it This paper gave the
most exhaustive information. When this or that city had
a local paper , then ours always succeeded in receiving
and gathering information mere quickly than the local,
and it was characteristic that in our paper there was
given more information on local interests than in the
local paper. ,#, 56
The great value of these trips derived from mobility and
their ability to give the most up to date information. They
continued up to the first years of NEP, changing their con*
tents and message to meet altered situations.
The history of the Soviet press during the Civil War
then represents a story of trial and error , an attempt to
define programs that were incapable of realization because
the course of events was beyond the control of the party and
state. Preoccupation with military events left the press in
the hands of press men who lacked the power to execute their
decisions. As Vardin said, "the main trouble of the press
is [sic] that the party , absorbed with the struggle at
the fronts, had not devoted to it sufficient attention." 5 ^
56. Quoted in Part i sov pechat* v bor'be , p. 49.
57. Vardin, II* » "Nasha periodicheskala pechat fM , Pechat' 1
revollutslla . Book 3, 1921, p. 137.
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The militarization of the press in this period was a natural
development given the concern with the war as was the decline
of party and soviet press. By the end of 1920 the situation
had become far less critical as the Red Army pushed its
enemies to the ends of the state. At this time the party
returned to its consideration of the press, hoping to lay the
foundation of its future development* The ideas generated in
the Civil War # although impossible of execution at the time,
would be revived again as the party sought a basis and pro-
gram for the Soviet press*
in
CHAPTER IV
THE PRESS CRISIS OF 1922
The End of Party Preoccupation
The party's preoccupation with the war ended toward the
fall of 1920. Lenin's article signaled this change and indi-
cated the renewed Interest which the party would bring to the
press. This attention had become all the more necessary because
as the hostile armies retreated to the borders of Russia, the
press net expanded again, quickly reaching 580 titles. 1
Guidance for this net remained the decisions of the 8th party
congress 9 but these directives were clearly in need of updating
and reemphasis, since they had been observed in the breach
during the fighting, and following the Civil War new problems
arose for the Soviet press. Additionally neither Tsentro Buro
or Tsekomzhur had been able to lead the press effectively,
coordinating leadership at the center to combat party indiffer-
ence to it*
The party took the initial steps to correct irregulari-
ties in the press at the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921.
In August two groups within the agit-prop section of the Central
Committee began serious work in the areas of dissemination
,
publication and subscription. Five months later individual
l« Vertlnskli. Gazeta v Rossll , p. 137. This figure represents
only gubemia (246) and uezd (334) papers. The number of
central and army papers in unknown*
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subsections were created within the gubernla committees to deal
with* inter alia , all aspects of the press at that level. 2 This
activity at the center provided the setting for another article
by Lenin which noted the party's indifference to the press in
the preceding five years and returned to the old slogans « ori-
ginally enunciated in 191b , of less politics and more produc-
tion propaganda* On this occasion the party leader castigated
Soviet bureaucrats who plundered papers before they reached
their destination* If they could be prevented from wasting
thousands of copies* the country's needs could easily be sa-
tisfied with a smaller circulation* The newsprint saved in
this manner could be used for other press work$*~
Lenin's article and the creation of a central leadership
apparatus, did not however* provide specific guidelines for
local publications* To fill this gap the agit-prop section*
2. IS TsK * #27. p* 5 and #28, p. 14. January and March 1921.
In 1921 the agit-prop section had five subsections $ pro-
paganda.^ agitation* national minorities* literature dis-
semination and edlting«publicatlon. The fourth section
dealt with Tsentro Pechat' and delivery of literature to
the party# The fifth section published1 Izvestila tsen-
tral'noao komiteta and Vestnlk agit-prop *
3* Lenin £ pechat
i
. pp* 632*5* "On the Work of the Peoples'
Commissariat of Education" » Pravda * February 9. 1921. Vo-
lin elaborated on this thsme in Pravda. February 16* when
he stated that every responsible x?orker and party member
felt he needed a complete set of papers* a feeling that
was shared everywhere in the chain of command. He pro-
posed single sets at capital, gubernia and uezd levels*
where they were needed, but in no case should the press
be pilfered by secretaries and chairmen*
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basing its policy on Lenin 1 * article on the character of the
Soviet press i dispatched a circular which gave detailed
instructions on the content and format of guberaia and uezd
papers* Their most glaring errors, according to the Central
Committee veret
: act, ism had ce MM
*l) The papers are filled with general discussion
and take little participation in the practical construc-
tion of local life, 2) the papers are little popular!
besides the predominance of abstract contents over con-
crete, they give material in the form of long articles
with complicated and not understandable phrases, and 3)
the papers are not the tribune of the readers, don't
have ties with the worker-peasant masses, with organize*
tions and even with local institutions*
*
After calling the attention of local committees to the need for
decisive measures to correct these deficiencies, the secretar-
iat proposed a program for the local press corresponding to
the needs of the Soviet Government. Gubernia and uezd publi-
cations oust be locally oriented, concentrating on the reali-
ties of the local situation. The abstract must give way to the
illumination of the concrete through agitation by facts. Factu-
al examples, if taken from non-local events, must be fully re-
lated to the local situation. To realize this program the local
paper should have the following format! "a) agricultural con-
struction, b) plant-factory industry, c) city economy, d)
party life, e) peoples 1 education, f) Red Army life,"4 These
sections did not have to be illustrated in each number of the
lz Ts&, #30, July, 1921. "On the Program of the Local Press".
ApriH4, 1921.
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publication, but had to be extensively covered In general.
Having Instructed the local organizations on the content
of their papers* the Central Committee next turned to delivery
of the message. Because of the semi*literate composition of the
vast majority of the population, the press had to consider not
only the interests of the reader, but also had to reduce the
style of presentation on the gubernla and uezd level to simple
construction and plain format, explaining unfamiliar names and
vords. Unfortunately the party noted that the Soviet press
attempted to flaunt its worldliness, using foreign words and
erudite expressions. This was a completely mistaken approach
to the press* Finally papers had to be tied to the masses, and
this could only be done through tens and hundreds of letters
and by visits of the editor and his staff to villages and
factories. Letters to the papers however, depended on the con*
tent of the publication* When that was interesting, letters
arrived in a steady stream* When it was not they fell off and
the paper was Isolated from the masses* Correspondents must
utilize the institutions within the area served by the press,
and party committees must render them all possible aid* "With-
out the establishment of a true connection with the readers
the paper will not succeed in fulfilling its task and, it
follows, the most Important agitational means for influencing
5the masses* that is the paper, will remain unused* " The desire
5. Ibid *
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to have connections with the reading public was also reflected
by the Central papers which appealed to party and soviet Insti-
tutions to designate special comrades for the systematic corres-
pondence with the parent paper* 6
Following enunciation of the program for the local press,
the Central Committee entrusted Trotsky with the leadership of
a commission to investigate the Improvement of printed matters
in the state. The costnission, like the agit-prop section, began
with an examination of the country's papers, and then considered
all the ancillary branches of the press. The basic principle
guiding the commission's work was delivery of the maximum num-
ber of papers to the masses with primary attention focused on
the technical problems of distribution and dissemination. It
also attacked the technical aspects of format, trying to secure
legible copy for the reader.
' Within the commission separate
subcornealsslons were created to consider problems of dissemina-
tion, newsprint, presses and ROSTA.
At the end of April, Trotsky reported its findings. Papers
were insufficient to meet the demand for them, and the commis-
sion had adopted measures to expand their sales. The commission
decided to divide the press according to type, designating
6. Pravda. April 10, p. I, circular to ail gubcomsi Lavestila
April 16, 1921, p. 1, from Presidium of VTsIK.
7 « Investlie . April 15, p. 2; Ekononilcheskala shlsn'
. April
10, 1921, p. 3. The Central Committee, VTsIK, Tsentro Pe«
Chat*
, the Moscow and Petrograd press participated in the
Commission* s work. There is no mention of it In Soviet
monographs.
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papers for workers and peasants • Trotsky concluded that little
progress had been made in the area of differentiation since
three quarters of the papers repeated each other and most of
the masses dldn 9 t even see publications* Following Lenin* a Idea,
the commission also stressed the need for economy of newsprint
with precise accounting for each sheet, and called for rational*
lzation of printed works.
the question of securing maximum dissemination in a period
of restricted circulation was recognised as the immediate crux
of the problem* Moiotov in the name of the Central Committee
informed all party organisations at the end of April that each
paper mast be widely read until the general circulation of the
press could be expanded. Party and trade union organisations
must be mobilised for this task and must impart to the reader
that every printed work, whether book, brochure or paper, could
no longer be considered individual property, but must come Into
general use* Papers, especially the ones pasted for public read-
ing, had to be given the widest circulation by carefully pla-
clng and protecting them. In those areas where there were no
papers
,
posters would be substituted giving brief coverage and
summaries of important events*
Trotsky, Soch . vol. 21, pp. 244*6. w Position on Publishing
Matters* , also in Isvestlla , April 16, 1921. The editors of
Trotsky* s works state that they could not find any reports
on the commission other than the one in Isvestlla ,
TsK . #30, July 20, 1921, pp. 13*4. "On Dissemination of
Agitational Literature*
•
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The appeals of the center for the rationalization of dls-
seaination and localization of content met a very limited
response. In Smolensk it brought immediate attention to the
press. Production propaganda was promoted. Politics and agita-
tion were ordered curtailed, and the editors of Rabochli put*
furnished the local committee with a list of collaborators,
who were obliged to write regularly for the paper. 10 As to
the distribution of the press, the gubemla committee noted
that it remained in unsatisfactory condition and called upon
party secretaries to correct the situation.
Other areas of the country did far less* In Georgia,
apparently, there was no response to the instruction from the
center, and the press , according to the local paper, remained
divorced from life and unchanged from the days of the Civil
War. 11 The situation in Georgia more accurately reflected the
position of the press in the country as a whole. Izvestlia
found that its appeal for local news had yielded no percep-
tible results and VTsIK repeatedly called for this information
to assist Izvestlia in creating a section devoted to the local-
ities. The central peasant paper Bednota confirmed the Smo-
lensk picture of dissemination, reporting the late arrival of
12
the central papers as close as Tula. Among Red Army
10. Wg£ 254. May 1921i WK£ 512, May 1 and July 28, 1921.
U. Pravda Gruzii, July 5, 1921, p. 2.
Izvestlia . June 1 # 1921, p. 1, editorial. Bednota .
September 2b, 1921, p. 3.
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readers f the situation was apparently the same. The paper " . .
.
must reflect the life of the red units* their thoughts * their
needs f their interests* This task can be resolved only if In
every unit are found correspondents and workers of the paper*
13both communist and non-party."
These reports indicated that the deficiencies of the local
press remained uncorrected mainly because of inattention at the
local level which the central press continued to decry.
"The majority of these [papers] produce a very wretch-
ed impression* • In the majority of papers local life is ab-
sent* Questions of economic construction get a place in the
backyard* There are almost no articles which illustrate the
new course of economic policy* A place is not provided for
the explanation of the latest decrees ...."14
They also failed to send their publications to the Central
Committee* a practice continued from the first days of the
restored Pravda in March 1917. This hampered the party's direc-
tion of the local press* and to rectify this omission the
Central Committee ordered all party organizations to send
IS
copies of their publications to the center* But toward the
end of 1921* the party recognized that improvement of the So-
viet press was still being realized very slowly in the locali-
ties* if at all* Local papers had not responded to the center
13. Trotsky* Soch* vol* 21* p* 236* "Tasks of the Red Army
Paper"* July 20, 1921.
14 • Pravda , August 14* 1921* p. 1* seventh lead article*
15 * l£ TsK * v33* October 1921* p. 20* The response to this
directive was appreciable as #33* February 1922, lists
some 90 publications received*
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and the party would have to pay further attention to them.
Part Of Its new attention was given to the possibility of
calling another congress of journalists and part took the form
of still another letter from the Central Committee to oblast
and guberaia committees. In the latter the Central Committee
argued that because local organisations failed to give the
press proper attention, "... many uezd and subernia, frequent-
ly even oblast publications stand below all criticism. " This
was Intolerable. Local branches of the party must change their
attitude to conform with the resolution adopted at the 8th
party congress. The Central Committee recommended examining
the composition of editorial boards with the aim of supplying
them with mature party members and politically prepared wor-
kers , first of all from the membership of the given party
committee. Local organizations were further enjoined to take
leadership of papers Into their own hands and direct and
instruct the press of the lower party committees with the aid
of the agit-prop sections.
"The Central Committee reminds you, that the party
committee bears completely the responsibility for the
condition of the given party-soviet printed organ. Attach-
ed to the agit section of the Central Committee has been
created a special apparatus , which examines the condition
of the press 9 strengthens its party leadership* The local
party committees must understand the whole importance of
the press for all our work and, led by the decisions of
the Vlllth party congress, take it in its hands, strength-
en the workers and render it all possible aid. "16
16. 12 IgK, #36, December 15, 1921, dated November 16, 1921.
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At the same time the Central Organ of the party reiterated
that part of the 8th congress resolution dealing with the
responsibilities of local organizations in the revival of the
party press
•
*As a general rule local organisations have not paid
serious attention to the periodical press. Papers have
been stripped ... at the present time of responsible wor-
kers, they are poorly supplied with money. About the paper
crisis and press destruction it Is not necessary to speak*
The paper is forgotten by all ... finds Itself in the posi-
tion of a 'poor relative* attached to the ROSTA informa-
tion apparatus. ** 17
This condition meant that the prime vehicle of influencing the
masses was crippled and not fulfilling Its elementary obliga-
tions* Even worse many papers distorted the policy of the
Soviet Government and compromised it before the masses. The
whole situation was best characterized by the example of
Svobodnyl pakhar« of Zadonsk in Voronezh Oubemia* The editor,
secretary and all the collaborators were the same individual.
He was afforded no support or aid by either the uezd committee
or the ulspolcom and the paper finally had to close. Such an
attitude toward the press had to stop*
••Every Gub Com of the party, every Gublspolcoro bears
the responsibility for the condition of the local press.
We will note on the black list those gubemia centers,
which by their organs disgrace party and [Soviet]] power. -18
Vardtn reported a similar attitude when he was discussing the
17. Pravda. November 22, 1921, p. 2.
18. Ibid .
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&th congress resolution. The idea of the party committee's
obligation M *.* evidently did not penetrate the consciousness
of the local leading elements of our party, since how can we
explain otherwise »•« the disgraceful position, in which our
local press finds itself .* The main problem lay in the absence
of any life in the local press, because the paper was a
matter the demands of which could be satisfied by the tenth
rank. 1* 19 *
*
From these statements it became evident that the direc-
tives of the Central Committee since the end of the Civil War
had fallen on deaf ears* Because of indifference, physical
impossibility or the lack of means at the local level, the
press was not responding to party directives. For the most
part the blame lay squarely on the provincial party and soviet
institutions which did not understand the importance of the
press in the scheme of Soviet power* While instructions and
orders of the Central Committee had little effect , the change
to NEP in 1921 left an indelible mark on the whole press net
and forced the party to assume an even more attentive attitude
toward the press*
19. Vardin, II., "Nasha periodicheskaia pechat 1 ", Pechat' 1
revoliutslla, November-December , 1921, pp. 134-7. He
repeated this theme in an article in Petroaradskaja
gravda , December 28, 1921, "Toward the Question of the
Press" 9 which noted that the wretched condition of the
press in the provinces required the interference of the
central institutions of the party. In another article
Vardin went still further and claimed that the majority
of the local press was non- party and even non-connnunist.
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The Change to NEP
First to be effected by this change to NEP was the
dissemination and expedition apparatus of Tsentro Pechat*
which until the fall of 1921 had serviced all Soviet papers
free. Its change to cost accounting was the Initial step
In the transformation of all phases of the press from the
20
newsprint industry to the paper itself* The introduction
of dissemination fees was quickly followed by the change to
the paid paper on December 15 » Not only were persons and
institutions to pay for the paper , but the price of the given
periodical was to be determined by the actual publication
according to prime costs including production costs." The
only exception to this general principle was a slight reduc-
21
tion in the price for collective subscriptions. * The final
step In the conversion of the press was then taken in Jan-
uary 1922, when all papers were transferred to cost accoun-
He wrote that this could not continue. "Every Soviet
paper must be a party, Communist paper in direction,
spirit and theme. We don't need a non-party, indefinite
paper even though called Soviet* 1* Vardin, Sov pechat
'
,
pp. 98-101. rtThe paper in the System of the Party
Apparatus**
.
20. This was done as early as August in the Moscow area.
OHt i knl^a, p. 234. The introduction of fees for dis-
semination and distribution had an immediate impact in
Smolensk. The editors of Rabochil put* asked the Gubernia
committee to discuss the question of the paper because
the tarif made its production run in the red. WKP 512,
#386, November 23, 1921.
21. Zakony o pechati , pp. 42-3. "Decree of the Soviet of
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ting retroactively from the first of the year. Apparently
realizing the impact of the last step on provincial papers,
the Soviet of Peoples 9 Commissars opened a fund to subsidise
the press through the local executive committees*
At the end of 1921 with the press undergoing the change to
cost accounting, the agit-prop section of the Central Committee,
faced with the patent failure of all efforts to improve and
strengthen the local press, worked out a general plan for a
paper network which was discussed at a meeting of the secre-
taries of gubernia and higher party organizations* The press
subsection had drafted a resolution for the meeting which
elaborated a series of measures and general directives for
the reorganization of the press and the creation of a basic
network of worker and peasant, gubernia and uezd papers* The
draft plan, adopted by the meeting, provided a blueprint for
the Soviet press in the localities, and for this reason it
deserves considerable attention, although the change to NEP
would render its implementation impossible in the immediate
future*
After stating that the bth congress resolution remained
unfulfilled and that the condition of the press was extremely
of Peoples' Commissars on the Introduction of the Paid
Paper" » November 23, 1921*
22* Ibid * * pp. 43*4* "Deere* of VTsIK and SNK on the Transfor-
mation of ail Organs of the Periodical Press to the Begin*
nlng of Economic Accounting* , January 24, 1922,
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unsatisfactory 9 the Meting of the secretaries confirmed
that the press is a basic and most important means of influence
on the masses and the Link of the party with them" and recog-
nized "the pressing need for the firm realisation of the mea-
sures, noted in the resolution of the VHIth congress and the
23
meeting of the agit-prop sections of the Gubcoms*" The ties
between the party committee and the editorial board, which
were an integral part of the correct operation of a paper and
which up to that time had not been correct , must be close, and
generally the editor of the paper must be a member of the given
party committee* The local party unit should guide its paper,
but not interfere in the daily life and details of editorial
work* It should also register all journalists and transfer them
to paper work. As for the press net,
"Considering the immensity of distances » the insuf-
ficiency of means, paper and qualified staff , the meeting
empresses itself for the maximum curtailment of the govern-
ment net of papers and the reorganization of the provin-
cial press* according to a general all-Russian plan, which
must be worked out in the shortest time* This plan must be
constructed on the basis of a calculation of the demands
of the basic categories of readers — workers and peasants
.
M
For the gubemias, the basic paper would be a mass worker-
23. \z TsK. #1(37), January 1922, p. 42* "Draft Resolution"
.
The meeting of the agit-prop sections took place in July
1921* The only material concerning it was found in Petro-
gradakala pravda * December 31, 1921, p. 2, in a report on
the secretaries meeting. This report stated that the sec-
tions had characterized the condition of the press as unsa-
tisfactory* but had noted its great importance in party
work. Editprs should be party members of the local commit-
tee and should be given autonomy to run their papers*
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peasant, political and production paper, an organ of mass
propaganda and agitation to uncover and mobilize public opin-
ion among the working masses. The paper of the Subispolcom
was relegated to the second spot, its circulation reduced and
its periodicity curtailed to weekly publication. In the large
guhernia and eblast centers a daily party and soviet publica-
tion was also possible*
On the uesd level the basic paper must be popular and
political f destined predominantly for the peasantry and publi-
shing one to three tines per week. In areas with a worker popu-
lation the orientation of the paper would be changed to become
the expression of plant-factory life* Where the material means
was weak or the uezd was close to the gubernia center, the
publication of the uesd paper must ceaset in other cases ralon
papers must serve several neighboring uefcds.
These papers provided the officially sanctioned net, but
any locality was free to create a publication on its own ini-
tiative under the aegis of the local committee. The leadership
of the whole net was entrusted to the subsection of the press
uhich would guide local papers through its branches in indi-
vidual guberala committees. These subsections would lead and
direct the local and lower press according to the tasks stan-
ding before the party and would rally to participation in the
24
press 9 party members and non-party individuals*
24. Ibid
. , pp. Iiw20 and 42-3.
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Following the drafting of this plan and Its acceptance by
the party secretaries # the Orgburo of the Central Committee
nominated a commission to define the number of each type of
23paper* The commission finished its work in January 1922, and
the Orgburo adopted its findings • Special press nets were to be
established in the Ukraine » the Caucasus and the other autono-
mous oblasts and national areas. All Moscow and Petrograd
papers were incorporated without change except for institu-
tional and trade union publications* The rest of the press was
reduced to 232 papers t 74 uezd papers and 156 gubemla publi-
cation Including 20 peasant and 11 Komsomol.
Conceivably the establishment of the new press net and the
party secretaries 1 participation in its creation would have
corrected the unsatisfactory press situation In Soviet Russia $
however » events evolved differently. The combination of the
change to cost accounting and the attempt to restructure the
press net had a catastrophic effect cm the number and circu-
lation in the provinces • The following figures illustrate the
25* Ibid * 9 p. 19* The commission consisted of Sosnovskil and
Vorob*ev from the press subsection* laroslavskil from
the Central Cotnmlttee, and Doletskii and Lebedev from the
Board of the Periodical Press.
26. Part £ £0£ pechat' j£ bor'bo . pp. 60-1* The military press
underwent a similar examination at this time by army and
fleet editors who decided against the creation of divi-
sional papers and established the okrug periodical as the
basic military publication* Pertiankin, Sov voven peghat' .
pp. 98-9.
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crisis that developed
i
Number of Papers
Date Gubernia Uezd Total Circulation
i^'^l 1922 312 490 802 2,661.139March 1 171 211 382 2 287 in?
^ April 1 163 199 362 IJS'SSo
**y 1 1« 175 338 l liS i«2
July 1 156 157 313 1.022 135August 1 163 136 299 993 050September I 178 152 330 1.000 055October 1 214 158 372 1 110 900November 1 233 178 411 1 210 930December 1 244 179 423 l^.tS
„
The meaning of these figures is obvious. Immediately after
the change to NSP the number of provincial papers Mi reduced
by more than half. That these publications had little support
is indicated by the fact that the loss of more than four hun-
dred publications resulted in a circulation decline of only
four hundred thousand copies. Put another way, while half
the uezd press net disappeared only about one seventh of the
circulation was similarly affected. Curtailment through the
elimination of the weaker publications probably would have been
acceptable to the party if the trend had stopped at that point,
since the remaining periodicals were undoubtedly the stronger
papers. Unfortunately in the spring of 1922 the stronger papers
27. Vardin, Sov. pqfihat', p. 54 1 Vertinskii. Peseta v Roaall
?' r?0t «ivOB slightly different totals for March andApril, but agrees with the rest of the figures. Cherno-
morskli, M.N., Perlodlchoakala pechat' . Moscow, 1956. p.27, cites the same statistics.
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with larger circulations also began to succumb to the high
costs of publication with a consequent heavy reduction in circu-
lation. The statistics reveal that the average circulation of
papers that failed in April-May was about 50,000 copies, a loss
that must have been felt far more extensively than that of the
four hundred titles.
This catastrophic decline far exceeded the desires of the
party, and the press subsection in January tried to arrest the
28
mass closings of the local press before they got out of hand.
It also produced a whole new series of Issues for the party
to deal with in addition to the still unresolved problem of
involving the party apparatus generally in the press. The change
to NEP in most publications generated a vicious circle that was
responsible for their failure. The prime costs for a paper
would rise as the supporting industries and services demanded
real payment for their work. This forced the paper to raise its
subscription price which in turn drove away readers and meant
a smaller gross income. Smaller income necessitated further
price hikes, and the publication ran the very real risk of
pricing itself out of existence. The answer to this problem
28. lz TaK. #2 (3ti), February 1922, p. 17. "Report of the Agit-
prop Section for January*1 . From this and other reports
throughout the year it becomes obvious that the closings
were an unplanned reaction to cost accounting and not
from planned reductions to fit the new state net, even
though the number of provincial papers at its nadir in
August still exceeded the number planned in the state net.
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created by NES* and the response to other aspects of the press
crisis flowed along several lines*
The best answer financially, if not ideologically, to the
problem of cost accounting had been utilized even before the
final change had occurred. A bourgeois problem demanded a
bourgeois solution, and the press replied to the challenge by
accepting paid advertisements. Initially appearing in the
central papers in November 1921, they had spread to all publi-
cations by early 1922. In the central press most of the ads
were for official or institutional goods and services, publi-
cations, nationalized industries etc. With time this compost,
tion expanded to include the theater and arts, private enter-
prise, even individual position ads began to appear. In quan-
tity they rapidly assumed a full page of a four page edition,
usually the back page, and frequently the last two pages of
a six page edition. By 1923 they were appearing on every page
in a given issue.
Advertisements enabled the central and larger papers to
change to cost accounting with a manageable deficit and a min-
imum of difficulty, but in the provinces such a solution was
clearly beyond local means. Primarily it failed because there
were not enough institutions or enterprises in the localities
who could afford ads, and the number of artistic and private
contributors at the uezd level was almost non-existent. Ads
did not provide the answer to the new economic policy for the
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local press and Its decline continued unchecked. Other attempts
to circumvent the problem were equally ineffective In the loca-
lities. Expansion of distribution either through collective
subscriptions or through the use of the oral paper that was read
to meetings and assemblies, both suffered from the same draw-
back! they did not deal with the problem of rising costs.
Collective subscriptions failed to expand circulation and hence
did nothing to meet increased expenses , and the oral paper failed
to generate any monetary support at all.
It was in conditions such as these, with the press being
reorganized along commercial lines, with papers closing in the
provinces and with party and soviet organizations seemingly un-
able to comprehend the function of the press, that the third
congress of journalists convened in Moscow at the end of Janu-
ary 1922. The congress met at a critical time and had the oppor-
tunity to present concrete proposals to deal with the problems
that were destroying the Soviet press. Unfortunately the press
workers missed their chance completely. Beside dealing with the
old problems of the role of their colleagues In the paper and
their position In the state, the congress simply reiterated the
Importance of party leadership in the new conditions. "The
change to the paid paper gives rise to the danger of adaption
(in pursuit of circulation) to the taste of petty-bourgeois
29
readers • and this tendency oust be fought by party vigi-
29. Vardin, Sov pechat' . p. 134.
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lence.
The keynote speaker at the congress v Sosnovskil 9 seemed
unaware of the rapid decline that was occurring, noting rather
the continued unsatisfactory content and the inattention of
local organizations to the press. He then referred to the
state paper net as a program that had to be realised. Only at
the last session did Sosnovskii hint that the congress was al-
most totally irrelevant to the crisis, stating that the dele-
gates had not been fully prepared for their work and that many
30Important questions remained to be discussed.
Having missed a fine opportunity to deal with the press
crisis in its infancy, the party reverted to browbeating lower
organizations about their inability to grasp the importance of
the press. Their culpability lay at the heart of the problem
and the Central Committee continued to demand greater respon-
sibility and attention to this party weapon. Repeating the ad-
monitions of the secretaries 9 meeting, the center again enjoin-
ed its branches to name competent, experienced party members
to editorial boards and lead their work by directives without
interfering in the routine of publication. Journalism was to
be regarded as responsible party work. At the same time the
30, Pravda Gruzii, February 16, 1922, p, 3. Probably the only
Important measure taken by the congress was the establish-
ment of wage norms for the various types of paper work
which helped to determine the standard cost for producing
a given publication.
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local committee must tread a fine line between * leaning* en the
press and preventing anti-party deviations*
* The Central Committee calls to the attention of
the party committee the fact that petty•bourgeois ten-
dencies are beginning to percolate through the local
press* It is necessary to carry on a decided struggle
with all deviations of editors from the political line
of the RCP. M 31
By March the situation had become so threatening that the 11th
party congress » March 27 - April 2, took time from dealing with
the worker opposition to discuss fully the press crisis* The
problem consisted of two parts* On the one hand the party was
not paying sufficient attention to the press and on the other
the new economic policy was taking a great toll of the periodi-
cal press which was not established well enough to withstand
^liw party eeg*ttit&£i4ms toad <*r«Mm**f fh* spear**** a*?e*«*ry
the pressures of publishing according to prime costs* In the
to revive 3»a j*f*s« ?r «s£*lri i «tat>4 m^e*tl«Mf* The re-
localities the value of the press as a party tool was tinder-
estimated or not understood* This led to qualitatively poor
publications , since the given committee was unwilling to assign
experienced members to paper work* Failure to designate experi-
enced party members resulted in a boring unltelligible publi-
cation that offered nothing of interest to its readers* The
introduction of the paid paper and rising subscription rates
drove away even the most stalwart subscribers* Such a situs-
31* Kaminakaia, N*, Ed., Sovetskala oechat' v dokumentov*
Moscow* 1961* pp. 218-20 (Hereafter cited as JSfiv oechat*
£ dok)* '•Central Committee Circular on the Periodical
Press", February 22, 1922* A similar statement of the
problems of the press in Georgia is in Pravda Qruzli *
k March 2, 1922, p* 2*
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tton could only be corrected by vigorous action and a complete*
ly new party approach to the press. Yet the party had to make
the paper popular and interesting to attract readers without
falling into petty bourgeois Phlllistlne tendencies.
In its report to the congress the press subsection of the
Central Committee, whose guidelines had been laid out in Novem-
ber 1921* related the history of the periodical press since
the 8th congress, noting particularly the absence of any re-
sponse to the great number of appeals from the Central Commit-
tee. Papers had not been strengthened and Journalists had been
registered in only fifty of ninety gubernla committees* The
February circular had produced some results, but in the provin-
ces few party organizations had created the apparatus necessary
to revive the press or established press subsections. The re-
port concluded that the decree of the 8th congress was still
32far from realization. *
The congress discussed the press at its tenth session on
the morning of April 1. The head of the agit-prop section, la-
kovleVft began the debate with a description of the press.
"If we photographed at the present moment the posi-
tion in which our press is found then the picture received
is very sad despite the fact that in the last months some
improvements have been noted. In the local press it is
possible to note two tendencies. One — when the local
press 9 in connection with the new economic policy, has
released the reins, on account of the new economic policy,
loses all its communist content, surrenders all positions.
The other — when the press remains as before without
32. Iz TsK, #3 (39), March 1922, pp. ll-3f #4 (40), March 1922,
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color, continues to crank out feuilltons on extremely
boring subjects # so neither a peasant or a worker give
it any [ consideration] •* 33
After relating further particulars on the condition of the
press and stating that the party was clearly losing its posi-
tion in this area of Soviet life, lakovlev proposed two steps
to rectify the situation. First, the party had to awaken its
membership to the importance of the press, and second, it was
necessary " . .. to give the possibility to the paper worker to
be devoted completely to his work, but not change the journa-
list to the last person, who can travel as he likes* The editor
oust always lead the paper, and not still do one hundred other
II
tilings* lie must do this immediately* * lakovlev also sug-
gested a series of measures dealing with the qualitative side
of the problem. The paper must, he said, respond to the demands
of the worker, and its content must be made more suitable to
him. This could only be done through greater attention by the
party. Finally, with the days of state support gone, the press
oust agitate on its own behalf and close the gap between its
prices and the wages of the reader.
lakovlev* s report covered every aspect of the press, indi-
cating the problems and suggesting an outline of positive steps
33, frUn^Tf 1^ RKP(b). stemearaflcheskil ot;chyot, £os-
cow, 1961, pp. 417*b. lakovlev later noted a third type
which bordered on Illiteracy.
34. Ibid. . pp. 419-20.
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that could cure them. The congress resolution on the press and
propaganda reflected the tone of his ldeas« In its nine para-
graphs the congress 1) called for greater party attention to
the press and the designation of press work as basic party work,
2) called for a basic change in content to reflect local life,
3) called for the designation of May 5 as press day, 4) forbade
participation of communists in private publications except in
rare circumstances, 5) asked the Central Committee to secure
funds and newsprint for the press, 6) made it the duty of every
party member to read and subscribe to a party paper, 7) called
for independent Komsomol papers under gubemia leadership, 8)
called for the establishment of subsections of the press at the
gubemia and oblast level, and 9) called attention to the need
35for papers in the national languages.
Immediately after the congress the Central Committee began
implementation of these resolutions. The press subsection ini-
tiated measures to secure a better press net by providing
local delegations with questionnaires on their publications.
35. Ibid * . pp. 569-71. In the draft press resolution in Frav -
da, March 26, only the first five points were included*
The other four were added during the debate after lakovlev
reported* At the tenth session an attempt was made to elim*
inate all ads from party publications, thus allowing more
room for other material. This suggestion was actually adopt-
ed in Lenin 9 s absence. When he returned to the session, he
spoke against the idea, asking where Fravda would get its
funds without ads. Evidently the decision to remove ads
was reversed, since they continued to appear in the paper.
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Even before the completed forms were analyzed the press sub-
section* s Instructional unit started to examine the Ideologic*
al and technical character of the state* s printed organs. On
another level the subsection convened general meetings In
Moscow of the various servicing Industries with the Idea
of reducing costs and correcting dissemination irregularities.
The result of these meetings was an attempt to Involve more
and more of the party and soviet apparatus in dissemination
work i while at the same time improving the technical quality
37
of format. On April 20, the third point of the party
resolution became law by a circular letter of the Central
Committee which established May 5 as the day of the party-
38
soviet press.
The first press day was duly celebrated with expanded
editions which recorded the Importance of the press to the
state and traced the history of individual publications.
Readers and collaborators were encouraged and enjoined to
promote the press and support it with articles and subscrip-
tions. The general theme of the day was stated In Bednota.
36. ie TsK, #6 (42). June. 1922, pp. 6, 18-20. •'Report of
the Central Committee". One idea for reducing costs that
gained currency after the congress was the transfer of
presses to the papers.
37. Sbornlk bol ' shevistskala pacha t* . part 2, pp. 80-1. "Regula-
tion of the Dissemination of Printed Works".
38. Pravda. April 21 , 1922, p. 1, circular | 0 part ^1 sov pechati .
pp. 254*5. "On the Day of the Press".
137
"In the Soviet state the task of the worker-peasant
press is to aid the powers in removing the defects of
Soviet construction, in the struggle with the violations
and infringements of Soviet legality in easing and
improving the life of the workers. "39
To improve the press further the Central Buro of the all*
Russian section of press workers, organized at the third
press workers* congress* appealed to both the Central Commit-
tee and the Soviet of Peoples 9 Commissars for a provincial
press subsidy and the mobilization of additional aid for the
40local press from gubispolcoms.
These instructions 9 appeals and meetings all dealt with
particular aspects of the press, but the main result of the
11th congress was a letter from the Central Committee. June 7.
which proposed a definite plan for gubernia and uezd papers.
The theme expounded in this letter was not new. merely
reviving in a more detailed form the ideas expressed in the
1921 program for the local press. On the gubernia level the
Soviet press would direct its attention to all manifestations
of local life* To insure this coverage the paper should set
up a lead article of 80*100 lines . followed by a second
article of smaller dimension, both devoted strictly to local
matters* Lead articles would be considered as political direc-
tives with the force of decrees. Next were sections on
39. Bednota . May 5, 1922. p. 3. All papers examined for the
first press day devoted at least one page to the press
.
many the whole edition*
40. JPravda . May 13 f 1922, p. 3.
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Soviet and foreign life followed by major sections on party,
worker and trade union life each with 120*160 lines per issue.
The rest of the paper would Include smaller sections devoted
to industry, rural economy, cooperatives, the Red Army,
correspondence and a reference section in which the readers 9
letters were answered. All these were designated as permanent
sections which could be supplemented by special campaigns
or temporary sections concerning the famine or the sowing
season*
For uezd papers the concentration was even more restricted
to local affairs. At this lower level two thirds of the paper
would be devoted to the locality, concentrating on the rural
economy and village life with subsequent attention to gubernia,
state and foreign life In that order. The leader* rarely
followed by a second article, would consist of 60*80 lines
on a local topic* The rest of the paper would be filled with
a compulsory party life section, and sections on industry and
trade unions which would be small unless the paper was
published in a proletarian area. The reference section at this
level was especially important since the peasantry needed
41
advice i explanations and information.
4l » Sgv a—hat' v dgk # pp. 222-4. "On the Plan of the Local
Papers*9 i Three days later in another letter the Central
Committee ordered the creation of women's columns or
sections in the local press and the involving of women
In the work of the paper. £ P*rt i SSI P*chatl » PP» 259-
60. "On Worker and Peasant Women's Columns in the Local
Press". Some papers had had these columns before on an
infrequent basis, but none survived the change to NEP.
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The immediate response to this program was minimal. At
the end of June with few exceptions the majority of gubemia
papers had not improved. Local life remained unillustrated.
According to the Central Organ, some of these publications
were literary periodicals divorced from the workers and
peasants! and some were hackneyed economic sheets filled with
reports and official materials} while others were printed on
paper suitable for cigars. Their material situation was
equally bad, since ads in the localities were not sufficient
to provide operating capital. fc The day of the press had not
brought the anticipated results. The agit~prop section of the
Central Committee noted that
M
... familiarity with the majority of the most Im-
portant party organs proved, that the local papers and
journals suffer In their material relation, bat also they
satisfy little the tasks standing before the local party
organ* • "43
Nor had the local party organizations suddenly concerned them-
selves with subscription and circulation or recognized press
44
work as a basic party task.
The decline in the number and circulation of papers con-
tinued, although at a slower rate* In some areas this was due
42. Pravda, June 29, 1922, p. 1, third lead article*
43 « i£ TsK , #7 (43), July, 1922, p. 26. "Report of the Agit-
prop Section for June-July, 1922% Two other measures at
the center provided for the payment of 50% of the local
deficit and the despatch of central papers on the account
of the Central Committee, Ibid . . #8 (44), p. 38.
44. Vardin, Sov oechat* . p. 35. "Unresolved Press Questions".
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to the financial strain of NEP, in others to cannibalization
and perhaps in a few due to the Introduction of the state
press net* In Petrograd with the cost of the individual issues
skyrocketing, it became necessary to combine four papers into
two in order to save on costs.
^
5
In Georgia the first Caucas-
ian Congress of Communist Organizations closed the uezd papers
except for those along the railroad. The local Izvestila was
also suspended, but in the centers where Central Committees
existed a general-political paper was established.^6 In
Moscow a conscious plan of cannlbalizatlon developed at the
end of May after many uezd papers had already closed. Rab-
ochaja Moskva , the organ of the Moscow Coimnittee, called on
the raion papers to cease publication and concentrate their
resources on the continued printing of Rabochaia Moskva . This
was the only way to insure the concentration of the necessary
47press resources for the masses. The lack of financial support
in Dagestan forced the local party organization to suspend its
45. Rappeport, Peslat* let , pp. 66-72. Makhovlk and Petro-
gradskaia pravda merged as did Derevenskala pravda and
f
rasnaja gazeta . Krasnala sazeta's price rose to 100,000 r
or an issue by the spring. In Smolensk the production
cost for an issue of Rabochll put' reached 2,300,000 r by
the fall of 1922, a price tnat neither gubcora, gubispolcom
or Tsentro Pechat 1 could meet. WKP 519. "Report of the
Editors of Rabochll put' ".
46. Pravda Gruzii . February 15, p» 3, and March 2, 1922, p. 2.
47. Rabochaia Moskva
. May 31, 1922, p. 5. To compensate for
this loss the coverage of local news %m.s expanded.
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publication. Saratov, which at the middle of 1921 had one
and in some cases two papers in each uezd, recorded a similar
fate. This net of 20-25 papers by the spring of 1922 had
collapsed to 2 or 3 * . which had their feet in the grave."
The situation improved slightly after press day, not through
the assistance of party or soviet organizations, but because
49
of the aid of cooperative societies in Saratov.
Recovery Following the 12th Party Conference
As the summer wore on. however, the measures adopted at
the center finally began to take effect* The crisis reached
its peak in August as the number of papers fell to 299 and
their circulation to less than one million copies , and then
began to recover slowly. In Moscow this revival was reflected
in the reestablishment of uezd papers beginning in mid August.
In Petrograd the reappearance of the evening edition of
Krasna^a gazeta signaled the passing of the worst period.
But the recovery was neither fast nor spectacular* At the
end of 1922 the Soviet press was only slightly more than half
of what it had been in the previous year. Basically, the reason
for the recovery was the cuinmulative effect of the instructions
from the center which finally impressed the Importance of the
48. Akhmedov, D.H. , Periodicheskala pechat' v pagestane . Ma-
khachkala, 1963, pp. lltt-9.
49. Pravda, June 30, 1922, p* 4.
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press on the local organizations, and a subsidy for the press*
Following the 12th conference of the party in August, the
agit-prop section convoked a special meeting of the delegates
to discuss the press crisis. They reviewed the critical
financial situation and the necessity for giving papers mon-
etary support, stressing that * »«« in the interest of preser-
ving our press , to avoid perversion of its character, it is
necessary that the proletarian press in the Soviet Republic
be found in material dependence only on the state and proletar-
ian party. The meeting established a commission to con-
trol and administer a state subsidy for the press and to
liquidate its indebtedness. Within the commission three
sections were established to investigate press expenses, pay-
ment for Information and dissemination and agitation costs.
This commission played an important part in reviving the closed
papers by supplying them with the financial support necessary
for publication.
The central party and soviet organs also contributed to
the recovery with a series of articles on the press, as did
the Central Buro of press workers which continued to discuss
the condition of the press. Both noted the failure of many
50. Vardin, Sov pechat* . p. 53. "Party Work in the Area of
the PresTTMarch 1922 - March 1923)-.
51. Ibid , t lz TsK, #9 (45), September 1922, pp. 21-2. Port-
iankin, Sov yoyen pechat* . p. 101, states that the Red
Army press alone got 35 million r in subsidy at this time.
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party organizations to designate reliable comrades for their
papers. To Improve the quality of existing publications and
to help reopen those that had closed, reportage had to remain
local. This would popularize the local press and Increase Its
subscriptions. The most Important point of attack for the
local conanittee. however* was the cost spiral which had to be
broken to Insure a strong paper* Reliance on the state sub*
sidy would not affect this aspect of the publication* Other
suggestions Involved the strengthening of the dissemination
apparatus , whose frequent malfunctions led to fewer sub*
scriptions. and further efforts to transfer presses to the
paper* The Central Euro found that the latter measure to-
gether with an expansion of the section devoted to worker
life resulted in an Improved publication and lower costs*
It would be easy to overestimate the Impact of these
measures* Although the crisis had broken at the end of the
sooner • and symptoms of Improvement were noted * many papers
particularly at the uezd level, well Into the fall of 1922
.
gave * *•• few pleasant Impressions. These are not papers,
but one misunderstanding. " They were Illiterate, lacking any
content connected with the locality, and filled with articles
52* Pravda. p* 4. and Izvestlla . p. 3, October 3, 1922* The
plenum concluded that no one solution would work In every
case, but the realization of the 11th congress resolution
should be the main weapon for improving the press.
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ranging 'r<M HEP trash to pornographic poetry. Tho party in
most cases remained without a decent press as did the workers
and peasants, while party and soviet organisations still en*
joyed themselves without concern for the situation. Ho one
solution would overcome the diverse problems facing the press.
3ubnov t the deputy leader of the agit-prop section told
Pravda*
j
readers that the state subsidy was not a panacea.
The transfer of presses to the papers and the expansion of
subscriptions would help solve the problem, but an important
part in improving the press involved rallying to participation
extensive masses of workers. The best way to achieve this
was through extensive correspondence to the paper, replies
to these letters and their publication in the press. Accord*
ing to Izvestiia . the amount of correspondence denoted the
extent of the paper* s ties with the masses, concentration on
54
the local area and a well founded publication.
53. Fravda . October 10, 1922, p. 1, second lead article.
He also repeated the familiar theme that nothing could be
done without the firm and deliberate leadership of the party.
54. Igyestlla t October 18, 1922, p, 2. A similar article by
Q. Neradov in the same issue harped on the bad quality and
small quantity of papers and stressed the need for subscrip-
tions from soviet institutions as well as support from the
party. Also at this time the Central Committee ordered the
local committees to stop procrastinating and implement another
part of the press subsection meeting which called for the
creation of local press worker unions. The struggle with
petty-bourgeois ideologies arising under NEP demanded the
binding of communist journalists to active participation
in the press. Sbornlk bol* shevistskaja pochat* . part 2,
pp. 91-2.
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rho costs of printing were directly assailed in the
Central Organ by Vardin, in an artiela far discussion* Since
few papers had their own presses* they had to pay the prices
demanded by the poligraphers* At the party conference in
"•«• tho Central Conreittee of the party gave a directive
to the locals in the sense, that it should render assist*
ance to loc^i papers in the master of transferring ores-
see to them* In a series of localities they have been
transferred and tho results are brilliant* Firstly* to
print the paper on their own presses results in a great
cheapening since there is no place for * fantastic cal-
culations*. Secondly, the press besides printing papers,
fills other orders, the resources from Which go to do*
creasing the deficit of the editorial board* "
Unfortunately the printers would not accept this change and
found some support for their position at the center* This left
the great majority of papers under the yoke of high costs, and
diveraifieatiea in an attempt to satisfy the various tfitigflt**
Vardin demanded a responsible decision on the question*
By the end of the year four months of slow but steady
growth and constant party prodding had achieved modest results*
The quality of the majority of oblast and gubernia papers had
become satisfactory, while the press in the major centers of
the country had also achieved a satisfactory level* Many pa*
per8, either through their own efforts, or because of the sub-
sidy, had emerged from the red, others could go without the
55, Pravda* October 2o, 1922, p. 1, fourth lead article.
The problem of press transfer continued at least to the
end of 1924 with the printers fighting the policy* Exact-
ly how many papers had their own presses could not be
determined*
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subsidy altogether. At the uezd level the situation was
quite different* Here the party still failed to pay proper
attention to the press and the quality of publications re-
mained unsatisfactory* Dissemination had improved « but many
party members still did not subscribe. Nor had local organ-
57izations taken dissemination into their hands. Generally
uezd papers were weakly established and had very tenuous ties
with their readers. Their circulation averaged less than
1000 copies 9 appearing mostly one to three times per week.
Only 28 of the 179 uezd publications were dailies. This was
the lojsc c i. vculax 1qd would be resslnetl ^ *m»iu*m^ j%# t*h^
the area on which the party would have to concentrate in the
ttexfc I wJItsml evefi ttiehad ml 1 hevrwi/i y & mi 1 1 1 *m #%aj*,< *
future» and in its efforts to improve this layer of the
press the center would once again confront the problem of
diversification in an attempt to satisfy the various readers
that could not be served by a general publication.
56. Vardin» Sov pechat' . p. 55. "Party Work in the Area of
the Press"
•
37. Ibid . t pp. 146*8. "Resolution of the All-Russian Meeting
of Factory Agit-prop Sections" , December 30 f 1922.
58. Ibid * . p. 39. "Position on the Press*.
147
PART II
DIVERSIFICATION,
PROLIFERATION AND EXPANSION
CHAPTER V
THE WORKER PRESS
Central Papers
The end of 1922 saw the Soviet press on the road to
recovery. Full restoration would require several years, but
the lost circulation would be regained in the course of the
next two and even pushed well beyond the 2*6 million copies
distributed at the start of NEP* While the main effect of
the crisis had been a sharp decline in the Soviet press, it
had also weeded out weak publications and established the re-
maining papers on a firm foundation* At the same time the
party continued to define the limits within which the net
would function and the levels of its performance. But most
important the localities had finally begun to understand the
importance of the press. From this foundation the party
initiated a program of diversification! which was the necessary
complement to its concern about the lower levels of the press,
appealing to different elements of the population* To follow
this process requires consideration of the different types of
papers already existing or being developed. The most im-
portant was the worker or party publication whose development
will be considered both at the center and at the local level.
14fe
Ever since underground Bolshevik presses had begun to
crank out publications the party had focused its attention on
the workers. This concentration flowed naturally from the
appeal and ideology of the party which in its early history
did not concern itself greatly with the peasantry, the Mil-
itary or youth. With the exception of the Civil War the first
several years of Soviet power brought ao change to this basic
pattern, 1 and only after the resolution of the press crisis
did the party give conscious thought to other types, as opposed
to levels, of papers.
At the head of the worker press stood the great central
dailies Pravda . Izvestlia . Rabochaja gazeta . Sudok and Ekon-
w\ch«pk*ia zhlzn' .
2 Slightly below these central publications
stood a group of papers serving the important centers of the
country such as Potrogradskala pravda . Rabochala moskya,
rCrasnala g.ageta . and at a third level were the guhernia papers
like Rabochll put 1 in Smolensk. A further stratification
occurred at the uezd level, below which existed the wall paper.
1. For simplicity party, worker and soviet papers will be con-
sidered as worker in this chapter. Contemporary accounts
refer to a group of leading papers'* but it is unclear
whether this designation refers to central or party papers
or some other category.
2 Ekonomlcheskala zhlzn* was the organ of the Soviet of Labor
K!Tffl£ie«. whlie^dudok was the organ of the Central Com-
mittee of railroad and barge unions of Russia.
3, Wall papers will be considered In chapter 7.
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The first three layers of this helrarchy survived the crisis
of 1922, relatively unscathed, although many gubernla papers
were forced to curtail or suspend their publication. Below the
gubernla level the crisis had devastated the press and by the
end of 1922 It was still the subject of grave concern by the
party*
As has been noted the party had finally given detailed
Instructions on the content and function of the press at the
11th congress and 12th conference* Not content to rest on
these laurels, the press subsection of the Central Committee
in 1923 continued to dispatch a steady stream of circulars, re*
questing full and complete registration of the press within
the local committee's jurisdiction, submission of copies of
all publications to the center and Information on their type,
a
periodicity and circulation* But, Initially, the main stress
following the crisis was an attempt to delineate the role and
position of the central organs In relation to the rest of the
press* Were Pravda and lacvestlla to be popular or leading?
The problem arose because of the nature of the history of
the press, since up to the end of 1922 these two papers had
provided the base for the Soviet Government* In those first
4. i£ £s& #6 (54), July 1923, p* 77. "On the Registration of
the Local Periodical Press" • In October 1922, an eighteen
question form had been sent out, but only 50% of the press
had responded! the new form contained an additional eight*
een questions on the condition of the local press*
five years they had been both popular and leading, and the
editor of Pravda, Bukharin, believed It was possible to main*
tain this duality*
His concept was unsatisfactory to the press subsection
whose chief , Vurdin, felt that the time for differentiation had
arrived*
•We must have a paper for all (Izvestlla VTsIK )* we
must have a paper for the leading vanguard of the working
class ( Pravda ) * We need mass militant papers going to
the center of the working class (Rabochala gaaeta ) and
peasants ( Bednota )* In the localities we need papers of
the type Rabochala Moskva , In the uezds mass peasant
papers* These are the basic types of our papers* The
character of the paper must depend on the reader It
educates and whose public opinion It thinks to influence*"
The Issue was fought out at the fourth congress of press
workers which met In Moscow February 6*11 t 1923* At the third
session Vardln directly confronted the editor of the Central
Organ with his publication' 6 failure in this area*
"Our papers have significantly improved, but all of
them are not without mistakes* There are mistakes In the
central press * . * * as to Pravda * its deficiency Is that
it wants to be a paper of several types, uniting in Itself
the function of both leading and mass paper* It is nec-
essary for Pravda to be exclusively a leading paper* *6
In his report on the condition of the Central papers. Buk-
harln condemned tills limited role for Pravda * stating that
without links to the masses. l*e* popularity, the Central
5* Vardln, Sov pechat* * p* 40* "What Sort Is the Worker Paper
Papers?*""
6# Pravda. February 9, 1923, p* 2. This is an edited version
of part of Vardln* s speech to the congress* The full text
in Vardln, Sov oechat* * p* 7b, is even stronger*
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Organ could not lead them. Vardln replied that the recently
published Rabochaia gazeta could fill the popular role far
better than Pravda , and the party would not lose its ties
with the worker if Pravda was not linked directly with every
reader. It was sufficient to have the reader linked with some
party paper to insure ties with the party. ^ He was backed by
Uritsky who felt Pravda 1 s role should be restricted to the ab-
stract discussion of a given question, while local papers sup-
plied specifics. The congress also supported Vardin, adopting
a resolution which called for press differentiation.
"For every basic layer of reader it is necessary to
create a special type of paper. These papers must be uni-
versal in the sense that they illustrate all the foremost
questions of life applicable to the given layer of read-
ers, but not in the sense of at the same time serving all
layers of the reading masses." ®
The restricted role of Pravda and the concept of differentiation
were subsequently confirmed by the 12th party congress, April
17-25, which, in a resolution almost identical to that of the
press workers, called for diversification of the press with re-
spect to the various elements of the population and layers of
of th.o Q
readers.
7. Vardin, Sov pechat '
, pp. 92-4. Concluding Speech at the
4th Congress of Press workers, "what must Pravda be?"
Rabochaia gazeta (originally Rabochil ) had been established
March 1, 1922 as another organ of the Central Committee.
8. Ibid
. g p. 150. "Resolution of the 4th Congress of Press
Workers".
9. Resheniia partli o pechati , p. 45. In the draft thesis on
the press prepared for the congress by Vardin, point 10
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The question of differentiation was only one of many con-
fronting the worker press* During the press crisis the in-
efficiency of the distribution and dissemination apparatus
had been glossed over In the face of the many publications 9
•
. vreti
failures* By 1923 dissemination Irregularities that had tem-
porarily escaped notice again came Into full view. Papers
leaving the expedition office were " ... plundered, delayed.
10held up and destroyed at various 9 points 9 of dissemination. M
This statement and the Inability of the center to extend its
concern for the press below the gufeernia committee level in-
dicated that many other problems beside diversification re-
mained tc be solved* The first efforts were made at the 4th
press worker congress which restricted the role of the Central
Organ and which* unlike its predecessor* dealt meaningfully
with press problems*
The Central Committee had summoned the press workers at
the end of 1922 to consider questions relating to the condition
of the press. This was the first congress to convene in
something less than a crisis atmosphere and apparently the
-
called specifically for leading roles for Pravda and Iz-
vestlla only* During the congress this point was tone?
down*
10. Pravda, January 27, 1923, p. 1, fourth lead article.
11* Pravda . February 6. p. 1, editorial, cited the change from
agit-prop to organizational work as the need for the congress,
while Izvestlla . February 3, p. 3, indicated a need to see
if the local organizations had begun to value the press
correctly*
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novel condition enhanced the work of the delegates. The con-
gress was able to confirm that most of the oblast and gubernia
papers were now well established and correctly linked with the
masses* On the uessd level the press still required a great
deal of attention* Vardin also reported a healthy change In
the attitude of local party organizations which had been mani-
fested ifi meetings with representatives from the center* Re*
quests for staff and guidance, that previously had not been
forthcoming, now frequently occurred and from this Vardin
concluded that some party committees had finally begun to pay
attention to the press. *
The general satisfaction with the higher levels of worker
publications enabled the congress to concentrate on the lower
tier of the press hierarchy* The question of uesd papers
revolved around the very existence of such a net* There was
no doubt that the vast majority of these publications were
weak despite the state subsidyf and some delegates raised the
question of curtailing the whole lot, expanding the circu-
lation of gubernia papers to satisfy local need. This idea
ran counter to the concept of diversification which had over-
whelmed Bukharin's objections to a restricted role for Pravda ,
and to the practical consideration that no one gubernia paper
could serve equally well a variety of uezds whose population
12. Pravda , p. 2 and Igvestlla * p* 3, February 9, 1923. Sta-
tistics at the congress reveal a press net of 493 titles,
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might be worker f peasant or both* Again Vardln stated clearly
the position of the press subsection.
"We must state In the most decisive manner that the
Indiscriminately negative attitude toward the uezd paper
Is criminal* It Is necessary to find all means and all
possibilities. In order that the uezd paper exist and
evolve* We can close an uezd paper only In the extreme
case when It Is Impossible to correct It. when they
write only philosophical classics In It. "13
To further diversification the party In the same breath approv-
ed the devolvement of control to the locality* abandoning the
Idea of detailed central leadership of the press at the local
level* Past experience had shown the futility of trying to
guide provincial papers from Moscow* Instead the center would
instruct the oblast or gubernla organization which would be
responsible for the guidance of local committees* This de-
centralization ended a tradition that had arisen after the
February revolution.
The congress resolution confirmed the findings and propos-
als of the various reports. The condition of gubernla and
higher publications was again deemed satisfactory, but the uezd
press was not, and the party • condemning out of hand attempts
to liquidate uezd papers , demanded greater attention to this
area* The congress also encouraged competition between papers
as long as it remained within the limits of healthy rivalry
and did not attempt to undermine any publication. Such com-
14
petition promoted the improvement of the press.
13. Vardln, Soy pechat* . p. 85. "Report to the IVth Congress
of Press Workers".
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For the first time the resolutions of the press workers
were blessed by the party* as the 12th congress confirmed most
of their findings. It further defined the area and extent of
the state press net, definitely approving diversification, and
laying to rest* any thoughts of liquidating uezd publications.
In the first place, according to the 12th congress resolution,
no single gubernla paper could serve both the village and the
city* Secondly, special dallies were needed at this level to
serve the worker and the peasant. This part of the resolution
cut the ground out from under the "llquldatlonists*. Yet the
congress was not content with the simple definition of the net
and ordered the realization of all measures to aid the uezd
press. As to the competition between papers, the congress
also supported It, noting that the local committee should ex-
plain the character of each paper to the masses, but In no
case take sides j rather propagandizing for all Soviet papers.
The press workers had concentrated on specific proposals
to Improve publications, but had not examined the role of the
press within Soviet Russia. In the Civil War and before the
Introduction of NE? the press had been an agitational sheet.
With the return to peace this role was no longer paramount, and
In the changed circumstances the function of the press became
14. Ibid . . pp. 148-51. •Resolution of the IVth Congress of
Press Workers*1 .
15 # Reshenlla parti
1
o oechatl . p. 45.
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organizational. 16 ThU theme was pursued by the 12th party
congress. Stalin referred to the fact that the press had
not yet assumed the position of mass organizer. It was only
establishing M
... an imperceptible tie between the party and
the working class, a link which is as strong as any mass trans-
missive apparatus .... The press is the singular weapon, through
the aid of which the party dally, hourly speaks with the work-
ing class in its own language, the language necessary for It." 17
The congress was less categorical In Its pronouncement about
the organizational role of papers, repeating almost verbatim
the words of the party secretary, but combining them with a
statement that the press was one of the leading elements of
agitation and propaganda. It also delimited another function
of the press.
"The systematic and planned utilization of the party
and soviet press from the side of the Workers* and Peas-
ants • Inspectorate and the Central Control Commission,
both with the aim of revealing and disclosing all nature
of crimes (sllpshodlness, bribery etc.) and systematic
deviations from the basic line designated by the
party ...."It*
IXirlng the Organizational Report Stalin had asked
16. Vardln, Sov pechat'
. p. 4d. "Successes noted — Failure
was Possible".
17. Sbomlk bol»shevlstskala pechat*
. part 2, p. 94. In
points 3-5 of the draft thesis Vardln had stressed the
general role of the press In society. Agit-prop was not
to be abandoned, but only put Into the proper perspective.
18. Reshenlla partll o pechati, p. 44. "On the Tasks of the
Workers* and Peasants" Inspectorate and the Central Control
Commission".
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rhetorically what the power of the press was. Vardln attempted
to answer this question by separating the press from this
section or that Institution. Organizationally the press would
remain isolated, unconnected with party and state, but serving
both and receiving Its Instructions directly from them. This
was the gist of the resolution on the Central Control Commiss-
ion and the Workers f and Peasants 1 Inspectorate, Partly a
recitation of the old rubrics, enjoining the press to reveal
the defects of socialist construction, the resolution in-
cluded the new concept that party and soviet papers would dis-
close all deviations from the party line. Inherent in such
revelations was the idea that they would depict the correct
line as a counter to anti or non-party deviations. The press
now took everyone and everything under Its surveillance,
supporting the work of the two central Institutions.
Despite the resolution diversification of papers was challenged
once more on the day before the end of the congress when
Vardln 9 s thesis on stratification was deemed inexpedient be-
cause of the narrowness of the Soviet press base. But by
19. Vardln, Sov pechat* . pp. 57-63. "Press Questions at the
12th Congress RCPM . He noted that this function of the
press met opposition from economists led by Krassln who
said press men and writers could not possibly understand
economics* Their Interference would ruin the economy.
Vardln accused him of returning to capitalism by hiding
commercial secrets and keeping the economy hidden from the
public.
20 * Izvestlla , April 25, 1923, p. 3.
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the second press day such opposition had faded away. Probably
it was no more than the expression of certain reservations
on general press policy, and the major theme for the second
press day was the expanded and diversified role of the press
as an organisational tool in influencing public opinion, in
economic construction and in the communist education of the
masses.
21
The 4th press worker and the 12th party congress had de-
limited the type of worker press net and its tasks. The mixed
paper or the publication attempting to satisfy all layers of
the masses would disappear. But the expansion or trans*
formation of the existing net was not immediately possible.
The material base, as Vardin had been told, was lacking. High
costs, which had closed so many papers, continued to inhibit
diversity since the publication of strictly worker papers
meant an inevitable loss of subscribers. The attempt to
transfer presses had received scant attention at the party
congress, although the theory had been supported. The con-
gress resolution, however, merely pressed for the correct
organization of the printing industry and not for the shift
21. Pravda . April 29, p. 4, which published the thesis for the
press day, giving eleven commandments for the press and
May 5, in which page 3 was devoted to the press. Vardin*
s
articles In Izvestlla . May 5, p. 2, and in Petrogradskala
pravda . May 8, p, 8, stressed the organizational role as
the basic function of the press during NEP.
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of presses to the papers. 22 This meant that a good portion
of the costs for production remained beyond the control of
the publication. „
The continued high costs of production led to a campaign
in the spring of 1923 to expand circulation even further than
had been done before the congress. As a first step the search
for subscribers was intensified with delinquent party members
attracting prime attention. In the words of the congress,
"the decree of the XIth Congress, that every member of the party
must subscribe (individually or collectively) to one of the
party papers, has to be brought fully into life.- 23 On press
day campaigns were realized in every publication for subscrip-
tions, particularly from the workers who were best able to
afford papers, and who received them with some accuracy and
timeliness. The second step toward increased circulation in-
volved additional efforts to cheapen the press. The papers
renewed their pressure for the transfer of presses and attempt-
ed to expand the printing of ads which would defray production
22. RaahenU* partli o pechati
. p. 44.
-Resolution on In-dustry". Trotsky had reported on printing matters at
the morning session April 21, but had not suggested the
transfer of presses. Vardin replied in Izvestlla
. April 22,
calling Trotsky's attention to this matter, and Trotskyhad then indicated that if publishing matters did not im-prove, perhaps the presses should be transferred to the
publishing houses. Vardin, Sov pechat'
. p. 142.
23. Ibid.
, p. 47. From the resolution of the 12th congress
on propaganda, press and agitation.
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costs and enable the state subsidy to help more papers. Even
at the center where the great mass papers had every advantage
In terms of ads f mass production and extensive subscriptions,
the prices for Individual Issues were considered too high. In
the summer of 1923 Pravda and Izveatlla both sold for 100
kopeks per month. This was high compared to the foreign press
and even to Russkove slovo which had cost only 85 kopeks before
24
the war.
A close scrutiny of the Institutional press became the
third part of the campaign. This was undertaken In June by
a Central Committee commission which examined the publications
of the central institutions and Peoples 9 Commissariats, and
concluded that most of them served a very narrow circle of
25people. Institutional papers on the local level suffered
from the same deficiencies , only five of sixty such publications
being oriented toward the masses. The commission recommended
the curtailment or suspension of the majority of these pub-
lications. In August the Central Committee accepted these
findings and adopted a decree implementing the commissions
proposals. Subsequently the Central Committee ordered feuber-
24. Pravda . August 11, 1923, p. 1, fifth lead article.
25 » i knlga , pp. 299*300.
26. 1% Tag, #1 (59), January, 1924, p. 54, cites the closing
of 56 paper8 during September-November, 1923 although it
does not specify what type they were.
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nla and oblast committees to examine their institutional papers
with the idea of eliminating all parallel publications. The
nonprofitable periodicals would be liquidated and responsible
and experienced party members placed at the head of all re-
27
malnlng papers.
The result of this examination was a decline in the num-
ber of papers, but a continued advance in circulation. At the
end of November, Iakovlev, the head of the agit-prop section
of the Central Committee, was able to report that the circu-
lation of worker papers had risen 500,000 copies with partic-
ular success noted In the gubernla press. At the same time
the first of the central papers began to turn a profit,
Indicating that they had solved the problem of production
costs and providing examples for the rest of the press. 28
The steady growth of the press continued Into the new
year. Accompanying this expansion was a further definition of
the role of the press and the Central Organ of the party In
27. iz T|K. #J(59), January 1924, p. 87. -On the Strengtheningof Publishing Matters-, November 14, 1923. In March 1924,
the Central Committee repeated this demand, stating that
the Initial pruning had not cut deeply enough Into the
Institutional press. 0 part i sov pechatl . p. 299,the Limitation of the Institutional Press". March 26.
1924.
On
28. Pravda, November 20, 1923, p. 3. Izvestlla . Bednota
. Pravda
*°d Ekonomlcheskala zhizn* all operated without a deficit
from October-November
.
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relation to fractional squabbles and anti-party tendencies.
The 13th party conference* January 16-18, 1924 confirmed the
line of Pravda as the Bolshevik position In the party 9 s dis-
cussion with Trotsky and Preobrazhensky, but the conference
also asked that this controversy be transferred from the pages
29
of the Central Organ to a special "Discussion Sheet" . The
confirmation of the line and leading position of Pravda was
followed by two other events of significance for the press.
On February 4 the Central Committee reorganised its struc-
ture, converting the press subsection Into a full section.
On the 24th this reorganization was extended to all party
units down to the gubernla committees, except In national
areas where the change applied only to the central commlt-
30
tees. At the same time the Central Committee adopted an
extensive decree on the press, uniting the directives and
Instructions dispatched since the 4th congress of press wor-
29. V pomoshch* partrabotnlkl . sisternatlcheskll sbornlk
rezollutall a"ezdov i konferentsll VKPCb) . Moscow. 1927,
p. 495, 13th Conference, "Greetings to the CO •Pravda 1 ".
Reshenlla partll £ oechatl . p. 51, "On the Stages of Dis-
cussion and Petty Bourgeois Tendencies In the Party". Pravda
was the first paper to attack Trotsky at the end of 19271
After an Interlude In 1924, this campaign against Trotsky
was renewed, although his articles were still published In
the Central Organ. By the end of 1924 everything he wrote
brought rebuttals.
30, Iz TsK . #3 (61), March 1924, p. 39* The next Issue stated
that this was done to strengthen party leadership of the
press, but by mid 1925 the reorganization remained Incom-
plete as Krasnala pechat' . #13, May 1925, p. 5, lamented
the continued existence of subsections.
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Iters in a single document that detailed the tasks of each part
of the press with respect to the party.
According to this decree the importance of the press lay in
the following three areas
t
*1# As one of the leading forms of the unity of the
party with the worker and peasant masses and the influence
of the city on the village*
2* As a weapon of strengthening and rallying the
party*
3* As a means of disseminating knowledge among the
worker and peasant masses and raising their cultural*
political level*"
Detailed instructions for the different types ef papers fol-
lowed the elaboration of the importance of the press* For the
central papers questions of policy in the areas of interna*
tlonal relations and internal policy would have primacy* Led
by prevda » they ***** must give the party's orientation to the
party member* avoiding superficial agitation* narrow institu-
tional illumination of questions and giving more facts and the
systematic illustration of them*" Part of this orientation
involved anti-Leninist tendencies* and the Central Committee
ordered the leading press ***** to begin a systematic explana-
tion of the basic deviations and a systematic Ideological
struggle with them*** rarty life would become the most impor-
tant section in this type of paper and the focus of party
policy*
In practical non-party questions the central press would
cultivate a full discussion of the "Scissors Crisis** and wages #
trying to involve more fully the lachelnlki of the lower party
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apparatus in this discussion* To promote the involvement of the
masses 9 the function of the press as a collective organizer
would be maximized » and to insure its fulfillment , the press
section together with the Peoples* Commissariat of education
and the Workers* and Peasants* Inspectorate would strengthen
the leadership of the central press and its dissemination*
Direction of the campaign would be controlled by the complete
utilization of available resources # which meant another regis*
tration of Journalists and frequent and regular meetings with
31the editors of the large centers of the state*
Reaffirmed in this decree was the idea of the central
(leading) papers providing the guidelines for the rest of the
net* delineating the general lines of party policy and
requiring local publications to supply the nuances peculiar
to their area* Prayda and Its peers were saddled with the re*
sponsiblllty and obligation* the right and duty of Indicating
the correct party line and deviations therefrom, combatting
those who strayed from the path of Leninism as defined by the
32 — - - -
Central Committee* To insure the execution of this oolicy
31* 0 oart i sov oechatl . pp. 290-6. passim. H The Most Impor-
tant Foremost Tasks of the Party in the Area of the Press"
•
February 6, 1924.
32. The question remains unanswered in the decree as to whom this
was directed against* It is possible that no particular
group such as the 46 was intended, and the decree was merely
indicating a new role for the press and a warning for those
who might stray from the correct path*
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at the lover levels of the press, control end leadership
were vested in the press section and the Workers* and Pea-
sants' Inspectorate*
Not content with this general directive, the Central
Committee dispatched in rapid succession additional instruc-
tions on the role of the press and Pravda m particular with
relation to the masses entering the party In response to the
Leninist appeal. On February 11, Pravda was enjoined to be-
come the leader and friend of each new party member, uniting
them with and around it. On February 19, another circular
latter expanded this limited competence to the organisational-
educational sphere, requiring all publications to educate the
Leninists with the aim of providing the best amalgamation
with the old party. Pravda would acquaint them with the basic
tenets of Leninism and the leading tasks confronting the
33party. A third directive stressed the role of the press
In involving extensive masses of workers In the improvement
of the governmental apparatus, raising economic productivi-
ty and mastering cultural backwardness. Again party commit-
tees were enjoined to guide the periodical press and exert
33. Sgv gqchat' v. dok» PP. 177-8. -on Work for Uniting NewMembers of the Leninist Appeal about Pravda and Recruit-ing among Them Subscriptions to If. February 12. 1924.
&£r'~/L {6¥ , J!LaZCh 19?*» P * 53i "0n the OrganisationalTasks of the Party Press In connection with the LeninistAppeal of Factory Workers". February 19, 1924.
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their leadership to make the press a weapon for rallying the
party fey Illustrating the most Important points of party pol-
The central papers dutifully adopted these suggestions,
and the worker press became full of reports and articles about
the Leninist appeal. The numbers and biographies of the new
members were featured prominently in the press* In response
to the will of the Central Committee, sections devoted to
party life were expanded* The leader in this field, not sur-
prisingly, was Pravda. which on January 26 had initiated a new
section. "Into the Ranks of the RCP f * and now developed Its
section on party life Into a full page* Less spectacular pro*
grass was recorded in other publications. In l2vestlia the
section expanded to a half page* but this coverage was dwarfed
by that devoted to worker life which preempted a whole page*
In Leningrad neither Petrogradakala pravda nor Rabochala
gazeta had even regular party life sections early in 1924.
although they printed frequent reports on the progress of the
Leninist appeal 9 while the Institutional and evening papers
were completely unaffected by the campaign and had no party
34. lz ysK* # 4 <62) t April 1924, p. 57. "On the Campaign In
the Press for the Consummation of the Leninist Appeal"*
April 19* 1924* In April it was suggested In Pravda that
a press questionnaire might be sent out to discover the
bent of Its readers* There Is no evidence that this sug-
gestion was ever implemented*
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life section at all.
On the other hand the desire of the 13th conference to
avoid the discussion of party policy in the press was not rea-
lized Articles of the opposition continued to appear In Pravda
and in the other central papers, at least until after the 13th
congress* Resolutions of local party organizations both for
and against the policy of the Central Committee appeared in
•Party Life". Trotsky and Preobrazhensky usually drew immedi-
ate rebuttals to their arguments in the Central Organ, but in
flsdnota and Izvestila their pronouncements were printed with-
out reply. All this led to a thorough discussion of the press
at the 13th party congress, May 23-31, 1924. Stalin set a tone
of cautious optimism in the Organizational Report, which noted
the growth of circulation from 1.5 to 2.5 million copies since
the last congress, even though the number of titles had fallen
35below 500. The press section supported this tone, reporting
with sane satisfaction the saturation of the proletariat by one
paper to every five workers, and in the capital and larger
36 _
cities, one to every three workers. When the congress dis-
35. Sbornift bol'shevistskala pechat' . part 2, p. 119. This
decline is probably due to the final reckoning with the
institutional press. Stalin posited two goals for the cen-
tral press in his report i 500,000 copies for Pravda and the
creation of a half million circulation paper for the new
party members. Neither goal was realized.
36. Trinadtsatyi, s»ezd, RKP(b). sttpesxaflcheskil otchvot. Moscow,
1958, Prilozhenlye III, pp. 810-11 (Hereafter cited as Trlnad-
tsatyl s*ezd).
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cuseed the draft resolution on the press at its thirteenth
session, May 31, these successes provided the background.
The general theme of the draft resolution, prepared by n
representatives of the press section and chairmen of the pro*
vincial press sections, had been to continue the policies
that had achieved these successes, intensifying already proven
campaigns and expanding the party's efforts in areas that had
not yielded results. lakovlev directed the discussion, attending
the draft to strengthen these trends by developing the links
with the masses in order to reflect what was happening among
them, and to maximise party influence. The congress also re-em-
phasized the Central Committee's concern for the new Leninists,
a point which had not received prominence in the draft resolu-
tion. On the whole the congress expressed its satisfaction
with the level of the worker press, but noted that its future
development required a radical improvement of the dissemination
apparatus which had now become the bottleneck to further
growth. T ; i ejL&flMI dmmjLAifcs* b&fons rapidly ss*,
The emphasis on the problem of dissemination coincided
with a change in the subscription system and was partially
responsible for it. Distribution of papers in the large cen-
ters of the country had been solved by creating local dissem-
ination nets when the failure of the Postal-telegraph Agency
37. Ibid . . pp. 584-6.
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and Tsontro Pechat' became obvious. Accurate and timely deli-
very was a major factor in subscriptions, but due to the char-
acter of most subscriptions » further expansion of circulation
had become nearly impossible* Two types were prevalent* One
was the forced or obligatory subscription for the party member.
The other was the collective subscription necessitated initi-
ally by the high price of the paper and the low wages of the
readers* The second type allowed several workers to combine
their resources for a subscription, but it limited the total
circulation of the press. Following the 13th congress a reac-
tion to the second type set in, and papers began to campaign
for individual subscribers* Two factors made this possible*
The cheapening of the press had been successful among worker
publications with individual copies of Pravda selling for
only five kopeks, and the beginning of economic reconstruction
had increased the ability of the workers to pay for papers
individually. The campaign begun toward the end of 1924
at first resulted in a slight decline, before rapidly ex*
pending the circulation in subsequent years*
At the end of 1924, having instructed local committees
cm individual facets, the Central Committee dispatched on
38* Sochacher, H.N.
,
Gazetnoye khozialstyo . opyt posoblia po
gazetoo-lzdatel'skomu delu
.
Moscow* 1929* p. 40. At the
&ki£. of 1924 the party also movec* to end forced subscriptions
at the local level. It is not at all clear what this refers
to but it is not unlikely that some committees abused their
position by forcing several subscriptions on party mem-
bers or coercing non-party members to subscribe*
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December L a series of decrees that dealt with every facet of
the press based on the experience of the past year. In its
consideration , the Central Committee reiterated the basic
differentiation into worker and peasant publications, adapt-
ing the content of the former to the rising political and
cultural level of the masses and striving for the illustra-
tion of all political f economic and party questions. This
was basic to all previous instructions , but the new directive
included an order for the worker paper to devote some attention
to the peasantry, so the proletariat could understand state
construction in the village and the party's policy toward the
39
countryside. In the same breath the press net was modified
to include a peasant paper in predominantly prolitarian centers
which already had a worker daily. Similar adjustments were to
be made at the lower levels, and execution of the decree was
entrusted to the press section of the Central Committee which
would devise a suitable network of local papers.
The reason for this shift and the more extensive differ*
entlation of the press lay in the center's determination to
39. o part i gov pechatl . pp. 319-20. wOn the Type of Worker
and Peasant Papers 11 • Zinoviev elaborated on the attention
to party policy in an article in Pyavda five days later.
Each publication from the Central Organ to the uezd paper
must explain it. The paper "... must not spare blows,
when the slightest deviation from the bases of Leninism,
the slightest deviation from the instruction of V.I. Lenin
threatens us." Pravda, December 6, 1924, p. 1, second
lead article.
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eliminate Che mixed paper which was the principal type of
publication in the outlying parts of the state below the
guhernia level* These papers • which tried to serve all
layers of the population in their immediate purview, flout*
ed previous decisions on diversification and the earlier
attempts to specify a particular paper for each segment
of the population. The impetus for the creation of peasant
columns in the worker papers came from the initiation of
"The Village and the Party1* in Izvestlla in June 1924. a
decision which the editors regarded as a response to the demand
40for more attention to the village.
Another decree in this series specified the format of
the worker paper in the same way that the 1921 program for
the local press had provided concrete guidelines for provin-
cial papers* In effect this Orgburo directive gave specific
instructions on the manner in which the general decree on
the types of papers would be realised. Three major and five
minor areas were listed as fields with which the worker
paper should properly concern itself. Major attention would
be devoted to general information on foreign affairs, social
construction, proletarian and party life at home and abroad.
40. Izveatlla . June 10. p. 1. editorial. Pravda had also be-
gun such a column in the summer of 1924 . but with less
regularity than Igvestiia * The institution of peasant
columns in worker papers seems to be a paradox in the
struggle with mixed papers, but they represented only a
small portion of the coverage. In mixed papers worker
and peasant received equal reportage*
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and the Leadership " • * • of the section of general information
roust be charged without fall to a member of the party, possess-
ing sufficient political preparation. " The other two areas
of major attention were party and worker life. With regard
to the former, the already hallowed shlbolleths were repeated
i
involvement in party life, systematic propaganda based on
Leninism, the struggle with all deviations from the party
line, special attention to new party members, while two new
features, work among Komsomols and women, were added.
Nor did the importance of worker life provide many
surprises. It was to coordinate its contents with that of
party life, involving worker, trade union and soviet power
in the work of the party* The head of the worker life
section would stress production and pay special attention to
the expansion and strengthening of worker correspondents
attached to the paper. Of lesser importance were sections
on production, the trade union movement, the Red Army, trade,
41
cooperatives and the problems of the village.
41, £ part i sov pechatl . pp. 320-22* *0n the Worker Press"
•
After giving these details the decree reverted to the
problem of dissemination and subscription, remonstrating
against forced subscriptions and calling on the local
committees to strengthen their work and control over
dissemination* To help improve distribution, the papers
were ordered to accelerate the delivery of their pub-
lications to the dissemination apparatus* The problem of
the worker and peasant correspondent movement is con*
sidered in Chapter 8.
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subecribec to th$ lufMfriff•pipm . atxJ lest tVn 2i of the
The local worker press lacked many of the characteristics
of the central and most of the generalisations about the lead*
Ing press did not hold true In the localities* Except for
a few centers like Petrograd, where both party and worker
papers existed * the local publication was the organ of both
party and soviet institutions* This conformed to the plan,
formulated by the party secretaries in the winter of 1921*
2 and confirmed by nearly every decree or resolution since
that time* Undoubtedly the existence of a single worker
paper also corresponded to the economic, technical and man
power resources available in the provinces* The gubernla
press in 1923 and nearly all the uezd papers that survived
the press crisis were worker publications! but in the course
of 1923*4 the latter became more and more peasant oriented.
The local press net recovered with difficulty from the
effects of NEP» being unable to tap either ads or subscrip-
tions available to central and large city papers. Nor did the
failure of the local party organizations to srasp the im-
portance of the press help provincial publications* This
lack of support can be Illustrated by reports from the local*
ities* In Kursk Gubernla by 1923 twelve papers existed
with maximum circulation* the 5009 copies of Kurskskaja pravda ,
The three gubernla and nine uezd papers were weakly supported
by subscriptions* Only 5% of the party members and candidates
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subscribed to the local party paper* and less than 2% of the
Central Organ. 42 In Kiev, Iakutsk, the Urals, Smolensk, Petro.
grad and Moscow similar reports about the failure of local
party leadership and the lack of party subscriptions were
recorded.
The role of the uezd press remained the same as that of
the central and guberniai serving as a weapon in the ideolog-
ical struggle, but the lack of proper utilization and support
in early 1923 prevented realization of its task. The Smolensk
Gubernla Committee responded to this dereliction by convening
meetings of local organizations and institutions, obliging
their membership to subscribe to the various local and cen-
tral papers. Particular attention was devoted to improving
dissemination of and subscription to Rabochll put' . the Guber-
43
nia Party and Soviet paper.
The Moscow Organization paid better attention to the uezd
press and material support was more forthcoming. The eight
uezd papers which resumed publication after the press crisis
had grown to eleven by February 1923, although their quality
remained low and they were still weakly connected with their
locality. 44 A survey of the local press taken before the 4th
42. Iz TsK. #1 (49), January 1923, p. 56. "Kursk Party Organ
ization Report".
43. WKP 9, January-February 1923.
44. Rabochala Moskva . October 1, 1922, p. 5 and February 7,
l923
» P« 6 ' *m , ~, rh. ^r .« of the Smoi-
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congress of press workers confirmed the satisfactory quality
of the gubernia and oblast press except for those in the recent*
ly added areas of the far east where they exhibited all the
characteristics of the old boring provincial papers. But
the uezd press remained the area for concern. This attitude
was reflected in the work of the two congresses early in 1923
which noted their poor quality and attempted to make them more
interesting and useful for the proletariat by instructing uezd
party committees to publish a paper devoted to the locality
and available to it. This had been the aim of both programs
on the local press which remained unfulfilled. The difference
between the uezd and gubernia papers was the complete con*
centration of the former on local events.
While the center considered the achievements of the
uezd press in terms of its local reportage, one of the most
important factors in its success at the local level was the
ability to deliver the paper to its subscribers. Delivery was
almost universally poor outside the cities and away from the
railroad stations* Complaints about poor dissemination
radiated from all outlying areas. Smolensk reported that
lateness of arrival complicated the problem of subscription.
In Voronezh not even the local paper reached its readers and
because of this subscriptions declined not only to the local
45but also to the central press. Such distribution hindered
45. WKP 9, "February 12 Protocol of the Presidium of the Smol-
ensk Gubernia Committee4* • Bednota , March 23. 1923, p. 3.
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the realization of the press day goal for Increased subscrip-
tions in the localities , and the statistics show a circulation
of only 199,000 copies for the 227 uezd papers.
Another factor affecting central and local paper alike in
the locality was price. When high costs were added to the
failure of the delivery apparatus, either through the defects
of Tsentro Pechat' or through party and soviet failure to
deliver the bundled publications from their offices, the
situation for the press in the locality might well be de-
scribed as a "... craving for the paper almost analogous
to a famine." Not surprisingly this led to the already
noted demand for the liquidation of all uezd publications,
since they did not serve the locality* In the summer of 1923
Pravda stepped into the discussion of the uezd press with a
series of articles devoted to the various aspects of the pro-
blem. According to these articles, the crux of the difficulty
lay in dissemination of the local paper. Bubnov, the head
of the agit-prop section, noted the successful delivery of
papers to main dissemination centers and railroad stations, and
the failure of distribution from these points to the reader.
As to the liquidation of the uezd press, he said such an idea
was unthinkable since they served local interests and raised
the cultural level of the masses in a way that could not be
46« Pravda , August 11, 1923, p. 1, fifth lead article.
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47duplicated by the higher publications. No one disputed
thla analysis , but when Bubnov also asserted that some local
publications equalled those of the center and even suggested
that exemplary papers were the rule, he elicited an insnediate
response which listed the local papers that were unsatisfac-
tory in importance and directly opposed to party and soviet
48power*
This attention to the uezd press succeeded in sparking a
slow expansion. Various campaigns for subscriptions were car-
ried out periodically in the provinces and the number of titles
and circulation grew. The drive for the curtailment of the
institutional press was extended to the localities , with the
Central Committee ordering the elimination and general review
of these publications by the agit-prop sections
,
although in
many areas this order was academic since only one paper existed.
Places like Iakutsk, where the local paper Kyym ( The Spark )
printed only 2,000 copies despite the support of party and
soviet organisations, could hardly worry about the rational-
ization of the institutional press. In Buriat similar con-
47, Pravda, August li>, 1923, p. 1, third lead article.
"Discission of the Press". Previous articles in this
series were H0n the Successes in the Urals" and "The
Thirst for Papers* In Pravda , August 2, p. 5 and August 11,
p. 1, fifth lead article.
48. Ibid . . August 24, 1923, p. 1, fifth lead article.
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ditions obtained. 49 In other ami the local party organiz-
ation began to involve itself with the press. In Kharkov
the circulation of 235 9 000 copies in February 1923 had risen
to 360,000 by May 1924, while the press of the Ukraine had
added fourteen new titles and 60,000 more copies over the same
such figures, but in the fall of 1923 it reviewed all local
publications and resolved to strengthen its leadership over
them with circulars, letters and experienced press workers*^
The fall review in Smolensk was followed by a general
gubemla conference of the local agit-prop sections and polit-
ical educators at the start of 1924. This meeting adopted
a resolution which corresponded completely with the views of
the center,
"1* The general improvement of the party-soviet pres
of Smolensk Gubernla is one of the foremost questions
fend] necessitates the strengthening in every way of the
dissemination of the paper among the masses*
2. Thanks to Che well known differences in the
Gubernla each paper had its own circle of readers
namely i a) Rabochll put* serving the workers and trade
unions, b) Smolenskala derevnja , the weekly peasant
49. Dimitrlev, S.K.
,
Partllno-soyetsk&la pechat' Iakutll v
pervyve xody govetakol vlastl . 1917-25 , lakutsk, 1964,
pp. 152-6 1 Dondakov, B. Ts# , Voznlknovenlye i, razvltlye
aartllno-soygtskol oechat i tolatil . 191 - J 7, JUS bator,
i960, po. 179-82.
period. 50 The Smolensk Gubernla press section published no
HUE I
50, IwitlU , May 6, 1924, p. 4.
51. WKP 518.
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paper destined for the extensive peasant masses of the
Gubernia. c) fonll torarlshch serving the worker*peasant
youth. "52
To assist the press in the execution of its tasks . the con-
ference recommended the establishment of agit-prop buros at
all levels of the party heirarchy down to uezd and raion
committees* They would organise correspondents and make
Rabochll put* a mass worker paper* removing all institutional
and long theses* and presenting what official material was
necessary in a popular way so the worker could easily assim-
ilate it* Leadership and support of the press would be
realized by party and soviet organisations, and the local
press deficit recovered through ads.
The promises of the conference were swiftly redeemed.
By March Rabochll put* had become economically self-sufficient
with a total of 6500 paid subscribers. This circulation re-
flected a certain willingness to play fast and loose with the
directives from the center rather than force each member to
subscribe to a party publication. In Smolensk only those
members earning over thirty rubles In wages had to subscribe
individually, while those receiving less could subscribe
collectively with a number of comrades depending on the level
52. jftld . 9 "Resolution of the Foremost Problems of the Press
and the Tasks of Agitational Organizations in the Area
of the Dissemination of the Press in Smolensk Gubernia".
January 15. 1924.
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of their wages. w
But no matter vhat successes were achieved , the Smol«
ensk press was never satisfactory* Each meeting called for
mere stress here, more vigilance there, further expansion of
Rafceefcll put' , establishment of uezd papers and the like.
The Importance of the press as • •. one of the most Important
forms of connecting the party with the workers and peasant
masses and Influence of the city on the village" was re-
peated over and over again* The Leninist appeal was also con-
ducted in Smolensk with the aid of the press* Statistics
revealed that 100% of the new party members read Rabochll
put* and 50% read Pravda. Conversations with the new en*
trants indicated a real understanding of Leninism from read*
ing the press, but in many cases they did not subscribe to
any paper, and the local party committees undertook the cor*
55
rection of this defect.
In Moscow the local press surprisingly seemed weaker
than in Smolensk after its strong start in 1923* During the
second half of 1924 sixteen uezd papers published in the
Gubernla, eight of which were either wholly or partially
worker. Their circulation had grown from 152,000 in May to
53* WKP 10* '•Protocol of the Agit-prop Investigation College".
March 28, 1924*
54* HSE 5l8 t "Basic Tasks of Political Education Work19 .
April 1924.
37* j[fiA<» PP- 64*3* -paperss ef the Ural oblaat
55. H&£ 126, oasslm*
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215,000 In December, but their financial position was difficult
since they no longer received enough support from the Moscow
Committee. The local Gubernla paper, Rabochll tfloskva . al-
though continually expanding its coverage of the local scene,
had not enlarged its material on party life In response to
the instruction of the Central Committee. These conditions
necessitated greater attention from the local press section
by fully grasping the leadership of the periodical press.
Other provinces had neither the Moscow net nor the
Smolensk attention, and the strength of the local press seems
to have decreased markedly from west to east* The situation
in the Urals probably was more representative of the local
press net* At the end of 1924 the sixteen Ural Oblast papers
had still not overcome the problem of mixed reader orientation,
despite the decrees of the 12th and 13th congresses. Worse
still, many publications were not locally oriented, going
either to the extreme of forgetting the locality altogether
or omitting every vestige of nationally and internationally
important news. The papers were frequently politically illlt-
57
erate and naive.
By the end of 1924, the worker press had evolved three
levels of performance. The large papers, having their own
56. Krasnala pechat* . #4*5, February 15, 1925, pp. 60-2.
"The Moscow Press for a Half Year*.
57. Ibid . . pp. 64-5. "Papers of the Ural Oblast".
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presses or a circulation of more than 30 , 000 copies, oper-
ated at a profit, vera veil established and responsive to the
directives from the center. These were the central papers
and the largest oblast and gubernla publications. On the next
tier stood the remaining gubernla and oblast papers with cir-
culation from 10 9000 to 30,000 copies. They generally met
the standards of the center and sometimes ran at a profit
owing to one of three favorable factors t extensive circulation,
large numbers of ads or possession of their own presses.
They were less responsive to the center, attempting to create
a satisfactory paper in conditions peculiar to their own area.
Below this second level came the uesd publications which had
neither the support or quality of the other papers of the
hierarchy. They ran at a deficit, at least partially defray-
ed by the state subsidy, and were almost completely unresponsive
58
to the center. They demanded careful attention and greater
party support and leadership before they could be regarded as
satisfactory.
HW IWu Oi lypssi were tar movie zxram v
58. Pravda . November 26, 1924, p. 2. Krasnaja pechat* . #8,
March 10, 1925, p, 39, A survey in the latter source
indicates that papers which could defray 30*40% of their
production expenses by ads would realise a profit, but
the possession of their own presses meant an end to deficits
regardless of the number of ads or subscribers.
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CHAPTER VI
T HE PEASANT PRESS
Origins and Early Development
tel*fc: •.. r .
S*l The history of the peasant press in the first seven ?
years of Soviet power is one of neglect followed by frantic
attention. The Bolsheviks had created only a very few peasant
papers before the October Revolution, notably the two in
Petrograd and Moscow. Following the October revolution em*
phasls had remained on worker papers t although the party took
steps in March 1918, to merge Doreveaskaja pravda . Pereven*
skala bednota and soldatskala pravda into the single peasant
organ of the Central Committee, Bednota , which promised to
struggle for the final liberation of the village poor from
the yoke of capitalism. 1 In subsequent years however « Bednota
was unable to develop into a mass peasant paper because its
subscription price was too high and its ostensible readers
unreachable. The paper's progress was further impeded by its
concentration on general and world events unconnected and
probably unintelligible to the peasantry. Finally its format
and level of appeal were far removed from the Intelligence
and literacy of the average Russian peasant.
During the Civil War and the demobilization of the Red
Army the military press to a certain extent supplemented
1. Bednota , March 27, 191tt, p. 1, editorial.
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Bodnota in attempting to reach the muzhiks. Since the re-
cruits were mostly peasants, the Red Army press adapted Its
appeal to their level and concerned Itself with their pro-
blems. Despite this supplement the peasant press was corn-
pletely unable to satisfy the need of the overwhelming major-
ity of the Soviet population for papers* That the Soviet Gov*
ernment in the first several years of its existence had neither
aovasMse our papers to tne vxxxege.
the resources nor apparently the inclination to satisfy this
segment of the population, did not seem to bother the party
which was more concerned with developing the worker press in
the cities where it had first taken power and where its
strength lay. Nor is there any indication that the twenty
peasant papers called for in January 1922 , ever appeared.
The introduction of NEP and the generally satisfactory
development of the worker press by the end of 1922 enabled
the party on the one hand to consider the peasant press , and
on the other forced it to pay more attention to the village
at the risk of losing all Influence in the countryside to
capitalism and the Kulaks* For this reason the development
of the peasant press really begins only after the press cri-
sis had been overcome, when it is probably safe to say that
only a handful of peasant papers existed throughout the state.
At their fourth congress the press workers coined the
slogan "get the paper to the village" , since party Influence
in the village Jtaad exceptional political Importance. This
Initiative occurred at a fortuitous time, since differentia*
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tion according to typo had become party policy. The old
mixod or worker paper at the uezd level and in gubernias
of predominantly peasant population now came under increas-
ing pressure from the center to cater to the peasantry*
As Vardin put the problems
*I can in no way imagine how we can educate the
peasantry in our spirit 9 how we can subordinate the
peasantry to our political influence • • • if we do not
advance our papers to the village* The supply of the
paper to the village is a question of exclusively
political importance* w 2
This was an indication of the growing Importance which
the Central Committee attached to the peasant press* but its
resources were insufficient to realize the task* According
to Fravda , at the start of 1923 there was one paper to 2000
3people in the village. The Ukraine, which had the most
firmly established peasant press* could only generate 9000
the faadliar subeer£pti$a campaign began re gather mMkantum*
copies dally* Other areas revealed even smaller figures as
the map of the village press was examined from west to east,
Jjj£^££0 and/or a local peasant paper* ledaote explained that
and the condition of uezd papers accounted for this* The
resolution of the congress phrased the problem succinctlyi
"In the village there is a completely insignificant collec-
tion of papers $" and echoing Vardin* stressed that supply
2. Vardin, Sov pechat* * pp. 84-5, -The Village and the
Paper11 • from a report at 4th congress on conditions and
tasks of the press*
3. Prayda
.
February 9, 1923, p. 2* The majority of these
copies were sent to agricultural Soviets*
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of the countryside with papers was a matter of first rank
political importance, for consolidating the links between town
and country and politically educating the peasantry.* These
tasks were unthinkable without the press , so the congress
took a strong position calling for massive attention to the
dissemination of papers in the village*
Since Vardln was the head of the press subsection , that
body manifested similar anxiety. It not only helped Bednota
become economically self sufficient, but expanded the press
subsidy to some four trillion rubles in February 1923 , a
major portion of which went to the peasant press. To provide
additional help the press buro of the subsection divided its
publications into two bulletins , for worker and peasant pa-
pers.^ At the same time under the aegis of the subsection
the familiar subscription campaign began to gather momentum,
with local committees beating the drum for subscriptions to
Bednota and/or a local peasant paper. Bednota explained that
subscriptions should be collective, since the individual
peasant could neither afford nor was he likely to want to
4. Vardln, Sov pechat*
. p. 149. "Resolution of 4th congress
press workers* • Part of the reason for maintaining the
uezd press in opposition to the "liquidatlonlsts" was the
fact that they were the only periodicals which could
reach the peasantry, its needs and its Interests.
5, %z TsK . #3, March 1923, pp. 76-8. Blulleten' A for wor-
kers and Blulleten* B for the peasantry.
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spend his money for an Individual subscription* 6
The press workers congress marked the turning point for
the peasant press. In Its aftermath more attention was paid
to those papers
,
yet relatively little beside the ground
work had been accomplished by the end of April when the 12th
party emigres s met* The concentration of the party congress
on the problems of the peasantry was also reflected in its
treatment of the press* In the draft resolution on the press,
prepared by the press subsection of the Central Committee.
Vardln had called for the change of most uezd papers to a
peasant orientation. All gubemia committees would take the
necessary steps to disseminate their uezd papers into the
village. On the gubemia level the press would reflect the
population of Its area, but even in the worker guhernias there
should be peasant papers or, if this were not materially
possible, the gubemia worker paper should establish a peasant
7 tt«d# cover*
column.
The congress resolution on questions of propaganda, press
and agitation elaborated on these themes, calling on the
Central Committee to order party committees to H ••• straighten
out the matter of dissemination of the press first of all in
the village, since it had at the present time the most gigantic
6. Bednota , March 21, 1923, p. 1.
7. Pravda
. April 15, 1923, p. 5.
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political Importance*" The congress also confirmed the press
stratification implied in Vardln's drafts a peasant paper in
large centers which could support both a worker and peasant
paper or a column in the worker paper when a peasant publication
was not possible* With respect to the uezd press the resolu-
tion went even further than Vardin.
"The uezd press mist designate the overwhelming
part of all its material to peasant questions , advanc-
ing to the first place the illustration of the life of
village and countryside. The situation, when uezd papers
are almost completely oriented toward the city (as the
general rule, toward the petty bourgeois) reader 9 is
completely intolerable* Guberaia Committees are obliged
to adopt all measures for the correct establishment of
the uezd press, which has been very lightly disseminated
in the village." 8
The congress also confirmed the need for continued financial
assistance to a whole series of local peasant papers and for
the organization of dally papers for mass dissemination
9 t^m^KKmet *mHm in supperv of eheee
in the village,
>aj>em. WiiPWiiWAires awl appeals far Information *er# Ala*
The 12th congress completely revised the attitude toward
8. Peshenlla partli o pechatl . pp. 45-6, from the resolution
on propaganda, press and agitation.
9« Ibid
. ,
p. 48* From the Resolution of the 12th congress on
the work of the RCP in the village. This resolution also
repeated the order for guhernia and uezd papers designated
for the peasants. In another resolution the congress re-
lated the role of the Central Committee's Bednota to the
future course of the peasant press* Bednota had shown that
it was unable to be a mass paper because of its content and
price during the early part of NEP. The congress therefore
decreed the creation of another all Russian paper to give
material to the peasantry at a price and in a language
tl acceptable to the peasant masses.
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the peasant press, and the party now recognized the need to
shift its attention to this area of Soviet life# Two prime
factors in the campaign ahead would be the extension of party
influence into the countryside, and the change of the uezd
press from worker or mixed to peasant papers. The develop-
ment of the peasant press in 1923-4 reflects the party's
attempts to establish an extensive village net and to realize
its policies and ideas through these papers.
Attempts to develop the peasant press were handicapped
from the start by the lack of knowledge about its publications.
Little was known about their number, composition, dissemin-
ation, format or content. The press subsection of the
Central Committee at once took steps to determine the extent
of the village press In order to respond better to the congress
resolution, and it also took direct action in support of these
papers. Questionnaires and appeals for information were dis-
patched to discover the local situation. The press frub-
section continued to designate a large share of the state
subsidy to peasant papers, almost one half for the third
quarter of 1923, while estimates for the final quarter were
that nine tenths of the peasant press would need support from
the center* At the same time the press subsection began to
consider rationalizing the peasant press, in line with the
resolution of the 12th Congress, into a net similar to the one
that had been established for worker papers at the end
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of 1921* However, the most Important measure taken was the
dispatch of an Investigatory trip by Shaflr, a member of the
press subsection* to examine the peasant press and the avail*
ability of publications In the village. 11
Examination of the situation In the countryside revealed
the very real weakness of the peasant press and the failure
of papers to penetrate beyond the railroads Into the village.
Shaflr felt the data which he gathered was Incomplete and In-
sufficient* but It clearly showed that neither subscribers
nor readers existed in the village* This was bad enough, but
the real problem lay in the absence of these publications
which meant «•« the village was being tilled by Papists*
NEPmen, quacks and other enemies of Soviet power". 12 Con*
dltions were universally bad. In Smolensk at the village of
Durbatovo* Bednota was read occasionally but not subscribed
to* since it didn't tell the truth and never printed peasant
articles. Muzhiks in the Smolensk area would subscribe to
10* l£ IgK. #7-8, (55-6)* August - September* 1923. pp. 38.
From the report of the agitation-propaganda section of
the Central Committee.
11. The information that follows all comes from Shaflr'
s
report to the press subsection of the Central Committee,
Qazata i derevnla . which was published March 3, 1924.
Shaflr' s trip took him to most of the peasant provinces
and extended from June to the fall of 1923.
12. Ibid . . p. 5. siit M
191
the peasant press only if it presented the village as Lt
really was and not as some fairyland.
In Saratov Gubemla at one village no one even knew
whether anyone subscribed to a peasant paper • while in Voron*
ezh the deficit for two peasant papers in May ran to 85
million rubles* The Voronezh despatcher said there were no
subscriptions among the peasantry, and that those subscribers
indicated in the figures of the local committee were sheer
13fantasy* Papers rarely reached the villages and arrived
late when they did* In one test case it took fifty eight
hours for papers to travel fifty eight versts from Voronezh,
fifty two and one half hours of this time were spent lying
around in various delivery rooms at the stations* In another
case a distance of thirty versts was covered in five days
at beet and generally in twelve days* From the railroad
station the press depended on the postal-telegraph system
for delivery* But not all volosts had postal.telegraph
sections and those that didn 9 t suffered even greater delays,
frequently up to a month, or the total lack of delivery*
The circulation of the two local peasant papers numbered
about 7,300 copies, while the number of local party members
totaled over 7,900, indicating a general failure to support
13* Ibid * * pp* 10-1* Shaflr had asked questions In Voronezh
on the periodicity, support, popularity, format, content,
dissemination, correspondents and subjects! the answers
resulted In this picture*
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the press* Most of these copies went to people connected with
institutions and never matriculated into the countryside* Of
the forty eight respondents to his questionnaire on reading
habits Shafir found only four who read a paper regularly.
All these deficiencies represented irregularities of the
dissemination apparatus and failures of local committees.
But the defects did not stop there, in fact the most serious
errors were made in the message of the peasant papers* The
contents of the uezd village press was very bad and did nothing
to fight the counter-revolution and Kulaks* After analyzing
several articles , Shafir concluded that the party did not
control the countryside since the village was not receiving its
information from the party or ROSTA* Local papers had not been
adapted to fight this type of battle and were unprepared or
illprepared to campaign on the ideological front* "It is
necessary to state, that our uezd press is too weak to fight
with this systematic onslaught of the counter-revolution in
ttM<*illage,"&tf «* if23. it nmiid a «L*liar oneat
The conclusions drawn from this examination of the
peasant press revealed clearly that the peasant press de-
manded more attention then the 12th congress had conceived.
"Since political and cultural union with the village can best
of all be established through the uezd press, we have to
pay particular attention to the uezd press, to its quantita-
14. Ibid . . p. 112.
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tive and qualitative strength* In practical terms this
meant creation or conversion* Peasant papers must be dif-
ferent from worker papers . concentrating on subjects famil-
iar to the peasantry* Due to their cultural level the peasant
try would best be served by a wall paper with simple language
and corresponding illustrations. But the Importance of the
paper for the peasantry remained to be impressed on the local
committee, and the question of the paper in the village must
be raised to the first rank. Papers must receive support from
the local budget j their dissemination, transferred to agencies
created by the despatcher, rather than remaining with the cells
where it was a patent failure. The editor should travel fre-
quently throughout the area which his paper served in order
to make it responsive to the needs and interests of the pea-
santry* ' i *»* 9****t& flttMMMNrf fry
Not content with one examination of this kind, the press
section sent another to the gubemias of Podolsk. Volynsk and
Odessa at the end of 1923. It revealed a similar unsatis-
factory situation. The peasant papers were exhausted from
the lack of proper attention by party organizations. Their
Importance was simply not realized. Of the peasant publica-
tions examined in the three gubernlas. those for Odessa ( luzhnyl
sollanln ) and Volynsk ( Sellanskaia bednota ) were merely weekly
supplements to the local worker paper. The third* Chervone
15. Ibid
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selo of Podolsk was an independent twice-weekly publication*
disseminating two thousand copies to the village. But in
comparison with the four million peasants of the gubernias a
total circulation of nine thousand copies was completely in~
sufficient, and this second investigation only confirmed Sha-
flr 9 s conclusion that the party must give more attention and
16
support to the peasant press*
Even in Smolensk where the weekly peasant paper Smolen-
skala derevnla had published since early 1923. and the guber-
nia committee could report that "the paper at the end of the
year was more or less secure in its means", the party had to
pay more attention to its content, popularizing it. orienting
it toward the village with copious material on local life,
and establishing its links with village organisations* 17 The
condition of the peasant press was summarised by lakovlev to
the press workers and representatives of publishing houses on
November 17.
"The peasant papers stand poorly. In the twenty
three peasant gubernias of the USSR the circulation of
all the peasant papers is 85.000 copies » and the major*
ity of the papers come out two-three times per week.
The circulation of peasant papers is 5% of the general
II I I
16. Igvestlla . January 12 t 1924, p. 5. The article felt
that the situation was really worse than the statistics
indicated since most of the circulation was in the cities
of publication and not in the countryside.
17. WKP 51S, "Agit-prop work for the fall of 1923, Smolensk
Gubernia"
•
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circulation of papers in the USSR* But these papers
reach the peasantry In small quantity, being lost in
vollspolkoms or in soviet secretariats. "io
He reiterated the demand for a special publication for the
peasantry and indicated that the minimum program for the
village press was the dissemination of 120.000 by the spring
*Nl#tt*<>r of • very ftaporcaat fa«t *l*c« 3sdnota»s
lee anc cmsMtme^vVVmnte*! *» Ttwm reacwxng toe *©w**r
Krest'lanskala aazeta and the
Expansion of the Peasant Press
Iakovlev's repetition of the proposal for a new Central
Committee peasant daily, probably indicated his knowledge of
the imminent appearance of Krest'lanskala gaaeta , which be-
gan publication November 25, Kalinin, the Chairman of VTslK,
was entrusted with the leadership of the new paper and di-
rected to strengthen the alliance of workers and peasants.
Its tasks were to " ... to reflect the life of the peasan-
try, practically aid the peasantry in grasping questions of
economic, agricultural, legal and other matters ... and ...
Illuminate for the peasantry every sense of events occurring
in the world and their deep connection with the life of our
republic.
•
19
18* Pravda , November 20, 1923, p. 3.
19. Krasflanskala gaaef . November 25, 1923, p. 1, edito-
rial! Initially a weekly, the paper became a dally by
1924.
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The publication of another central peasant paper created
a problem of competence for Bednota , which had stressed the
need for a second, Inexpensive peasant paper* Krest'ian-
skala gasseta* g large type and simple language brought It closer
to the cultural level of the masses, according to Sosnovskli,
the editor of Bednota , a very Important fact since Bednota '
s
price and content prevented It from reaching the lower
strata of the peasantry.
While the editor of Bednota agreed on the need for two
central peasant papers, It became obvious that some members of
the party did not share his view, and Pravda again served
as a sounding board for the discussion of a press problem*
Trotsky Immediately supported the publication of Krest* lanakaja
gageta . He believed that Bednota with a circulation of 50*
100,000 copies could not reach the peasantry. What Soviet
Russia needed was a peasant paper with a circulation of two
million copies to relate events In the village to what was
happening In the Soviet Union. Such a paper would not teach
or appeal to the peasant masses, but simply relate the course
of events.
Trotsky* 8 Idea meant a vast expansion of Krest'lanafcaia
ftaseta at the expense of Bednota . and It was attacked by Kar-
20. Bednota . November 21, 1923, p. 1, editorial. According
to ads in Bednota for the new paper, farest* lanskala gazeta
was supposed to begin publication November 15, but was
delayed for some reason.
197
plnskli who defended the original central peasant paper as
the best village publication and claimed that its popularity
had doubled* He suggested that Trotsky didn't realize the
value of Bednota * but reserved his major criticism for
Kres t * lanakala xaasef which could not be supported by the
existing press apparatus » It would be a serious mistake to
create a peasant paper of two million copies which had no
....
links to the messes and no established collaborators, and
Karplnskii believed this mistake would become obvious to all
stxivms 5ft w&toi *&&Pla i/V; $1 jtfcstt would \o\
after the first several issues of Kresf lanskala aazeta. *
In this case Trotsky was supported by the party* His
idea of the mass paper was correct, but insufficiently
developed* According to Soltz, a member of Pravda*s staff,
the tasks ef the mass paper were, as Trotsky stated, to tell
what was happening in the Soviet Union* especially in areas
close to the party and the economy. Unfortunately the press
apparatus would not immediately support two million copies
so three hundred thousand would be Krest' lanskala gazeta'g
goal for Its first year with the whole peasant press expand*
ing to two million copies* Bednota would keep its read*
ers and compete with Krest' lanskala Jtaseta for the recent*
21* Pravda , December 6* p* 2 (Trotsky) and December 12,
p. 1, fourth lead article (Karplnskii).
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ly educated muzhiks.
The final distinction Ml give* by Sosnovskll, who re-
sponded to the greet number of letters Lnquirlng about the
difference between the two papers and the need for Krest'lan-
skala gagota .
m The Central Committee of the Communist Party striv-
ing to satisfy the village with papers decided to publish,
beside a dally and therefore insufficiently cheap [ paper]
,
a weekly Krest ' janskaja gazeta . Its price • 15 kopeks per
month secures for It many hundreds of thousands of sub-
scriptions from the village, thus we will not know a great*
er paper famine. Beside this, Krest' lanskala gazeta
.
strives to write in a simple language, that would be fully
approachable to the most poorly literate reader.
As to Bednota, it serves the more literate peasant
and has to give leading statements on all questions of
work in the village. Bednota'
s
50,000 circulation Is
insufficient as every agricultural soviet needs one copy
for guidance on all questions. We want to expand the cir-
culation in the next months. But due to the extensive
illiteracy in the village Krest* lanskala gageta is also
very important • * 23
At the same time that this discussion was being vented in
22. Pravda, December 19, 1923, p. 1, third lead article.
In a footnote to his article Soltz stated that he had
written it before he saw Karplnskil's. He regarded the
latter 1 s attack on Krest'lanskala sazeta as non-party
and purely official. Another article In Bednota Decem-
ber 8, had also attacked the idea of a second mass peasant
paper, saying collective subscriptions would cover the
problem of mass*
23, Bednota . December 22, 1923, p. 1, second lead article.
Karpinskil stopped baiting Krest'lanskala gazeta , but
continued to attack Trotsky's idea that a peasant paper
should not appeal or teach. He felt such a belief was a
narrow methodological concept. Pravda , January 3, 1924,
p. 1, third lead article.
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the Central Organ of the party, the Central Committee acting
through the agit-prop section convoked an all-union confer-
ence of peasant paper editors to discuss the condition and
tasks of the rural press* lakovlev gave the keynote speech,
confirming the weakness of the village press apparatus, and
stressing the small percentage of peasant papers within the
Soviet press* Improvement of rural publications represented
one of the meet important programs in linking village with
town. The advent of the new economic policy in the village
had precipitated a struggle between the worker and the NEPman
for the peasantry, and the press as an educational and cul-
tural weapon was a most important tool of the workers.^ In
the eyes of the conference the peasant press was hindered in
pursuing its tasks by three factors i illiteracy, low cultur-
al level and the poor network of roads in the countryside
that made dissemination nearly impossible.
The discussion of lakovlev 1 a speech confirmed his view
of the condition of the press and reflected the failure
of peasant publications to satisfy the peasantry. In most
cases they had failed to win the muzhik over to the party
line, and the center abetted this failure by paying insuf-
24. jrravda
. p. 3, and lEvestlla , p. 2, December 22, 1923.
In addition to press subsection representatives, editors
came from Smolensk, Tula, Nizhni, Voronezh, Gomel, and
Union and Autonomous Republics. £z TsK, #1 (59), Jan-
uary 1924, p. 58, states that the conference consisted
of 18 central and Ukranian peasant paper editors.
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flclent attention to the peasantry* "A peasant paper must be
a true reflection of the life of the Republic, and the main
place, of course, must be taken in it by questions closely
affecting the interests of the peasant population* Important
25
attention must be devoted to questions of agronomy* " Other
reports and speeches to the conference also confirmed the
findings of the press subsection's investigations of rural
papers, and naturally injected themselves into the determina-
tion of the future peasant press net*
The conference supported the idea of a circulation of two
million copies by the spring of 1925, setting an intermediate
goal of 800,000 for the spring of 1924* Realization of this
program would mean one peasant paper to ten peasant homes* To
help achieve this goal, the conference enlisted Komsomol and
Red Army organizations to facilitate delivery to the reader
and emphasized the role of the selcor in disseminating and
supporting the paper in the village* The editors then adopted
a three tiered net of peasant papers* At the top stood the two
central publications, Bednota and Krest'lanskaia gazeta t at
the bottom would be the gubernla and uezd papers lumped to-
gether under the heading of okrug publications* Somewhere in
25* Izvestlia , December 23 . 1923, p. 4* A report on dissemina-
tion noted that of the 11,400 volispolcoms only 5400 were
in the postal-telegraph net, while the rest lay ten to
forty versts from the nearest drop point*
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between would come oblast and autonomous republic papers. In
constructing this net the conference Invalidated the peasant
supplement to the gubemla worker paper as a true peasant
publications accepting It only In exceptional cases. In the
autonomous republics* the paper should be printed In the
national language.^6
The pressure for expansion met Its best response apparent-
ly In those areas where peasant papers were already well esta-
blished. In Smolensk the gubemla agit-prop conference In
January 1924, fully supported the center on the Importance of
the peasant press. Differentiation In Smolensk had been achieved
through the publication of worker, peasant and youth papers.
The party committee reaffirmed the resolution of the editors
for enlisting selcors In dissemination and ordered the estab-
lishment of ralon and uezd agit-prop buros to further distri-
bution of the press. Peasants were allowed to pay In kind for
their subscriptions, and the gubemla committee went on record
for the real material support of the peasant press by the
27gubemla, rather than being merely Its nominal publishers.
26, Pravda, p. 5 and Igvestlla . p. 4, December 23, 1923. In the
latter source the extent of this net Is given as 2 central,
3 oblast and 58 okrug papers i of these 47 existed and the
conference called for the establishment of 14 others In the
Immediate future.
27, WKP 518. "Resolution on the Foremost Tasks of the Press and
Agitation Organizations In the Area of the Press In Smolensk
Gubernla"
.
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The activity of the press subsection at the end of 1923
and the discussion in iravda were Incorporated in the Central
Committee decree of February 6, 1924 * which instructed the
party on all facets of the press. For village publications 9
the decree reiterated the points of the 12th congress , sum-
marized the conclusions reached by the press subsection 9 s in-
vestigations 9 indicated what tasks stood ahead, and how the
party should approach them* After officially recognizing the
need for only 200 9 000 copies of Krest * lanskaia gazeta by the
spring » the decree stated
$
"In the area of serving the peasants it is neces-
sary in every possible way to support uezd and gubernia
peasant papers. The press is working out a concrete plan
for a network of uezd peasant papers • weighing the spe-
cial conditions of various raions, striving for the
expansion of raion service (okrug papers in the Ukraine)
for their change to serving the peasantry* It is indis-
pensable to reinforce the instruction of uezd papers and
to improve their composition by editorial boards estab-
lished in a series of agricultural gubemias (up to ten)
who have exemplary papers*
Along all lines of peasant papers » push to the first
place questions of the economic and political position of
the Republic from the point of view of strengthening the
alliance of the working class and the peasantry along with
the illumination of questions of cooperatives and the pro-
paganda of agricultural enterprises* which could have mass
application and could give even minimal strengthening and
improvement to the peasant economy* It is indispensable
also to pay special attention to the illustration in pea-
sant papers of questions of the way of life peculiar to
28. Iz TsK. #3, March 1924. pp. 48-52i 0 part i sov pechatl .
pp*~290-l* "The Most Important Foremost fasks or the
Party in the Area of the Press"*
This decree marked the beginning of the major efforts
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to Improve and expand the peasant press which developed
rapidly along a number of new lines. Sednota , having accepted
its role as the senior and leading village paper* established
a subscription corner which reported irregularities in the
dissemination process and provided the incentive to improve
distribution. The circulation of Krest' lanska^a gazeta . de-
spite the predictions of Karpinskii* passed the 100,000 mark
even before the subscription campaign had reached the guher-
nia level « and reports from the localities indicated an
expanding demand for peasant papers now that they were becom-
ing available* The Central Committee encouraged all these
trends* constantly badgering local committees to pay more
attention to the peasant press.
At the end of March In a circular to all gubernia and
higher party organizations the Central Committee again
stressed the role of the peasant press as " • • • one of the
most important means of uniting the peasantry with the work-
ing class and a means for the realization of party influence
29in the village. • To Insure the availability of the press,
periodicals had to be reduced in price* To realize 200*000
copies of fir^ft * lanskala gazeta. party and Komsomol organiza-
tions would have to assume an energetic role in distributing
the paper.
29. WKP 209, #54. "On Disseminating Peasant Papers- . March 28*
TS24. Also in lz TsK* #4* April 1924. p. 157.
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The experience of a series of gubernla publications had
proven that the successful organization of peasant papers
was fully possible, therefore the Central Comalttee ordered
all party organisations to Initiate campaigns for the dis-
patch of Krest* lanskaja gasata to the village, appealing
especially to those workers who still had ties with the coun-
tryside* To further these campaigns local meetings would be-
come forums for the discussion of dissemination and all trade
union, cooperative, party, Komsomol and soviet organizations
would become vehicles of delivery. The campaign for fares
-
t* lanskaja gazeta was extensively supported, but the local
committee was warned not to overlook gubernla or uezd papers
. 30
,
which had the best ties with the peasantry
As the campaign wore on the results became more and more
Impressive. By March the number of peasant papers had more
than doubled that of the previous year, while circulation
had tripled. Although the center maintained that the peasant
press was still Insufficient, an Indication of Its progress
was the reduction of Its subsidy for the first and second
quarters of 1924. 31 But the press section continued Its In-
struction of the village press through Blulleten' A, articles
30. Ibid . In Smolensk this appeal was repeated to lower par-
tyunlts on April 9 as "The Basic Tasks of Political Ed-
ucation Work". WKP 51b.
31. Is TsK #4, April 1924, pp. 103 and 122. The percentage
declined from 40 to 23, although this still represented
35,000 r. With the Increase In the total press subsidy
for the second half of the year to 210,000 r, peasant
papers received 48,300 r.
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in iCragnala pechat' . consultations with rural paper editors,
written instructions, general directives and circulars , in-
structional trips • articles in Pravda . information through
ROSTA and reports to the Central Buro of press workers to
32
maintain the momentum of the campaign* At the same time
the dissemination network was expanded and reorganised. The
new delivery system of the Kontragentstvo of the press had
nearly twice the number of drop points i 800 compared with 458*
Its distribution was now divided between two institutions. A
Buro for the dissemination of the periodical press delivered
the papers to the railroad drops, while the new Buro, Sviaz,
created in August 1923 to assist in dissemination, now dis-
patched the press from the railroad points to lower organl-
332a tions and subscribers.
As press day approached the initial campaign peaked, and
Kalinin reported its successes. Peasant subscriptions which
stood at 7000 at the start, had risen to 60,000. The circu-
lation of the peasant press had grown steadily. By May Kres-
t' lanskaja gazeta had passed the mark set by the editors in
32. Ibid . . p. 105. For the year ending April 1, the press
section and Its predecessor had given 2100 oral instruc-
tions, 700 letters, 20 general instructions and circu-
lars, held 70 conferences, run 7 trips and published 251
press Blulletenl .
33. Ibid., p. 122. Bednota also asked the Commissar for
Posts and Telegraphs to examine press delivery through
its system and correct these irregularities. Bednota .
April 3, 1924, p. 2.
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December 1923. The Chairman of VTsIK emphasized, however, that
these were only the first steps toward flooding the peasantry
with papers, an Interpretation that was shared by the editors
of the paper* "This first major success must not create the
Impression that the whole task has been fulfilled and Kres-
t f lanskala gazeta can without special efforts toward the winter
of next year have a million circulation* w The harvest season
would bring a decline In subscriptions or at least a leveling
off In the tempo* Because of this seasonal decline * all organi-
zations would have to redouble their efforts for subscriptions
and, since accurate and timely receipt of papers was such an
Important factor In their expansion, Improve the delivery of
the press to the village*
The Initial success of the peasant press campaign was fur*
ther confirmed at the 13th party congress, which also regarded
these achievements as only the first step along the road to
greater expansion* In the Organizational Report Stalin placed
the realization of one million copies of Krest'lanskala aazeta
before the party* He was supported by the press section which
enumerated the progress of the campaign up to the end of May*
In the period since the 12th congress peasant papers had grown
34* WKP 209* Circular of the Central Committee to All Ukoms,
Volkfcms, Iachyeks and Members RCP* "On Krest' lanskala faze*
ta»* May (?) 1924* Attached to the circular was a poster
advertising the paper which each party organization was to
display In a prominent place where the peasantry could read
It* The Smolensk copy was not found in the archives*
?07
Into 15% of the two and on© half million copies of the Soviet
press, but this was still insufficient for the needs of the
35Russian peasantry* In pursuit of further expansion, the
congress broke little new ground, but continued to hammer
away on already familiar themes*
"The further development of the net of weekly
peasant papers is indispensable , the strengthening of
existing peasant papers* expansion of their circulation
.
improvement of their con teats and the firming up o£
their connection with the peasantry by means of mass in*
volvenent of seicors • * * * The work of the selcors must
be aided in every possible way by party and soviet
organs* An attentive relation to peasant letters, the
promotion In the soviet order of each peasant desire*
legal aid to the peasantry, the skillful combination of
agro-propaganda with the illustration ef general policy
and economic questions* especially cooperatives* finally,
acceptable accounts for the peasantry, without hypo-
critical emptiness and unnecessary vulgarization — all
these are necessary qualities of a mass peasant paper*
The red army and red fleet press which must be in
every way strengthened has great importance for serving
the peasantry, but its contents and language must be
adapted to the youth who are flowing into the army* It
is indispensable also to use the territorial musters
for establishing the link of the red army and peasant
paper with the peasantry* 19 36
The party thus went on record for further expansion of the
peasant press and its support by ancillary papers which reached
parts Of the peasant population*
The response to the congress appeal for further work can
35. Trinadtsatyl s M ezd * p. 119, 125 and 8L0-L* Both the
draft resolution and the resolution adopted by the con-
gress stressed the same llnei success, but a long way to go.
36* Sov pochat* v dok, p* 65. The congress also confirmed the
continued financial support for the peasant press*
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be traced with some clarity in Smolensk. In that gubernia the
campaign machinery that had generated peasant subscriptions
during the winter and early spring was merely retooled for the
new goals* Aiming for one paper to ten peasant huts, the new
campaign generated a series of uezd and volost reports that
revealed a steady growth in the number of subscriptions to both
the central peasant papers and to amolexisicaia darevnia. Al-
though the gubernia committee felt its progress was insuffi-
cient! and ordered all organizations to agitate for and dis-
cuss the peasant press, the subscription campaign moved rapid-
ly ahead. The appeal of the editors of Krest ' janskaia gaseta ,
sent (Hit in May, was repeated at the uezd level throughout the
summer with the order to popularize the paper among the peasan-
try, and at the end of June the gubernia committee issued in-
structions for the immediate future.
"It is indispensable to develop subscriptions to
the central Krest ' lanskaja gazeta and to Smolenskaja
d ?revnja toward the fall on a more extensive scale than
up to this time. Along with this must be strengthened for
the fall period the instruction of selcors and the correct
leadership by the party of their work. Selcors and readers
must be active agents for the dissemination of peasant
papers. With the new budget year all agricultural Soviets
will subscribe to the paper Smolenskaja derevnla«»37
fhe results of this campaign varied. In the rural uezds sub-
scriptions mounted and it was reported that Krest 1 ianskaia
37. W£P 518. "Political and Educational Work in the Village-.
Issued at a session of the gubernia committee buro, June
28, 1924.
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aareta had become the main paper In the village* But in the
city of Smolensk the local committee carried out an "inexpedi-
ent and unrealistic" campaign which failed completely to meet
• 38its goals.
At the beginning of the fall the gubernia committee out-
lined the harvest campaign. The press subsection would regis-
ter all press workers in the gubernia, organize meetings with
peasant editors to establish closer ties between the paper and
the subsection* centralise paper publication, decide on pro-
grams for local selcors, examine wall papers and work out ba-
39
sic directives for all the gubernia press.
At the center the campaign was led by Bednota . Sections
dealing with the localities became regular features in an
attempt to establish links with the peasantry. During July a
new section was instituted which reported the action taken on
letters to the paper* By aid sunnier the trend toward the pri-
vacy of agricultural news, initiated after the 12th congress
.
was completed by printing peasant material on the first page
and relegating foreign news to the back* To expedite dissem-
ination a new column. "Bednota in the Village19 » apparently a
replacement df the former * Subscription Corner" . related the
38. WKP 277. "Report on the Work of the Agit-prop Section of
Gshatsk Uezd Committee for June-September. 1924" • WKP 10.
"Protocol of an Extraordinary Session of the Agit-prop
Section of Smolensk" . September 18, 1924*
39* WKP 518. "Plan of the Agit-prop Work In Smolensk Guber-
nia for October-December 1924"*
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successes and failures of the paper In the countryside
Other central papers also began to publish peasant sections
or columns regardless of their direction and reading public.
Isvestlla opened its peasant section in June, while Pravda
started special consideration of the countryside during the
summer. Leningrad*kala pravda began publishing peasant num-
bers in July, and Kalinin demanded that other papers follow
its example. 41 lMU:9Xiw . *
. As the campaign continued it became obvious that two fac-
tors were impeding major expansion of the peasant press. No
longer were the absence of paper or technical means of publi-
cation dominant factors » and although the majority of peasant
publications sustained themselves through the state subsidy
»
this was not a limiting factor either* Party and soviet or*
ganizations had begun to back the campaign and were promoting
local papers t but price and dissemination remained obstacles
that seemed to defy solution. The price of peasant papers
varied from area to area; most cost 15-25 kopeks which was
too much. A ten kopek peasant paper was inexpensive* while
42
those costing thirty kopeks were completely out of range.
40. These changes
.
resulting from the 13th congress resolu-
tion, probably occurred also in Kresf lanskala gageta .
but no copies were available for this period.
41. i,ftnlngradalcaia pravda . July 9, 1924, p. 3.
42. Iqvestlla . June 10, 1924, p. 5.
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Essentially the question of price was linked to perlodicty.
More frequent editions meant higher costs assuming a constant
circulation* The absence of many ads to help defray the pro-
duction expenses of frequent issues resulted in high prices,
despite the experience of the cities which showed that such a
reaction was not the solution. The knowledge gained in the
preceding years had shown that the best peasant papers in the
localities were weekly publications* a theory that had been
supported at the 13th congress. This frequency allowed the
editors to choose and summarize their materials from a greater
selection of information and events*
But the prime reason for this periodicity was dissemina-
tion. A weekly issue was the limit of the local delivery sys-
tem* More frequent editions caused the complete breakdown of
delivery* while the weekly could be disseminated with some
success* The situation was best described by the editor of
Kurskala oravda . Or* Tsypln* who noted the effect on the pea-
santry of irregular delivery after they had scraped together
the money for a subscription* Hundreds of letters had poured
into his office about such circumstances* Papers sent In May*
arrived in June* In the case of Krest' janskala gageta sub-
scribers had not received a single copy in the course of sev-
eral months*
A continuation of such dissemination would result in a
complete refusal to subscribe* meaning in turn* an end to the
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campaign and a loss of party Influence in the countryside.
Tsypin blamed the postal-telegraph system for the trouble,
since it could not deliver papers beyond one hundred versts
in less than ten days, and the vollspolcoms which delayed
or forgot about the papers. By the fall the party had
transferred its attention to the selcors in an attempt to
overcome this obstacle. Conferences of village correspondents
responded to this shift, calling on their colleagues to sup-
plement the dissemination apparatus by delivering the paper
to the peasantry.
In December the party summarized eighteen months* activi-
ty with a comprehensive statement about peasant publications.
The function of the peasant press was defined in relation to
differentiation into worker and peasant papers. It was not
enough for peasant publications to concentrate on the country-
^^wtty, ******* , wieuitarel MppMl
"Peasant papers must without fall, along with the
illustration of questions of village life and agricul-
tural economy applied to local concrete conditions,
acquaint the village with the international and internal
position of the Union SSR, the activity of the party,
cultural and economic construction of Soviet power. Pea-
sant papers must also designate a place for worker life,
the condition of local Industry and economy from the
point of view of the collaboration of the working class
43. Pravda, July 16, 1924, p. 1, third lead article. This
example was probably being used to reveal deficiencies
of the local dissemination apparatus and encourage local
organizations to correct them.
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with the peasantry. Only through fulfillment of these
conditions can the peasant papers become the real leader
of soviet and party Influence In the village, which has
not been transformed Into a narrow specialist sheet of
agrarian character. "44
This decree expanded the role of the peasant paper, while Its
main function remained the exertion of party and soviet Influ-
ence In the countryside, the peasant paper now became a coor-
dinator of an extensive collective effort to Illustrate what
was happening In all phases of state construction. The pea-
santry would now see local conditions within the wider con-
text of the domestic and international situation.
Within this expanded context the Central Committee defined
the approach and content of individual peasant papers. The
first was to realize the educational level of the reader for
which it was destined. This meant that editors must attend
to the language of the paper so It would be comprehensible to
the peasantry. As to content, agricultural propaganda came
first, then the Central Committee demanded the establishment
of a section devoted to party life, a feature which had been
conspicuously absent from the peasant press up to that time.
As the worker would have a section on the peasantry, so the
peasant paper would devote a small section to the life and
problems of the proletariat. Other sections would cover Red
44. 0 part 1 sov pechatl . p. 319. "On the Type of Worker
and Peasant Papers".
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Array life and anti-reltgious propaganda*
By the end of 1924 the party had refined the role of the
peasant press and prescribed its content. At the same time the
continuing campaign for the expansion of Its circulation had
born positive results. Village circulation had grown to 1.3
million copies and that of Krest'lanskaia gazeta to 600,000
copies. All but four gubernlas had peasant papers, and those
four were preparing to launch them. In a manner very similar
to the worker press following the crisis of 1922, the gubernia
peasant paper had been taken in hand and Its importance con-
veyed to the local party organizations. The press section now
believed that the time was ripe to shift the focus of its
attention to uezd papers which continued to be official sheets,
46
not involving the peasantry or responsive to its needs. As
the number of peasant papers approached 150 9 almost double the
number of titles existing one year before, the press section
could well feel some satisfaction with its activity during the
eighteen months since the party had called for attention to
peasant publications.
papers, *ad at ttao h*giattiat| of 1923 the ?.***lutien*ry Mill*
45. Ibid . , pp. 322-3. "On the Peasant Press 0 .
46, grasnala pechat* . #9, March 25, 1925. The press section
felt that the resolution of the 13th congress would be
fulfilled only when the uead press had been improved.
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CHAPTER VII
MILITARY, WALL, NATIONAL, 'Mi
AND YOUTH PAPERS
n*tt*»V *f irf.ltt*ry n*pm/t* «b«t ivntaM staff* *f four or tlv*
The Military Press
The end of the Civil War and the proas crisis combined
to curtail the extensive net of military papers that had
existed at the height of the fighting in 1920. The change to
cost accounting had a heavy impact on the military press
which had scant recourse to ads or extensive subscriptions
,
and It was clear that army publications would completely dis-
appear without aid from the center* The Central Committee
recognized this danger as early as July 1922
,
decreeing a
subsidy of 35,000,000 rubles for the Peoples 9 Commissariat
for War to support the most important army papers. Emphasis
in the distribution of this money would be placed on those
papers published for distant units that would not otherwise
receive the press* 1'
The state subsidy prevented further decline ef military
papers, and at the beginning of 1923 the Revolutionary Mili-
tary Soviet created its own press Buro to direct and assist
!• Portiankln, Soy voyen pechat' * p. 101* About this time
KrasnoarmelsfcajLa peckat* . the military counterpart of Kras-
nala pechat* » began to appear. Its publisher and date ef
issue are unknown, but it was probably printed by a section
of the Rewoyensoviet* There is no record of its publi-
cation by the press section*
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the remnants of the Red Army and Fleet press* In July of that
year the Buro initiated Its counterpart to the Central Comalt-
tee Blulletlns . the need for which had been proven In an exami-
nation of military papers that revealed staffs of four or five
press workers
.
While these steps were taken to prevent the total collapse
of military publications, the center had not yet considered
their function within the context of the whole press net. The
party maintained its silence on the role of Red Army papers at
a time when military agitation no longer held primary Impor-
tance. Presumably political education and raising the class
consciousness of recruits remained integral assignments. But
until well into 1923, unlike worker and peasant publications,
the party had not defined the position or function of the mill-
tary press*
Nor was the general growth of Soviet papers during 1923
reflected in the military press. In fact just the opposite
occurred* The 4th congress of press workers heard one report
that noted the decline of Red Army publications to a total of
eleven papers, some of which did not publish dally. Their
2
circulation was 70,000 copies or 5% of all the Soviet press*
In this case, however, the party apparently sensed no urgency
2» Pravda , p. 2 and Izvestlla . p. 3, February 9, 1923. The
relationship of the decline in military papers to the
attack on Trotsky is not clear, although it might have
been intended to deprive him of a mouthpiece.
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for correcting the situation. Since the class struggle was
not being fought in the any, the military press remained an
unattended backwater t and the congress contented itself with
an appeal to civilian papers for more attention to the Red
Army. This attitude was shared by the 12th party congress
,
which, preoccupied with the peasant press 9 did not even con*
sider military papers.
Party inattention began to end in the fall of 1923,
when the levels of the military press net were designated, and
plans were laid for the publication of a central military pa*
per* This net was extremely simple, calling only for papers
at the okrug level in addition to one central paper. With a
small number of supporting military correspondents it was
realized in the course of the next year through the publica-
tion of thirteen okrug papers and Krasnaja aveasda on January
1, 1924, The central military organ became a major factor In
the development of the Red Army press, supplementing the guid-
ance of the Press Buro, explaining themes of importance to
the Red Army, and proclaiming its goal to be the laboratory
of military thought* A critical evaluation of the militant
period of the army's history would be the first step in mill*
3« Waterlalv a sostolanll pechatl SSSR . Moscow, 1924, p. 51
(Hereafter cited as Materialy o pechatl ).
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A
tary education.
But to accomplish these self-appointed tasks the paper
had to rely on readers for staff and material, establishing
an unbreakable link with the soldiers and responding to their
questions and needs. This optimistic program was not realized
,
since Krasnala zvazda never received the attention or support
it needed to become such a paper. Its subscription rate re-
mained unimpressive, attaining only 20,000 copies by the
end of 1924. 5 *1 Mtf *imm
The task of the military papers, like the rest of the
Soviet press, was educational. The change to the territorial
system allowed some publications to double as peasant papers,
devoting their pages to agricultural and soviet construction,
but for the most part they formulated their task in terms of
delivering basic cultural and political education to recruits
and focused their attention on the problems facing the Red
Array. The latter task was almost exclusively the province of
military papers. Only rarely did the rest of the Soviet press
; .
v \ i i :
, rwe&ling tkw& uLelWUfc** 4Mtf atames of the IUm
4. Editorial of Krasnala zvezda, #1, January 1, 1924, in 0
part i sov pechatl . pp. 28^. This examination probably
was aimed at Trotsky. Portiankin, Soy voyen pechat' . pp.
104*8, states that the main task in the military press
for 1923*24 was eliminating his adherents who controlled
the Moscow military okrug and its paper Krasnala volna .
He claims Trotsky denied partlnost' to military papers by
restricting them to communicating facts and not educating
the soldiers.
5. Portiankin, Sov voyen pechat' . p. 119| Materialy o pecha-
ti, p. 56.
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Invade this domain, and then, usually when some crisis threat-
ened Che state.
The desultory progress of the military press was punctu-
ated in Hay 1924 by a congress of Red Army editors , at which
its functions and tasks were elaborated further* On this
occasion Trotsky spoke about the problems of the military
press* The army publication was a paper first and then mill-
tary, according to the Commissar for War, and it was " . •• the
basic instrument for the political and cultural education of
the vast masses. n • Through the paper the main lesson is
given, through the paper £the party] can and must not only
inform, but give a known supply of information, raise ... the
political and cultural level of the readers. * For the mili-
tary press the continuous turnover in personnel meant that the
educational process began each year with the new recruits, and
had only two years to accomplish its tasks before they left
the army. In keeping with the general function of the Soviet
press, Trotsky also maintained that military publications
mast be critical, revealing the mistakes and abuses of the Red
Army. 7
6. The Curzon ultimatum in May 1923 was such an occasion.
In response to it sections like * Defense of the Republic"
which reported the activity of the Red Army And discussed
strategy and tactics, appeared in the central press until
the crisis had passed.
7. Trotsky, Joch . vol. 21, pp. 219-34, passim . "On the Mil-
itary Press" • Trotsky warned however, that military
criticism had to be applied carefully to avoid abuses.
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The work of the military paper had to be supplemented by
military correspondents (voyencors). "The voyencor exists to
correspond militarily » it is necessary to understand that the
voyencor is a weapon for raising the cultural level of the Red
Army* From the moment that the voyencor thinks he is an end
in itself, that the voyencor is only for military correspond
dence — ha has died."
Questions of content and emphasis were more easily answer-
ed* military matters had primacy. "But military matters for us
are deeply connected with politics. Politics is connected with
the party, with the worker state. " From military subjects the
press would shift its attention to the life of the working
masses of town and country. Military publications could not
be divorced from the reality of party and soviet existence and
must be intimately connected with it. This supported Lenin's
idea of the party establishing links with the other parts of
the Soviet state. And Trotsky left no doubt that he under-
stood the function of the military press in terms of parti -
fast' . "I could say a great deal about the tasks of the press.
There is no need to say that ail this work will be fine from
beginning to end only if it realizes the principle, i.e. if
o
it is permeated with the principle and spirit of Leninism,
•
a clear indication that the military publications, like all
8. Ibid * . p. 229.
9. ibid . . p. 233.
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other parts of the press must be party first and military
second.
With its functions and tasks clearly defined the military
press returned to the mere prosaic activity of expanding its
Amber and circulation. This activity achieved small results,
since the military published only 15 papers with a circula-
tion of about 70,000 copies, 10 but the regularly published
periodicals in 1924 were supplemented by a great number of
garrison wall papers in the various units, which were edited
by members of the political or party organizations within the
unit* This type of paper will be examined next.
Wall Papers
The best description of the Soviet wall paper would be a
cross between an agit-prop flyer or poster and a regular
paper, with the content similar to the latter while the format
indicated its relation to the former. Its actual origins are
obscure, but references to this type of publication began to
appear during the Civil War, and it is not improbable that
10. Statistics on the military net vary. The press section
listed thirteen okrug papers, while Portiankin, Sov voven
oechat' . p. 120, cites fourteen. Berkhin, l.V. , "Ukreple-
niye partlino-polltleheskikh organov 1 uluchesheniye pert-
politraboty v krasnoi armil v 1924-25 sodakh" , Voprosv
storll . #2, 1958, p. 43, gives a total of nine okrug, two
leet, two corps, ten territorial and six national lan*
guage papers in 1925. These figures correspond roughly
to the nine okrug, two fleet, one corps, four territorial
and six national language papers elaborated in Pechat'
SSSR & &iV s«ezdu . Moscow, 1926, p. 195 (Hereafter cited
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their publication started during the hostilities in place of
regular papers due to the newsprint shortage. The moat likely
candidate for prototype is the military paper published on the
arrival of an armored train or military press at a village or
city* This sheet was then pasted up in a prominent location,
not infrequently on the wall of the village center or soviet
where all could read it*
With the end of the Civil War the wall paper returned to
the barracks with the Red Army and began to serve the soldiers
in garrison, but its military experience was adopted by other
Institutions of the state to disseminate information to the
lowest levels of the population* One of the first to utilize
wall papers was the central press agency ROSTA which began to
publish Stennala aaaeta KOSIA at least as early as 1921* 11
Another area in which the wall paper prospered following the
Civil War was the industrial enterprise where a variety of
factory sheets were soon publishing. But this brief flurry of
wall paper activity was almost entirely obliterated during the
press crisis of 1922* when the process of cannibalization,
11* Apparently the various geographical sections of the agency
printed their own devoted to their area, but based on in*
forzaatioa disseminated by the center* The one copy found
in the Smolensk Archives was #24, February 4. 1924. It
measured about 23x26 inches and was published by the Smo-
lensk section of ROSTA. Its content was factual, largely
devoted to local affairs, but also containing brief tele*
graphic surnmaries of a few foreign and domestic events*
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which insured the survival of the larger daily publications*
devoured literary and technical resources at the local level, 12
The wall press recovered far more rapidly from the crisis
than the dally press* Smaller requirements for publication
and the restricted audience in any enterprise allowed the wall
paper to publish on very slender resources* By early 1923 it
was no longer a question of their existence* as was still the
ease with many regular papers * but a question of defining
their role in the cosmography of the Soviet press* Initially
this was done by the local paper*
In Moscow Rabochaia Moskva dealt with the problem* empha-
sizing the difference in content between the great party press
which defended the general interests of the proletariat* and
plant publications which concerned themselves with the partic-
ular enterprise and its working conditions* Exceptions to
this general distinction occurred only when the political or
13
economic question directly affected the plant* At this time
12* Since the statistics on wall papers even in the most
sketchy fashion began only in the period after the press
crisis v there is no way to determine how extensive their
net was or what portion was wiped out* Evidence for
their demise appears in the Moscow and Fetrograd press
which noted their failure or demanded the use of their
resources*
13. Rabochaia Moskva * March 11* 1923, p* 3* This section be*
came a regular feature in Rabochaia Moskva during 1923*
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control and leadership of the wall net had not been developed 9
and ag long as the papers were not counter-revolutionary, they
were allowed free rein* Apparently the practical value of the
wall paper in illuminating and discussing the needs and Inter-
ests of the factory, outweighed the Idea of rigid control or
direction, and as the number of wall papers grew, Pravda en-
couraged all enterprises to consider their publication and
adopt measures for their organization.
By the time of the 12th party congress, the number of wall
papers had grown to such an extent that they were discussed
during its sessions • The idea behind the wall paper coincided
with the concept of diversification, representing its logical
termination and providing local information which higher papers
could not hope to deliver. The congress confirmed this percep-
tible role that plant papers were already playing in the state.
Their importance lay, according to the congress resolution, in
the illumination of local factory life and the involvement of
15 m
public life. Stressing the value of this tool, the congress
pointed out the need for its control by the party.
14. Pravda , May 5, 1923, p. 1, fifth lead article.
15. Reahenlla oartli o pechatj , p. 46. "Resolution of the
12th Party Congress on Questions of Propaganda, Press and
Agitation"
.
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The encouragement from the center produced a rapid expan-
sion In the number of wall papers* By the fall of 1923, five
hundred existed in Moscow alone. Unfortunately rapid growth
produced chaos in the net, as the poor publications multiplied
more rapidly than the satisfactory papers* According to Rabo-
chaia Moskva . many wall papers mistakenly attempted to become
dally publications 9 rather than waiting for enough useable ma-
terial to accumulate for printing on a regular biweekly basis*
A second error was the failure of local editorial boards to
establish links with higher levels of the party which would
examine and analyze their publications. Wall papers had
responded to the encouragement to expand, but not to the idea
of control, and they had merrily gone their own separate way
without relying on party leadership or earing about content*
The party, on the other hand, grew increasingly uneasy since
this weapon remained outside its control, considering that
neither the information or technical power was available to
warrant daily publication without risking degeneration*
The importance of wall papers for the party was stated
most emphatically at the first correspondents' meeting of
Pravda . where the following resolution was adoptedt
"The wall paper is the organizer of the collective
will of the workers of a plant, the expression of public
opinion i it is the expression of the mood of the workers
.
16. Rabochala Moskva , October 5, 1923, p. 3*
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their Ideas and thoughts* tt is their organizer. Weil
papers are the foremost posts of our press in the middle
of the working mass. Here lies their great social impor-
tance • • # •
ad risen u Party and trade union organisations in the person
of agitation and cultural sections and also editors of
papers met render all attention and aid to the wall pa-
pers. This support must be rendered at meetings of the
comrades who work in the wall papers, by analysis of
wall papers appearing in the given raion or city
,
analy-
sis of their local condition etc. "17
This resolution reflected the Importance of wall papers to
the party and its very real concern about lack of control
over the press closest to the masses*
In the period after the 12th congress the wall paper also
began to appear in the village, probably in response to that
congress* emphasis on the peasantry* But away from the major
centers publication difficulties were far greater, and they
never achieved in the countryside the numbers that they
attained in the city* Like the daily peasant publication,
the village well paper lacked the technical and material sup-
port as well as the editorial cadre necessary for publication*
The inception of wall papers in the village, even on a modest
17. Pravda * November 28, 1923, p* 5* At the same time the
congress expressed itself against any form of censorship
or preliminary examination of wall papers*
13, In 1924 a debate arose over spoken or oral papers at the
lowest levels* Osal advocates pointed to its value with
the illiterate masses and the savings in costs* The
"written paper* advocates stressed the ease of absorb-
ing information* Izvestila , February 7, 1924, p. 4, con-
sidered the question for the Urals, concluding that writ-
ten papers were the better type of publication generally,
but not to the exclusion of the oral paper*
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scale, added a third dimension to the city and barracks papers,
and by the time the 13th party congress assembled their number
had risen to 3000,
When the delegates considered the press, they concluded
that plant~factory papers had now reached the point in their
development where they were already playing an important role
as a weapon influencing the masses and as a form for revealing
their activity* In the village, however, the wall paper had not
duplicated this success, and in the countryside it must become
one of the most Important forms of party and Komsomol work,
struggling for improvement of the economy and cooperatives,
raising the cultural level of the mouzhiks, and supporting the
interests of the peasantry against the Kulaks and abuses of the
19
administration.
While the quality of worker publications had improved,
the party was still concerned about control and leadership of
wall papers, calling for their strengthening* This call for
better party control went unrealized like its predecessor,
as, did the instruction for meetings with ralon committees, and
the papers continued to publish virtually without party direc-
*Wr°t.« rep-t* that th. villas wll plpr «*.t COW«tri»
Since the party resolution had become a dead letter, at the
19. Trlnadtsatyl s"ezd . pp, 649-50. •'Resolution on the Press".
20. Pechat' XIV s"ezdu . pp. 34-5.
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.
end of the year the Central Committee dispatched its own decree
on wall papers at the same time that it considered other aspects
of the Soviet press. The December decree reaffirmed the impor-
tance of wall papers and stressed that all their activity must
be under the leadership of the party. Execution of party gui-
dance meant direction of the editorial board by responsible
party members and frequent meetings with the various organiza-
tions and institutions important to the paper. General leader-
ship would be exercised by the sections and subsections of the
press which would designate a member to guide the editorial
college and party cell*
Having dictated general control principles, the Central
Convaittee then addressed itself to the contents of the papers 9
Articles must be short, connected with the enterprise and its
activities, and accessible to the readers. The paper must not
only be negative in revealing mistakes, but must explain errors,
the reasons for them, and propose solutions for their elimina-
tion. In the countryside leadership must also reside with the
party and be part of general political-educational work. The
peasantry must be rallied to participation, and the Central
Conmittee repeated that the village wall paper must concentrate
on the issues expounded by the 13th congress, i.e. agriculture,
21
culture, cooperatives, and the struggle with the Kulaks. This
21* 0 o«rt 1 sov pechati . pp. 325-7. "On Wall Papers-.
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decree succeeded where previous directives had failedt By the
14th congress control and leadership no longer held the spot*
light i and emphasis had shifted to expansion of the net in the
viU«|fe mn *«*tfta*e* («rtk««Ui frm the om**c vfeich i»d
The Rational Press
From the first days of the February Revolution the Boishe
viks had published papers in languages other than Russian.
Before October they numbered only a handful predominantly in
the Baltic area, and most ceased publication when the Baltic
states achieved Independence* For the rest of the country an
embryonic national press net began to emerge in the days after
October as the Bolsheviks expanded their control into non-Rus-
sian areas* These publications rarely survived the fortunes
of the Civil War* but at the end of the fIghting about sixty
s in various national languages had been established
22
mainly due to the efforts of the Red Arsiy. While there are
no figures available for national language publications during
the interval between the end of the fighting and the change to
NEP* it seems unlikely that they grew substantially. However,
the introduction of HEP was a death blow to this modest net
of papers 9 and a large percentage of the papers that ceased
22* Part ^ sov oechaf v bor f be * p. 13,
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publication during the press crisis were national papers which
lacked the resources and support necessary to see them through
1922s * tee* tim 8b* eettgr*** reaXUad that the femr he**
>?& Nor was assistance forthcoming from the center which had
never given any special attention to the national press despite
the dth congress which called for it, apparently content to let
non-Russian publications emerge as they would, or more likely,
overly concerned with parts of the press nearer at hand* Not
until 1923, when gubernia papers had achieved a satisfactory
level, did the party begin to examine the nature and function
of the national press*
In this case the initiative came at the 4th congress of
press workers which extended the concept of differentiation to
the various peoples of the state and called the attention of
the press workers to the vacuum that existed in this area* The
delegates confirmed the very real difficulties of the national
press due to the change to cost accounting, and asked for fl~
23
nanclal aid for the papers of the national minorities* This
straightforward approach was repeated by the 12th party con*
gross in April, which decreed
i
w Periodical publications in languages of the na-
tional minorities, which serve the poorest and most back*
ward masses of the national minorities, need in view of
23. Vardin, Sw pechat' * p. 151. •Resolution of the XVth
Congress of Press Workers"
.
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their very weak dissemination* the absence of paid ads
etc. * powerful support without which their existence is
impossible, "24
At the same time the congress realized that the former hap*
hazard and unregulated policy toward the national press was
unsatisfactory* and instructed the agit-prop section of the
Central Committee to strengthen party control and instruction
of the national press in order to improve It*
The monetary part of this instruction was quickly execut-
ed by the agit-prop section which designated half the state
subsidy for the last six months of 1923 to the national press,
and over seventy per cent (105,000 r) in 1924 for the support
25
of 68 national papers* But beyond financial aid there is
no evidence of any attempt by the center cither to direct or
lead the national press which maintained its position of poor
relative, probably because the peasant paper campaign fully
occupied the party's attention*
The state subsidy* however, prevented decline and even
prompted a slow expansion. At the time of the congress there
were some seventy nine natioaal publications* representing 5%
of the Soviet press* In November 1923, this number had grown
to ninety three and by early 1924 to one hundred and eight*
24. Bmsmomlla parti,! £ £§jg£&, pp. 45.7*
25* I* TsK* #7*8* August-September* 1923* p. 8 and #4, April*
1924V p. 122.
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Most of this growth represented the transformation of local
Russian papers Into local language publications, while a
26
smaller part represented the creation of new papers. This
slow expansion In the number of titles was accompanied by a
relatively greater growth In circulation, however, the total
dissemination for the national press In 1924 was still less
than that of Pravda alone and averaged slightly more than
2000 copies per paper. 27 ' ^ **** «iltut*l lew
In 1924 the party's lukewarm attitude toward non-Russian
papers changed with the incorporation of a full section devot-
ed to the national press in the Central Committee's decree
of February 6.
•Tit is necessary]] to recognise the need for
strengthening the press in non-Russian languages by the
reorganisation of material means in the budgets of the
national Republics and oblasts, covering the deficit on
account by entering a subsidy in the budget of the union,
distributing it through the existing oblast sections.
fit is necessary] to continue the examination of
what Is published in the national Republics in Russian
with the aim of the maximum reduction of publications of
an institutional-apparatus type and the utilization of
the means liberated for the development of the press in
the local language.
[It is necessary]} to Oblige the press section
26. Pravda. November 20, 1923, p. 3. In Georgia and the Ta-
tar Republic the press was 60% Russian and 40% national*
The Ukraine had the worst balance of any area, although
White Russia and Kirghiz had no national papers at all.
Part of the problem lay in the absence of any type in
the local language*
27 • IS TsK » #4, April 1924, p. 103. The report of the press
section gives the following statistics for April 1923 and
March I924i 86 titles with 149,000 copies and 108 titles
with 238,000 copies*
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to study in the first place all forms of papers In the
local languages (wall, press etc.) and depending on the
cultural level and local conditions of the given national
area, to set up a paper for the peasants* •••
At the same tlae In the largest Republics leading
papers for party members in the local language must be
strengthened. " 2o
The decree focused the party^s attention on continuing diversi-
fication, extending it to the national press which the Central
Committee believed was ripe for differentiation. Peasant and
worker-leading papers were to be laid out if the cultural level
of the national minority could support a variety of publica-
tions and if the material-technical base was available* At the
same time the attack on institutional publications was extended
into the national area with the aim of liberating these resour-
ces for more Important tasks.
The three pronged attack on the national press yielded
steady results. By the end of May all the press in Armenia.
94% in Georgia and 54% in White Russia was in tine local nation-
29
al language* The 13th congress resolution on the press reit-
erated the Instructions of the Central Committee for party
leadership, support and diversification* thus reinforcing al-
ready existing directives of the party to continue along the
28. Reshenlla pertll o pechatl, p. 55i i£ JjbK, #3, March 1924,
p. 50. The copies of this decree In Sov pechat' v. dok and
£ part i aev pechatl do not have this section.
29, Tir^nadtgatyl s H ezd . op. 119-and 650. In Stalin's Sochl-
nenlla and £ part i sov. pechatl the figure for the Ukraine
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path chat had been charted. The press section summarized the
progress of the national press in even mere detail shortly af-
ter the 13th congress* Considering the problems of illiteracy
and press resources, national publications had achieved consid-
erable success. The conversion of Russian papers had reversed
the situation of April 1923, when nine out of twelve national
Republics had more Russian than local language papers. Only
four such Republics remained and their inattention to the press
explained the continued predominance of Russian papers.
These achievements were fine as far as they went, but the
press section maintained that much still had to be done. The
qualitative level of the national press remained low. particu-
larly in the southern and eastern areas of Russia. Part of the
reason for this lay in weak or non-existent ties with the
masses through correspondents. Quality was also a facet of
differentiation which had only begun in the national Republics.
The national press was still predominantly mixed, trying in one
paper to be something for everyone. Many of these publications
also tried to duplicate the format of Russian papers which
were unsuitable for the backward and semi-literate minorities
which had different needs and interests. Wor were the old ani-
mosities between national groups absent from the press, while
the number of party members on the staffs was very low. When
these problems were added to financial insecurity which 170,
000 rubles for the second half of 1924 could not completely
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defray, the press section was forced to posit the major
tovwlahah Atrina, 1923 and La Bvir'g/>v at>d Zhltowir at the end
strengthening of the national press and its correspondents
30
as a serious and immediate task of the party*
Youth Press
The origins of youth papers are also obscure. Apparent-
ly some began to appear after the Civil War. perhaps reinfor-
cing a few similar publications that had already existed. The
January 1922 press net had called for eleven Komsomol papers
,
but their creation is uncertain* and the press crisis closed
or curtailed what youth papers existed. The few that survived
the crisis, however, were able to stand on their own. and by
1923 this group headed by Molodol Lenlnets (Moscow 40,000).
Smena (Petrograd 36,000) and Na smenu (Ekaterinburg 20,000).
had become firmly established and began to expand, developing
31further publications at the gubernia level. In the area of
the youth press the provinces generally led the center which
had its attention on other parts of the Soviet press.
In Smolensk the gubernia committee began to publish lunll
30. Materialy o pechatl . pp. 67*75. The situation had not
changed by the 14th party congress before which the press
section again noted poor quality, political lapses, local
deviations and lack of support. Only in Georgia, the
Ukraine and Armenia were national papers somewhat sat*
Isfactory and the press section attributed this to their
higher cultural level and a literary tradition. Pechat'
XIV s"ezdu . pp. 135-42. This report of the press section
lists the total number of national titles as 139.
31. Ibid . . pp. 58-9. mam
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Begun Closed Total
mm 49
14 10 53
5 15 43
9 1 51
Another 9tmv taken £e *»?r*v* ?ha ia^dertfilp of yti* yo*th
tovarlshch during 1923 and in Kharkov and Zhitomir at the end
of the year two other youth papers also appeared. The press
section of the Central Committee recorded the appearance of
other youth papers throughout the year, but their continued
publication depended on support from the local committee and
subscriptions, neither of which was immediately forthcoming.
For all youth publications the press section recorded the fol-
lowing figures
t
January 1. 1923
May 1
November 1
April 1, 1924
national *tJt*rttl^ 4***tin* ***cUl tetwklM to the lUter
These figures indicate that most youth papers were shoestring
operations 9 their periodicity extremely irregular, and their
life expectancy short. lunil tovarlshch in its first year of
publication managed only forty one editions with a peak cir-
culation of 6000 copies even though supported by the Smolensk
34Gubernla Carnalttee.
The general lack of support and leadership was corrected
in 1924 when the Central Committee called on the Komsomols to
examine their publications with the help of the press section
and consider the creation of dally papers for their union.
'ire v
32* Kra.nala pechat' . #15, August 1926, pp. 41-2* WKP 518
"Resolution on the Closest Problems of the Press".
33, Materlaly o pechatl
. p. 57.
34. WKP 275 "Report on Work among the Children of Smolensk
Gubernla", March 3, 1924.
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Another step taken to Improve the leadership of the youth
press was the creation before the 13th congress of a separate
press section within the Central Committee of the Komsomols
whose functions were to realize the party line and direct
youth papers toward the leading tasks of the union and party. 3
The 13th congress also discussed the youth press, proposing
Inter alia , an all-Russian Komsomol paper.
The congress noted that the Komsomols had been very in-
sufficiently served with literature up to that time, and to
correct this deficiency it was necessary to strengthen and en*
large the net of youth oblast papers for worker, peasant and
national minorities, devoting special attention to the latter
two categories and to the expansion of the nets of young wor*
ker and peasant correspondents.
The attempt to realize the pronouncements of the congress
brought mixed results. Prayda took up the drum for the youth
press, explaining the value of luncors especially In the vil-
lage. At the same time, during the summer of 1924, more and
more of the central and larger provincial papers evolved youth
35 • P&rt JL sov Pechatl . p. 291. " Decree of the Central Com-
mittee on the Host Important Tasks of the Party in the Area
of the Press". February 6, 1924. At that time there were
39 Komsomol papers with a circulation of 34,000 copies. Iz
TsK, #4, April 1924, p. 103. "Report of the Press Sec-
36 # Trlnadtsatyl s"ezd , pp. 650-1. "Resolution on the Press".
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or Komsomol columns and pages to serve and guide this part of
the population* But the campaign to expand youth papers did
not achieve dramatic results 9 realizing only the base from
which future development would evolve* Continuing the policy
Of diversification, the first steps were taken to divide the
youth press into worker and peasant nets, but many gubernias
refused to publish a peasant youth paper despite an appeal
37from the Komsomol Central Committee* Nor was this surpris-
ing since only four of the twelve gubernias published any
peasant papers at all, Por the most part it was easier for a
newly published youth paper to be a mixed publication
. since
that type would appeal to the most extensive audience even
though not appealing in the manner ordered by the center. In
November the youth net had about equal numbers of mixed and
worker or peasant papers, but by the end of the year eight
more publications had been added to the net and of these six
were mixed.
In December the question of youth paper diversification
37* Materialv o pechatl . p« 61 i Krasnaja pechat' . #1, January
1925. p. 12. According to the press section, city youths
were best served while peasant and national youths were worst.
These papers operated at a deficit and an examination of
30 revealed four non-party editors.
38« f»gfiH|af ff^V 8*edu . p. 170. There were eleven worker,
nine peasant and eighteen mixed on November 1 and twelve
worker, ten peasant and twenty four mixed In January
1925.
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was raised in the Komsomol press* and after a prolonged dis-
cussion, 1a August 1925 resulted in a decree specifically divi-
ding youth publications into worker and peasant types. At the
tame time the Central Committee of the union instructed Its
organizations on the content and composition of its papers.
The party line was to be fully reflected in all union publi-
cations. Komsomol organizations would designate a qualified
responsible editor from the local Buro to direct the paper
39
and rally to participation all union members. These activi-
ties and the continued interest of the Central Committee and
its press section assured that major successes lay ahead for
the youth press. But at the end of 1924, only the foundations
had been laid, and the youth press like the national remained
under-developed And in need of considerable support and gui-
dance from the center*
39. Ibid . , p. 175. The question of the Central Organ for the
Komsomols was resolved in 1925 with the publication of
fr9flf»rate&* £ravda<
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CHAPTER VIII
THE RABSELGOR MOVEMENT
Ia thf first alftc* Jfegt uk»4«# Ifgf ai**ii 9# &e far «&?e
No treatment of the Soviet press would be complete
without considering the worker*peasant correspondent (rabsel*
cor) movement. Soviet historiography traces Its origins
to the underground papers of Tsarist Russia and the few
legal Bolshevik publications that appeared during the 1905
revolution and the last years before World War I* Soviet
encyclopedias point to letters printed In the various par*
ty papers as evidence of an early correspondence movement f
and In the widest sense of the expression this Is correct*
In the pre-revolutlonary era the party press had to compen-
sate for Its lack of reporters by the letters and consnunl-
cations from Individual workers*
With the coming of the February revolution this situa-
tion still obtained and there were constant reminders and
appeals for the party press to be close to the people, con-
nected with them etc* But throughout the first years of Its
existence there Is no evidence of a conscious effort by the
party press to organize or unite the disparate correspon-
llehed <pnt"*Mt i$* cities* t&e oaeural ttmr was a M*ea&t
dents Into a whole or Instruct them In a way more positive
then appealing for their letters* The change to NEP provided
the Incentive and catalyst which transformed this haphazard
attitude Into a conscious effort to guide and control an
amorphous movement that was not dignified by a title until
241
1922.
Reasons for this sudden change appear in several areas.
In th. first place the press under REP needed to be far more
Interesting than before to gain and hold subscribers. This
entailed the accumulation of materials on the local scene,
a process which had been handled In such a prefunctory manner
previously that It had already drawn the criticism of the
cirtLM be&ftO to ^ont Lfl MftS^Q^t Pettoarad a ttottgy on Itoa ajidCentral Committee. Most papers were not staffed to gather
such material on their own and the natural answer was to
attract correspondents who would accomplish the task*
In the second place the problem of revealing the defects
of socialist construction, unmasking corruption and counter-
revolutionary attitudes In the population and government,
could best be done by Individuals familiar with their local*
Ity and better able to comment on It* The non-offlclal status
of the correspondent would be an additional benefit. Finally
after the change to KEP, as the party rapidly became aware
of the general dissatisfaction that existed In the country-
side aad the growing danger of the Kulaks, It needed Its own
weapon In the village* Since the party was so weakly estab-
lished outside the cities, the natural answer was a peasant
correspondent movement, reporting on conditions among the
muzhiks. These Ideas did not emerge fully developed or at
the tame time from the Central Committee, but were evolved
In the period 1922-4 when the correspondents came Into pro-
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ainence, and the party attracted to deal with them*
The beginning of the rabselcor movement, as opposed to
the mere writing of letters to a paper , Is not at all clear.
It Is unlikely that more than a minimal net of correspondents
existed until the end of the Civil War, since the first con-
temporary references appeared in 1921. 1 At this time, either
on their own initiative or with direction from their papers,
circles began to form in Moscow, Petrograd, Rostov on Don and
Baku, Probably these arose in response to the frequent appeals
2from the press for correspondence. Then on April 8, 1922,
one of Pravda's rabcors, N, Spirldonov, was killed by workers
for complaining about abuses and irregularities of the party
committee and the officials of a Moscow factory. At the time
the correspondent movement existed only in the cities where
the central papers noted that its role lay in watching and
1. Prayda . July 26, 1922, p. 1, fourth lead article. The
central organ noted that two years previously rabcors had
hftrdly existed, Sekretar' " Pravdy" . p. 50, claims the
movement began In 1^21, but was unorganized and unplanned
in the early stages. At Its first conference In 1923,
Sosnovslcii placed the start of the movement in 1913*9,
but claimed that real growth occurred from 1920 with the
change to peaceful construction. Pravda . November 21,
1923, p. 5.
2, In Part ^ sov pechat' v bor*be . p, 70, the claim is made
for the organization of rabcor circles around Pravda as
early as 1919, and that a buro of rabcors was created In
the editorial board of the paper. Sekretar' " Pravdy"
,
p, 49, states that this was not done until 1922T
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and revealing the corruption tn socialist construction* But
Spiridonov' s murder brought the embryonic movement Into the
spotlight 9 and attention to the tasks and responsibilities of
a
the rabcors dates from it.
The stir caused by the murder immediately evoked a cry
for the protection of rabcors from persecution and for the
severe punishment of the persecutors* It also galvanized many
correspondents and their papers into beginning rabcor organiza-
tions* the first or one of the first of which was organized at
Pravda in the name of Maria I, Ul'lanova. The problem of per-
secution became even more prominent following the trial. Prav-
da noted cases of intimidation and harrassment for rabcor notes
and asked whether it was not time for the state to think seri-
ously about defending the rights of the correspondents. ^ At
the same time the press began to relate the proceedings of
3. Pravda . July 29, 1922. p. 5| Bednota
,
July 28, 1922. p. 3.
Kotlyar, Newspapers
. p. 18, says that during the early NEP
period rabseleors were used to reveal irregularities and
Injustices in the state administration.
4. It developed that Spiridonov had been warned several times
about his revelations. Whan the local committee failed to
correct the abuses which he revealed, Spiridonov had gone
to the press which printed his notes. Shortly thereafter
he was murdered* The complicity of the factor director,
Firsov, made the event more spectacular, and the trial
of the accused drew the attention of all the press in
July. Firsov and the killer, Volodln, were sentenced to
five years, while others implicated received shorter sen-
tences.
5. Pravda, September 12, 1922, p. 1, fifth lead article.
2 ?re«*
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of rabcor meetings which demanded protection for the movement
The concern for the rabcors was soon demonstrated In an-
other way. Papers began to establish sections to follow up
correspondent revelations and selected rabcors from among the
workers who were disposed toward paper work. At the end of
1922 Pravda , to propagandize the movement, Initiated a compe-
tition for the best plant director. The Central Organ wanted
to Involve the workers and change casual correspondents into
continual collaborators by offering prizes for their letters.
The campaign 9 which was duplicated by other papers, spurred
reports on many enterprises which were printed in a special
section in the Central Organ and succeeded by 1923 In adding
great numbers to the ranks of rabcors.
The new year also brought the first consideration of the
movement In its relation to party, state and press. The 4th
press workers* congress discussed the function of the rabcor
and found that he played a decisive role In the creation of
ties between papers and the masses. To Insure the proper
forging of this link, the congress posited the political and
technical education of rabcors as a foremost task among them.
This appreciation was confirmed by the 12th party congress
6. Rabochala Moskva . September 26 and 28, p. 5j Pravda,
October 1, 1922, p. 4. Izvestlla . December 14, 1922,
p. 4, reported a bequest of one million rubles to the
family of a murdered rabcor by the Central Committee.
7. Vardin, Sov pechat* . pp. 148-9. "Resolution of the 4th
congress of Press Workers'* , February 1923.
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which ordered all party organizations to take measures for
their political education and Involvement In general party
work.
^
The 12th congress, which marked the turning point In the
party's attitude toward the peasant press, also denoted the
time at which the center began to pay more than passing atten-
tion to the correspondent movement. Heightened Interest In
peasant publications meant the eventual growth of a seicor
movement to serve that press In the same way that the rabcors
worked with their papers. The development of the seicor move-
ment, however, had to surmount more difficult obstacles, since
the environment In which It worked was basically hostile to
the Soviet Government. But by the end of the summer of 1923,
the press at the center was full of material on the corres-
pondent movement, discussing Its activities, tasks and leader-
ship. For the peasantry Bednota described the correspondent
as a link between editor and muzhik, who would relate what was
happening In the village and what was useful and necessary for
the center to know, m addition the seicor would provide the
link between town and country, worker and peasant, while secur-
ing subscriptions and disseminating the paper. 9
8. 0 part I |OV pechatl. p. 273. "Resolution of the 12th Con-gress on Questions of Propaganda, Press and Agltltlo^. ItIs Interesting to note that the resolution refers to therabeors as a new power of the party.
9. Bednota
. June 16, 1923, p. 4.
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Pravda tried to put the two phases of the movement into
perspective according to their experience and organization.
Rabcors were already organizing, exchanging experiences and
writing to the Central Committee and its organs about their
activities* Selcors, on the other hand, since they were just
beginning to develop , were not organized , and they needed
experience even more than rabcors. Pravda placed the creation
of selcor nets before the peasant press as an Important task
in terms of its educational value for the village. In the
larger provincial centers the movement also proceeded along
S€>.i 0
two fronts* The Riazan Gubernia Committee noted that in one
year it had established both types of correspondents, direc-
ting the activity of its selcors toward the explanation of
new forms of agriculture and social relation in the village
,
while its rabcors illustrated the condition of labor and the
relationship of the workers to politics and social life. In
Smolensk Gubernia the party committee for the fall ordered
the strengthening of its correspondent buro and the attracting
of new writers, while at the same time guiding their work and
education in terms of Soviet power , the international position
10. Pravda . p. 7, July 26 and p. 2, August 2, 1923. The Cen-
tral organ of the party complained that most worker cor-
respondents were local and Isolated from other papers.
For instance, Pravda had 190 rabcors at this timet 180 were
in Moscow. Its correspondents in other cities were occa-
sional and not continual contributors.
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of the state and the future tasks of the correspondent. 11 ?
The anomalous position of the movement and its rapid
growth, the persecution of correspondents , and articles in the
press asking for instructions, guidance and leadership finally
galvanized Pravda into convoking a congress of rabcors. Attend*
ed by delegates from Moscow and the industrial centers , the
meeting opened November 15 with a report by Lenin's sister
Maria , the main speaker and spirit of the congress, who attack*
ed a variety of problems in relation to the movement including
organization, selection, tasks and persecution* The problem of
selecting correspondents generated the most heat. As the move*
ment developed, a worker became a rabcor by election , selection
or volunteering. The congress concluded that the first two
methods were incorrect since they revealed the identity of the
correspondent and put him under obligation to the enterprise
at which he worked, making him feel responsible to it. The
third choice had two advantages i anonymity and enthusiasm, and
12
it avoided red tape.
In the area of persecution Borisov described several dif-
11. Bednota . September 6, 1923, p. 4| W£P 518, "Agit-prop Work
for Smolensk, Fall, 1923".
12. Pravda » November 21, 1923, p. 1, edltorialf Sekretar' " Prsv-
dy ' . dp* 57*8. The congress did not forbid the otiter meth-
ods, but recommended against them. The Urals, Kiev, Petro-
grad and Rostov all selected.
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ferent types. Working conditions were made impossible or the
correspondent was transferred to an area whore heavy physical
labor was demanded* Some were brought to trial for their reve-
lations. When the work force was curtailed* rabcors were among
or all those relieved of their jobs. Borisov also Indicated
that party members as well as avowed counter-revolutionaries
participated in the persecution. In order to combat this acti-
vity, Borisov demanded recognition that the rabcors were doing
important party work, and the strengthening of the party's
13
struggle with elements opposed to them.
Maria UL'ianova also reported on the organization of the
movement. She first noted that the congress only represented
seventeen papers. Other publications had not deigned to attend
despite their demands for the congress. This reflected a total
life* * ii*i& ^c^wr. j>*»#r aotf **t4 •** aetivo orgaaisMr
lack of organization and exchange of ideas* But Lenin's sister
would have no truck with the idea of a general or united rab-
WMH>Jf 4&**l&p tfrteir ixtdepandaftae *n4 Initiative and
cor organization! perhaps basing this feeling on the experience
of the stillborn all-Russian Union of Journalists, and the
delegates supported her, adopting the circle attached to the
13. Ibid * The congress fulfilled this demand, ordering all
organizations to consider rabcor work as an important
party task* It stated that the habit of ignoring rabcors
and their work was Incorrect. The press was to undertake
campaigns against persecution, publicize all incidents,
and obtain court action against offenders. Pravda ,
November 28, 1923, p. 5*
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editorial board of the given paper as the basic rabcor unit.
AC its head would be a buro, responsible to the correspondents
and to the editorial board, which would organize work among
rabcora. attract new contributors, and supervise their moral
m 1A _ ^ „
and social outlook*
As to the tasks and role of the rabcor, the congress found
him to be a completely new social power* According to Kerzhen~
tsev,
••The rabcor actively influences the working
mass* He is the guide of the ideas of the party* he In
his factory organises worker public opinion* He* for
example, by means of the press and in his personal im-
pact Increases the class conscious relation to produc- . *
tion *•• raises the worker v s feeling of class dignity*
"
The rabcor was an independent voice of the working masses,
checking up on the whole proletariat, a reflection of worker
life, a link between paper and masses , and an active organiser
at his plant* His tasks were to express the will of the work-
ing masses, to develop their Independence and initiative and
16
to fuse the workers with the proletarian dictatorship*
The congress also showed the extent and structure of the
Pravda * November 27$ 1923, p* 5i Sekretar' *Pravdy" . pp*
219-20.
15. Pravda . November 27. 1923, p. 5.
16. Ibid * . November 28, 1923, p. 5.
250
movement* The email response to the calling of the congress
has already been noted, ae has the contention that many party
organizations paid insufficient attention to or ignored rabcor
organizations* None of the fourteen provincial reports could
boast of a rabcor organization previous to Hay 1922, and only
four before the end of that year* Surprisingly the outlying
cities like Ekaterinberg, Baku, Kharkov and Rostov on Don had
initiated correspondent groups nearly a year before Moscow and
Petrograd. All local reports, however, indicated a steady and
in dome cases rapid expansion of membership in the six months
before the congress, and the majority reported the calling of
regular and increasingly frequent local meetings to consider
the problems of the movement , educate the rabcora and raise
their cultural level. 1 *
The congress had considered the whole spectrum of the rab-
cor movement, but neglected the selcor completely. Yet mast of
the decisions applied equally veil to peasant correspondents.
Organization and membership were the same, and although the
persecution was more frequent, its elimination depended on the
same party support necessary for the rabcor. Only in terms of
17* Ibid * . November 22*5, 1923, passim. The time sequence in
the establishment of local groups supports the thesis
that Che rabselcor movement arose in response to a need
for reporters on the local scene after the introduction
of NEP, since the central papers, which had fewer corres-
pondents, could rely on the wire service for information.
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his function and tasks did the selcor differ, and these had
yet to be completely mapped out* With the turn of the new
year , as the campaign for the peasant press swung Into high
gear, the function of the selcor would assume greater Impor-
tance. At the same time the decisions taken at the congress
concerning rabcors would become operative and their practical
value tested in the field*
The key to success in 1924 for the rabcors was the publi-
cation of the instructional journal Rabochll ^correspondent «
edited by Maria Ul'ianova, in addition to her responsibili-
ties as head of the NWorker Life" section in Pravda. Such a
publication had been discussed as early as the summer of 1923,
but not until the congress was the idea given official sanc-
tion. Its tasks were to help establish rabcors as tributar-
ies of their papers, to organise, guide and defend them from
persecution* Additionally the journal printed acts and decrees
affecting the press, published articles on the press and rab-
sorec ©y Je8hSS&£* Galium j ssoaiYovsH *, % ano jyestian B&dnix . who
cors, and in general discussed all problems related to the
18
movement.
X t ffcet s f 1& Xeftt Bierely te describe what m& $ happen—
18. Karavashkova, S.V., "M. I. Ul'ianova - organizator 1 re-
daktor zhurnala Raboche-Krest' lanskll korrespondent"
»
in Mishurls, A,Lt, Partllno-sovetskaja pechat' v period
bor'bv za stroltel ' stvo sotsjalizma , Moscow, 19^4, pp.
102-7 | Sekretar* " Pravdy". pp. 52-62. The first issue
rejected the selection of rabcors, but supported the
idea of buros attached to the editorial board of the
individual paper* However this institution tended
to fossilize into an official structure and the eighth
Issue of the journal stamped it as incorrect.
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First to consider the eelcor was the meeting of the pea-
sant paper editors at the end of December. Shafir reported on
the village correspondent and his thesis was adopted by the
delegates. He decried the trend among village correspondents
to consider themselves officials with special authority. This
tendency must be fought. Another incorrect approach was the
proliferation of selcors who had no contact with the village.
Put in a negative way,
"The selcor (of the official type) was given to us
that we would not know what was happening in the village.
The selcor is in essence a most important support for
our own press, since he is a peasant leader, he is an
active reader. But in order that a correspondent should
be a real support, it is indispensable, that he should
be a true link between the village and the paper and not
a bureaucratic distortion of such. * 19
Following the editors' meeting more frequent pronounce-
ments began to appear on the function of selcors. Kalinin be-
came their spokesman, and under his leadership the first selcor
congress was convened at the beginning of February 1924, spon-
sored by Bednota . Kalinin, Sosnovskli and Demian Bednll, who
were the leading speakers, prescribed the direction of the
movement.
It was not sufficient merely to describe what was happen-
ing in the village without any feeling for events. As Kalinin
explained * ... the first thing that is demanded from a corres-
19. Shafir, la., Gazeta 1 derevnla . Moscow, 1924, pp. 135-6.
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pondent Is that he has lived through and suffered those very
passions of the peasantry about which he writes . * The selcor
must also be able to provide examples of the phenomena which he
was describing* and must be able to generalize from the speci-
fic. There was no need for a special peasant language * but
merely a study of Russian to enable the selcor to recapture
20
on the printed page what he had seen in the village* Oemian
Bednii stressed the role of selcors as representative of Soviet
power in the village and among the peasantry* the ears of the
center in the countryside* Sosnovskii talked of selcors in
terms of distributing papers in the localities and dealt with
21
the need to protect them from persecution.
One speaker stressed the newness of the selcor movement*
noting that before the revolution there had been no peasant
correspondents * and that in 1924 there was only one to 3000
muzhiks. Another added
t
"Generally speaking* the illumination of agricul-
tural-economic questions in the paper is a means of
approaching the peasantry* a means of the conquest of
the reader 9 8 attention* and this means* the reader him-
self. Agricultural-economics and agronomy — this is the
path bringing the paper to the village. Thus we come
l i ^rif rr W » *UU*e aod the old
20. Kalinin* 0 korre spondentakh . pp. 11-21. *On the Tasks of
the Village Correspondent 11 * also in Bednota* February 8,
1924.
21. Bednota . February 12-15* 1924* passim.
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to the conclusion that the first important task of cor-
respondents is to write what has this or that relation
to agricultural economy. 0 22
But the peasant's dislike of organization had to be overcome
in order to work usefully in the countryside and this was
another task of the selcor. As to the selcor 9 s function, Kar-
pinskii devoted his attention to that topic. The peasant cor*
respondent played a dual role, the conductor of ideas from
the center and the expression of the peasant* s needs. "A peas-
ant writer must • be a leading class conscious citizen of
the Soviet Republic, that is a guide
,
explainer
,
interpreter
for the peasantry of the plans, ideas, measures of Soviet
power. " On the other hand as the center of the village, the
selcor should explain everything in relation to the interests
of the peasantry*
"... the peasant writer must be the expression of the
interests of the peasantry* He must inform the worker*
peasant power about what is happening In the village,
and defend before the worker-peasant power the interests
of the peasantry* This is the second, very important,
basic task of the peasant writer* "23
The former function was particularly important since the cen-
ter needed unvarnished accounts of events in the countryside*
With the revolution beginning in the village and the old
22* Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, Krest* lanskll korrespondent i
23* Ibid * . pp* 72-3* "What a Peasant Writer Must Be".
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capitalist system reviving, Karpinskii pointed out that sel-»
cors were the leading element in the countryside and must
direct the peasantry along the proper path. The selcor would
attack the struggle in the village from the class point of
view, as a member of the have*not class in its struggle with
the haves*
But the first selcor congress accomplished less than the
first rabcor congress because of the limited number of peasant
papers about which selcor buros could organize* Rabcors had an
extensive and well established net of papers, but selcors could
only claim one such sheet, Bednota * and their first meeting
should more properly be called a meeting of Bednota selcors.
Not until the village press existed in a more extensive form
could a real congress of selcors be held*
Thus by early 1924 the two major types of correspondents
had been called to the attention of the party through its lead-
ing papers, and the basic questions, functions, and organise*
24
tlonal framework of the movement outlined* The problem of
24* On February 15, Kalinin spoke at a meeting of rabselcors
of Rabochala aazeta and defined the tasks of all corree-
pondents as follows t *••• to grasp life, to write as a
process of life itself. They £the tasks] are approached,
1 think, only when a person is deeply interested in life
and Inserts part of himself in the process* 1* Kalinin, 0
korrespondentakh . p* 23* Shaflr, la* , Gazeta ^ derevnja ,
Moscow, 1924, p. 138, cited the struggle with abuses, the
raising of the cultural level in the village, and dissemina.
tlon of papers as the tasks of the selcor.
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persecution had not been eliminated and even the decisions of
rabselcor meetings remained to be realized throughout a move*
meat that had as yet no internal cohesion or real interdepend
By the time of the thirteenth congress the party was ready
to discuss the rabselcor movement as a whole. In the draft
resolution f prepared before the congress, the press section
of the Central Committee had called for party leadership of its
15 intiitfii^a ^ift tfrl^Mlft^l ****** *
writers. But the draft resolution was regarded as unclear
and Incomplete even before it was considered v and the Central
Organ of the party demanded the expansion of the points deal*
ing with rabselcors to Include aspects other than their edu-
sd 26 i
cation. When the congress convened, Stalin in the Organi-
zational Report noted that rabcors numbered 25,000 while there
were an additional 5000 selcors. According to the party secre-
tary,
"The organization of rabcors and selcors has a great
future. Through known conditions of development these or-
ganizations can play the role of the best expression and
a powerful proponent of the will of proletarian opinion*
You know the force of proletarian opinion in reveal-
Ins and correcting the deficiencies of our soviet society
— It is much more serious than the power of adminis-
trative pressure* That is why the ^arty must render all
possible aid to this organization
25. Pravda, May 22, 1924, p. 4.
26. Ibid*. May 23, 1924, p. 4. ^ ****
27. Trlnadtsatvl a»ezd . pp. 113, 122-3. The rabselcor move-
ment was considered in the section on organizations link*
ing party and class.
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Given the Interest of the party secretary, It Is not sur-
prising that the resolution on the press adopted at the 13th
session of the congress, May 31, extensively considered the
•eaent. Its decisions on the worker correspondent confirmed
the line adopted In the fall of 1923. Rabeors must be free
from all forms of bureaucracy and formalism, united organiza-
tionally around the Individual paper. Party leadership and sfl
assistance would take the form of communist education and
political work among the rabeors, but the intensified activi-
ty of party and trade union groups should in no case take the
form of censorship. The future of the movement demanded a
mass influx of fresh cadres and the linking of rabselcors to
the masses in production. As to the selcors, party and soviet
organizations ware to help them in every way. They would be
the means of strengthening the links between peasantry and
peasant paper. These statements jet the tone for rabselcor
development until they were reexamined at the end of the year
by the second correspondent congress.
Up to the 13th congress the correspondent movement had
been largely amorphous despite the figures cited by the party
secretary. Actual circles were few, and the selcor movement
had barely been recognized except for the meeting sponsored
28. iov pechat' v dok, pp. 63-4. "on the Press-. From theResolution o? the 13th Congress.
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by Bednota * As later reports about this period indicated, even
party committees in the largest centers failed to recognize
the value of correspondents* Only a small number of party
organizations participated in this work and like the paper at
29
an earlier date, its place in the state was not understood*
The resolution of the congress on the importance and meaning
of correspondents helped to change this attitude* It provided
the foundation from which the movement would expand as well as
the guidelines along which this expansion was to run* In the
period from the 13th to the 14th congress the major questions
concerning organization
,
leadership and participation were
considered further and basically solved*
Immediately after the congress Stalin reviewed the func-
tion of the correspondent in an Interview with a writer for
Rabochil korrespendent * "Only as an organized force can rab*
selcors play* in the course of the development of the press,
the part of a mouthpiece and guide of proletarian public opin-
ion, exposing the deficiencies of Soviet society, and the tire-
less fighter for the improvement of our construction* 0 Stalin,
however, felt selection of writers by the editorial boards
was advisable, so long as it insured the independence of the
correspondent, but he argued against conceiving the movement
29. Pqchat' XIY s»«*t.du . p. 28.
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as a training ground for future Soviet journalists* Inde-
pendence was primary* Nevertheless* correspondents must be
guided by the paper to which they were attached* " Direct ide-
ological guidance of rabselcors must be exercised by paper
editors who are linked with the party* Censorship of arti-
cles must be concentrated in the hands of the papers* edi-
tors* * Stalin struck two new notes in this interview* The
first was the apparent abandonment of the voluntary principle
in favor of selection, while the second was the possibility
of censorship* Selection foretold future party control of a
movement that was at its inception spontaneous* Censorship
indicated that seme state deficiencies were beyond the compe-
tence of the correspondent*
The voluntary principle was quickly reaffirmed! however,
in a review of the first six months of Rabochll korrespendent
by Pgavda which confirmed the concept announced by Bukharln at
the first congress* Ner was censorship developed at this
time by commentators on the movement* Trotsky referred to
30* Stalin* Joseph Vissarlonovich, Sochlnenlla * vol. 6, pp.
274-6. "On Worker Correspondents* • The 13th congress
had not considered selection , but the resolution noted
the need for party leadership in assisting papers in
selecting rabcors.
31* Pravda . July 3, 1924, p* 6* It is possible that Stalin
was only choosing between the two non-recommended methods
since he did not mention the voluntary principle in his
interview.
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the realising Lenin's dictum of continuous criticism end
self•criticism as the spirit of correspondents. This meant
two guiding principles in fulfilling their assigned taski
facts and point of view. The latter oust be class. Yet
the spirit of criticism mast not degenerate into arbitrariness
and irresponsibility* "The feeling of responsibility for the
fulfillment of work must play a leading role in all his acti-
vity. The rabcor is an organ of social conscience* which
watches, reveals, demands, insists. It is impassible to be
otherwise. The rabcor writes about Irregularities and waits
^fcfI- m rami mk mm <»«.? tofor them to be removed." Trotsky's view was supported by
Maria Vt'ianova who also stressed the social function of rab-
cor* at a link between the masses and the paper, and through
the latter with the pa*ty*3* ***» Vmwmm* capitalism,
The expansion of the correspondent movement and its pene-
tration Into the village aroused increasing opposition* Rab-
cors in the cities and major industrial areas had encountered
scattered persecution because of their revelations of abus-
es and corruption. But for the most part they were accepted
as representatives of the working class* In the countryside
32. Trotsky, Soch . vol. 21, pp. 180*201. "The Rabcor and His
Cultural Role" I written in July 1923, also in Pravda.
August 14, 1924.
33
• ^•ffdaif POchat' * #16-7, 1924, pp. 6-7. -Partila i rab-
cor*. cited in Sekretar' "Praydy*. pp. 63-4.
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the case was different* There the majority of the population
was hostile to the Soviet Government and selcors encountered
threats i harrassment and persecution almost as soon as they
entered the village* Initially this situation was brought to
the party 1 s attention in March by the murder of G.I. Malln-
ovskli, a selcor and party member , who had revealed bribery
and abuses in the Ukrainian countryside.
Mallnovskil 1 s murder became a cause c^lfebre during the
course of the year* attracting greater attention than it might
otherwise have deserved because the press used it to whip up
public opinion against the persecution of correspondents. 34
The press campaign developed along two basic lines i no mercy
for the enemies of the working class, the Kulaks
,
Papists and
speculators who hoped to profit from renascent capitalism,
and the attempt to Infuse thousands of new members Into the
selcor movement to expand party influence in the village.
Having seized on correspondents as useful tools, the party
intended to utilize them fully. But to penetrate the country-
side required a vast net of selcors who would spread the gos-
pel, and persecution deterred many from entering the movement.
34. The trial of the killers received extensive coverage by
all the press in October. Bednota devoted several col-
umns to it for weeks, with transcripts and commentary.
Persecution in White Russia was about equally dealt out
by officials and individuals according to Martselei, Pa-
chat' Belorussll . pp. 141*3. He records two killings""
and a variety or threats and abuses.
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Pravda noted all this and cited it as a political danger that
Mist be eliminated. The Central Organ called on all class con*
scious elements " ... to take measures for the protection of
the life and property of selcors from Kulak banditry ."
The instances of persecution were more and more frequent-
ly reported in the press* Personal accounts were enlisted to
reveal the machinations of counter-revolutionary forces in the
countryside 9 and the opinions of harassed selcors were solid*
36
ted on the fate of their persecutors. With the beginning
of the trial of Malinovskii's murderers in October the publi-
city campaign reached its peak. The Central Organ of the par*
ty ran several first page articles defining the role and im-
portance of the correspondent , his relation to Soviet power
and the problem of persecution.
To overcome the ambivalence and even hostility of lower
soviet and party institutions , Pravda stressed the great value
of selcors to the state. Hardly a day passed without further
notices of attacks, and until they were repelled, correspond
35. Pravda . September 11, 1924, p. 1, third lead article.
Use of the term Kulak seems to have been as elastic in
1924 as it would be during collectivization, since many
persecutors were party and soviet officials.
36, In Pravda . September 17, 1924, p. 1, fourth lead article,
the Bednota selcor V. Svetsov suggested deprivation of
rights and freedom.
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dents could not fully use their strength to aid the state in
restoring the economy and raising the cultural level of the
masses* They must be fully protected against anti-social ene-
mies, and to provide for their families in case of persecu-
tion, Pravda reported that it was reviving the Iron Fund. All
this was done to assure the movement that the power of the
37government stood behind it* This message was repeated by
Sosnovskli who stressed the inter-relationship of the growth
of the Soviet press , its correspondents and the counter-revo-
lutionary struggle* The opposition was given the already fa-
miliar names i Kulaks, Whiteguards and SR's, but the murder of
Mallnovskii had been perpetrated by party members, and this
necessitated a thorough examination by party and soviet insti-
tutions into their attitude toward the correspondence. Again
party organizations were called on to stand behind the rabsel-
cor movement and take decisive measures against the counter*
37t Pravda . October 3, 1924, p« 1, second lead article. In
an interview in Pravda, October 5, Kalinin said that the
importance of rabselcors demanded the state's assistance
to families of injured correspondents, and put the re-
sponsibility on the editors. Correspondents must know
that their work was considered socially important by the
state which would support them* In the same issue the
Central Organ listed twenty cases of persecution ranging
from threats to killings, and printed an article by Kar-
plnskii calling for special campaigns in defense of sel-
cors and for special decrees on persecution.
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revolutions
As to the work of selcors, Molotov explained It as the
defense of the poor and middle peasantry against the Kulaks*
They would play an ever growing role in the countryside* since
freyoincioatr* QAffgaterrttlg will * red Y*t iron cm this
the party had only one member or candidate for every two vil-
lages. Even the addition of Komsomols did not raise the influ-
ence of the center to the necessary height , so selcors repre-
mm
sented an important supplement to the party in the village.
Trotsky also explained the importance of correspondents, this
time in terms of the freedom of the press.
"Freedom of the press in the Soviet Republic con-
sists most of all in this, that the worker, peasant and
military correspondents have the opportunity and are not
afraid to write about all irregularities, excesses, ille-
galitles, violations and abuses which they observe around
them* This is real and authentic freedom of the press,
taken from the view of the masses. It is necessary no
matter what to defend, expand, deepen and strengthen this
The attempts on this freedom come, predominantly,
from two sourcesi from the side of officials who do not
like it, when they disturb them and from the side of the
kulaks, who do not want them interfering with their plun-
dering. *
Trotsky did not absolve correspondents from all blame in pre-
fabricating cases, but felt Soviet officials were overzealous
in their defense of Soviet power when they attacked correspond
38* Ibid * , October 4, 1924, p. 3. The whole central press
supported the campaign with a variety of articles and re*
ports on the trial or the movement*
39. Ibid., October 12, 1924, p. 1, second lead article*
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tents for revealing deficiencies.
"Rabcors and seleors these are the eyes and ears
of the worker Government* The kulak who attempts to blind
and deafen the power of the working masses must and will
be stopped ruthlessly * *«« And if the greedy frantic kulak
lifts his arm further against the rabcors and seleors , the
Revolutionary Dictatorship will use a red hot iron on this
fraternity 40
The activity of the central press and the important party mem*
bers who wrote on the movement show that by the end of the
summer of 1924, the party had firmly and definitely taken an
interest in the correspondents, and had become concerned with
directing and defending them from any attack inside or outside
the party* The occasion of the Malinovskii murder trial, which
had been delayed by a prolonged search for the killers, provi-
ded an excellent opportunity to galvanize the country behind
the movement and solidify central direction. At the same tine
in the major provincial centers party committees began to break
out of their lethargy.
In Smolensk the Importance of the various types of corres-
pondents was noted in terms of disseminating the press, parti*
clpating in wall papers, and as a link with the masses. The
local committee called on all organizations to strengthen
*
. the systematic leadership of this work, developing and
40, Trotsky, Soch . vol. 21, pp. 201-6. "With a Red Hot Iron".
Published in Pravda, October 18-9, 1924.
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deepening it as one of the important branches of the work of
the party." This was particularly necessary since previously
their efforts had been so weak that some areas had no corres-
41pondents.
In connection with tile campaign for expanding the move-
ment and attending to its direction 9 various meetings and con*
ferences were convened to consider past experience and discuss
future developments, Igvestlla held its first selcor meeting
at the end of October and noted that their correspondence was
Insufficient and unsatisfactory. At the beginning of Novem-
41. H££ l0 » Circular #43, October 18, 1924, of (to?) Gzhatsk
Ucom RCP(b). Only in Smolensk were materials available to
see this change of attitude. The reports of the local
buros at their second congress support this change showing
steady and sometimes dramatic growth in the period of the
press campaign. Reports on local congresses, on the Don
and in the Northern Caucasus, at the end of 1924 shed no
direct light on this, but indicate the competition between
local papers for correspondents which was regarded as un-
healthy. Krasnala pechat ' . #4-5, February 15, 1925, pp.
64-5.
42. Igvestlla , October 24, 1924, p. 3. The congress was also
attended by secretaries of volost and agricultural cells
who met with the press section and Central Committee. At
this meeting the importance of dissemination and the lack
of leadership for the movement In the village were noted.
Nluremberg of the press section stated, "Not to pay attent-
ion to the selcor movement risks, that this movement,
which is a powerful weapon in the matter of connecting our
party with the non-party peasant mass, will slip from our
hands." Igvestlla . October 29, 1924, p. 5. The meeting's
Cotami ttee for confirmation
.
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ber Kregt'lanskaja saeeta held a conference of Its correspon-
dents, at which lakovlev Listed the improvement of rural econ-
omy, revelation of all mistakes of Soviet work in the country-
side, and promotion of the ;>arty in the village as the main
tasks for seleors. Information gathered at these meetings
and by the press section resulted in a flurry of activity at
the center which took the form of decrees and the convoking of
the second correspondent congress.
Among the several decrees issued by the Orgburo on Decem-
ber 1, 1924 was one concerning the forms of uniting the paper
with its worker and peasant readers. The experience of the
year had shown the value of rabseleore in Linking the paper
with the masses, and this experience had been generalised into
an Instruction. In the other decrees on that day the Central
Committee had given official sanction to recruiting new mass-
es of correspondents, while at the same time explaining their
proper position, direction and participation in social life*
Their papers were to supplement the instructional work of
Rabochll korrospondent by providing individual instructions.
^
These decrees were supplemented by a circular on corres*
43. Bednota . November 6, 1924, p. 4*
44. £ part i sov pechat
1
. pp. 322-4. M0n the Peasant Paper*
and "On the Forms of Uniting the Paper with the Worker
and Peasant Readers".
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nondents, which told party organizations that In the time
since idle 13th congress the movement had expanded to one hun-
dred thousand members. Because of this expansion their work
demanded clarification with special attention to political*
educational work in the ranks. The circular reaffirmed the
circle as the basic form of organisation and ordered all
publications to strengthen their links with rabselcors by de-
signating a special comrade solely for this task. Quantita-
tive growth must be tempored by qualitative improvement
through study and cultural development. To further their con*
trol and leadership of the movement, papers would call fre-
quent and regular correspondent meetings and dictate the most
important events and assignments for the discussion of the
movement*
Reading between the lines , it appears that rapid expan-
sion had allowed the movement to escape control, -a fact that
was quickly confirmed. The Central Committee reported the for-
mation of Individual and independent correspondent organiza-
tions outside the Influence of the party with their own dis-
cipline and regulations. Many of these were attached to trade
union organizations, a clear violation of the party 9 s concep-
tion of the movement and of the congress resolution which
called for the protection of rabselcors from any type of red
tape or bureaucracy. This was bad enough, but the spirit of
capitalism had also invaded the movement. Correspondents
began to compete for fees, and many editors, Instead of coin-
bating this tendency, promoted it by attempting to attract
correspondents through monetary incentives. According to the
Central Committee decree, systematic political education
among the correspondents, through regular meetings, and rais-
ing the general educational and political standards of the
new entrants, were the means to correct these irregularities.
The local press subsection would lead this campaign, report-
ing regularly on its work to the press section of the Cen-
tral Committee.^5
Prom this decree it became obvious that headlong pro-
liferation had resulted in nearly complete loss of party con-
trol. Hany correspondents, lacking party background and poli-
tical education, fell victims to all kinds of non-party and
anti-party tendencies. Their crime was abetted by local com-
mittees who offered financial rewards for their services and
turned their backs to the formation of correspondent organi-
zations not attached to the paper, but under the direct con-
trol, apparently, of another institution. These tendencies
made a meckery of the voluntary principle and the concept of
45. M££ 248, To All Qrgburos, Central Committees, Kraicoms,
Oubcoms, and Okrugcoms RCJ?(b), December 4, 1924, "On
Worker and Peasant Correspondents".
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en independent power revealing the deficiencies of the Soviet
apparatus, but more important they threatened to render the
movement useless as a weapon of the center.
The dispatch of this circular coincided with the second
all-union congress of correspondents, which. Pravda asserted,
should pay serious attention to the question of party Leader*
Ship of the rabselcors* reassert voluntary selection, and
46
rebuff all other approaches. The conference considered the
whole range of problems which had developed in the course of
the movement's growth, and as was noted by Lenin's sister
Maria at the opening session, found that the general line of
the first meeting was correct*
The voluntary principle was reaffirmed and all tendencies
toward official correspondents condemned. Both the secretary
of Pravda and Zinovlev spoke against selecting or electing
47
correspondents . Immediately connected with the voluntary
principle was the question of the organizational unit. The
first (Prayda ) congress had adopted the circle attached to the
46. Pravda . December 6, 1924, p. 1, third lead article.
Ibid* > December 7 and 9f Igveatlla . December 6 and 8,
pass lias Some idea of the importance of the congress for
the party is indicated by the two full pages that Pravda
devoted to it for more than two weeks. It is ironic that
Zinovlev should speak against selection since the Lenin*
grad organization resisted the voluntary principle at
least until 1926.
?71
Individual paper as the basic unit, but organizations arose
in many areas on different principles, united to party or
soviet institutions and frequently electing or selecting their
correspondents* the main argument against unity through the
editor was that the latter was already overburdened, while the
proponents of editorial annexation stressed that this was the
only way to avoid bureaucracy. Party leadership would be exer-
cised ever the movement through the editorial boards* Before
the discussion was over more than seventy delegates had spoken
on the organizational question and spilt nearly equally into
pro and con factions.
No such division arose over the tasks of rabselcors, which
remained as before, the revelation of mistakes and deficiencies
in the Soviet apparatus* The tasks of the peasant correspon-
dent were spelled out in detail.
"The basis for the activity of the selcor Is de-
fense of Soviet power from perversions, from its seizure
by kulak forces in the village* At this point stands the
party i the selcor is its assistant. Therefore completely
incorrect are those comrades, who say, that selcors must
begin with the description of the sunny sides of the vil-
lage, ignoring the class struggle that is proceeding
there. "49
As usual the results of the conference were incorporated
in a resolution that confirmed past lines of progress. The
M
48. Prayda . December 10 and 12 1 Izvestlla . December 8 and 12,
192ft. passim.
49. Izvestlla . December 10, 1924, p. 6*
272
• was approved as was the organization of
correspondents through the editor or editorial board of the
paper. The tasks and functions of the movement remained un-
changed, but the instructional journal was renamed Kaboche-
krest'lanskii Correspondent to reflect the improved and more
important position of the selcors. 50 The congress had given
its stamp of approval to lines of development dictated at the
center, but the struggle with different approaches was only
joined. The delegates had hardly left Moscow before the
Central Committee reacted sharply to Leningradskai* pgavda
which attacked the resolutions of the congress. The issue
was not only the organizational unit, but the use of non-party
personnel in correspondent work. Qn this occasion Bukharin
raised his pen against deviations from the party line, writ-
ing that the use of non-party correspondents was not only
possible, but in the village, necessary. Continuing the attack
on the Leningrad organization, which he had launched at the
congress, the editor of Pravda assailed its desire to harness
rabselcors to party organizations rather than allow attachment
to local papers. The debate continued for two years before
resolution at the third rabselcor congress in 1926,
By the end of 1924 the party had attempted to gain firm
control of a correspondent movement which permeated all areas
50 « Izvestlia , December 16, 1924, p. 5.
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of the state » but had grown too rapidly and escaped direction.
Its lines of development had been sketched and Its main tasks
laid out during the course of the year* but all evidence sug-
gests that the center* s concept of the movement had not won
general acceptance. In reality the party was trying manfully
to assert Its control and leadership, and in print assumed
that it had, while still trying to convert the theory into
practice*
flpratf* • -liMSM Wm MflMflHM foiliwiiift t&u* J**ly 4e/» 6kro*e
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L*e*l n eult«t mv^wm**0mLtt* m •*
THE PAPER
ntkA*s+*tlm*~* rhfjjjjf^ ***** r**p#nstfei* for the
At the head of each Soviet paper stood an editor who
was responsible for what was printed on Its pages* In the
first days of the revolution the few party papers had been
run by prominent local Bolsheviks* This tradition continued
into the October days with the single exception of Petro-
3rad, where the reaction following the July days drove most
of the important party members into hiding* After October
more important tasks called for the immediate attention of
the party hierarchy, and editorships devolved onto lesser
lights and in some cases onto non-party personalities**
This tendency persisted until the change to NEP and
perhaps after, due to the local committee 9 s failure to re*
alize the value of the press* Only in the period follow*
ing the 12th party congress did experienced Bolsheviks fill
the overwhelming majority of editorships in the Soviet press*
Undoubtedly the center's complaints about the quality of the
1* Pravda+ edited by Bukharin from the October revolution, is
the notable exception to this trend*
2* Statistics on party editors are rare* The frequent orders
from the center to appoint them suggests that until the
12th congress, they were the exception* Two surveys at
the end of the period under study indicate that 3 of 121
paper8 were edited by non-party men, while 94*3% of pro*
iftiiinl rl editors were party members* Krasnala oechat' *
#25, 1925, pp. 59~62t #14-5, 1927, p. 6T
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local press resulted from the inability or unwillingness of
local committees to appoint experienced comrades to editorial
positions* The importance of this composition is difficult to
underestimate since the editor was held responsible for the
direction of his publication and was the party's insurance
that it reflected the proper line* Only one example was found
to indicate what happened when a paper strayed from the correct
path. In a May issue of Ural'skll Rabochll an article attacked
Isvestlla and the Central Committee for their German policy*
In response to this the Central Committee wrote to the Ural
Oblast Committee in June* stating that
"... the CC considers intolerable similar attacks
against the line of the CC or against comrades, who
serve at responsible posts.
The CC orders the oblast committee to call to order
comrade Safarov and the editorial board responsible for
printing such articles. *3
The position of editor entailed a variety of roles and
functions. Since party members lead the press
,
they always
A
took an active political part in the life of the state. In
addition to this function, the editor was ... the leader, in*
splrer, main organizer, boss (manager) of the paper. He gave
the publication personality and directed its stress and impact.
*Without the editor the paper is the same as the army
3, pereolska TsK. vol. Ill, pp. 86-7.
4. Kerzhentsev, V., Gazeta, Moscow, 1919, p. 20.
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without the commander. It can have the most valuable workers 9
these workers can write fine articles f but in the end, if
there is no editor to receive the collection of articles 9
there is no paper
In addition to the publication's direction the editor
was responsible for its organization, ... systematically
checking the work of the section leaders
,
correspondents f
technical staff of the paper Put In another way, he
designated the line of the paper, selected its workers,
assigned sections f provided themes for articles or general
directives for individual sections and planned every issue* 6
Another task for the responsible editor was censorship,
not in a forma! manner, but with the idea of ensuring that
nothing counter-revolutionary or anti^party appeared. The
formal functions of censorship were exercised by Glavlit, but
the editor was responsible for the purity of his own publica-
tion.
The performance of these functions depended on the sise
of the papert In small wall papers and at the uezd or volost
level they could easily be accomplished by a single man, but
in gubernla and central publications where there were many
sections and extensive materials and correspondence, the edl-
5. Vardin, Sov pechat' . p. 106. "The Paper and the Staff".
6* Kerzhentsev, V., Gazeta, Moscow, 1919, p. 21.
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tor's functions were usually dispersed throughout an editori-
al board. In particular the technical side of the paper was
often entrusted to another member of the staff. 7 while leader*
ship of individual sections was almost always exercised by
other members of the editorial board* Only responsibility for
the whole paper could not be shifted.
The editor, who was generally a member of the organization
of which the paper was the organ, wrote most of the editorials
and in those papers having large formats and several lead arti-
cles, his was the first editorial almost always located in
8the upper left corner of page one* Since editorials had the
force of decrees* the best person within the publishing organ-
isation for the position of editor was the committee secretary
or the leader of the agit-prop section* In smaller papers the
editor assumed a proportionately larger role, directly con**
trolling and running more and more of the publication , until
at the wall paper level he might be the whole staff with the
exception of the rabselcors* With respect to the rest of the
material published in his paper . the editor fulfilled the
7* Kotlyar. Newspapers * p* 23. A responsible editor was
organiser of the publication but the assistant editor
(Secretary) managed the paper* He read galleys, set fees
and handled the technical aspects like press runs, dis-
tribution and subscription.
8, In party papers editorials were unsigned and a responsible
editor was never Indicated* Other papers generally signed
their editorials and named the responsible editor on the
last page.
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meaning of his position, editing articles received, changing
and adapting them to fit the role envisioned by the party
line. The editor also connected various parts of the paper,
uniting them internally, and externally linking them to the
party, Soviets, trade unions, cooperatives and masses*
With the change to NEP and the rise of the correspondent
movement, the editor became responsible additionally for the
organization of rabselcors about the paper, for their politi-
cal education and control by the party committee which he
represented* in larger periodicals this duty was functionally
shifted to the head of "Worker Life 1', since he published all
rabcor notes and letters, 10 but the responsibility for the
paper's correspondents still rested with the editor. For the
selcors, except in the two leading peasant papers, Bednota
and Krest ' janskaja ftaseta . there was no similar leader, and
editors of peasant publications shouldered this function
directly*
Next in importance after the editor and usually a member
of the editorial board was the paper's secretary* The secre*
tary assumed greater and greater importance as papers expand*
ed in size* He handled all incoming materials, from letters
and notes of readers and correspondents to major articles,
9* Vardin, Sov pechat' * p* 103,
10, Maria Ul # ianova, head of the "Worker Life" section of
Pravda is the best example of this functional shift*
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directing them to various sections or to the editor. The secre-
tary also executed all corrections Indicated by the editor in
materials for publication which meant that he was a major fac-
tor in the control, administration and publication of the pa*
per# But the number of secretaries who were also party members
was far from an overwhelming majority of the total, 11 In addi-
tion to the control and distribution of all materials arriving
at the paper, the secretary was responsible for the fixing and
payment of wages to the various members of the staff. 12
Due to his technical-administrative duties the secretary
had little time to write articles, but acted as the intersec-
tion within the publication where staff and materials related
ia Jbiaiurti >f ] *to the paper all crossed. This combination of administrative
tasks in the person of the secretary resulted in a power not
unlike that of the party secretary in the given organization,
and it seems likely that while the editor was burdened with
responsibility for the paper, the publication was actually run
11, The surveys already cited indicate that 45 of 121 papers
had non-party secretaries in 1924} even in 1926, 46% of
leading provincial papers and 69% of other provincial
papers had non-party secretaries*
12* The one set of pay scales available dates from the end of
1923. Central editors earned lOOr/month while gubernia
editors got only 58r/month« Similar scales applied for
other staff members. Isvestija , November 21, 1923, p. 3*
Kotlyar claims that wages were controlled to avoid
competition with the editors and secretaries receiving
a so-called maximum, originally set at 180r/month.
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by the secretary , who at the and of 1924 was frequently not a
party member*
After the secretary came the other members of the edi-
torial board and the staff t their number depending on the size
of the publication* These assistants or section heads assumed
leadership of different parts of the paper* Section leaders
usually became such by virtue of their continual collaboration
in the paper on a given subject* and except for the secretary
,
the members of the editorial board were invariably heads of
individual sections
,
although the contrary was not always true.
The editorial board or college provided a sounding board for
13discussion of the paper' 6 general work* In Fravda as early
as August of 1917 * the editorial board numbered twelve, and
there is no reason to believe that this number had diminished
by 1924* The heads of the various sections were responsible
inter alia for local life, party activities, worker life, the
peasantry, army, youth, economics, foreign affairs, culture
and current events, all of which were deemed obligatory sec*
tions at one time or another by the Central Committee*
The rest of the staff consisted of technical people and
reporters or correspondents. The rabselcors have already been
13* Vardin, Sov pechat' . p. 108. "Editor and Paper*. Vardln
argued for wide and narrow editorial boards. The former
would run the paper, meeting several times per week* The
latter would meet once or twice per month and Include all
regular contributors and the paper's staff.
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considered, but reporters have not* They never developed in
the Soviet Union and the term is not found in Soviet litera-
ture on the press* Their place was taken by correspondents
*
telegraphic services of ROSTA and reprints from the central
press* Only major papers had reporters (called correspondents
without distinction as to type) in important areas of the state
and sometimes abroad* Izvestila . for instance* sent a special
correspondent to the Genoa Conference in 1922, and frequently
reports from other cities on events of significance bore the
interpolation "from our correspondent* * But reporters failed
to develop and become integral parts of the Soviet paper for
two reasons! it was dangerous to be too inquisitive and there
was no journalistic base from which to evolve* By the mid
1920* s the few reporters in a given area would pool their in-
14formation since there was no incentive pay for scoops.
On the technical side of the paper were stereo and lino*
typers* dispatch and expedition people responsible for produc-
tion and delivery* The technical staff, frequently known as
the office of the paper, handled all material aspects of pub*
licatlon and was run by the secretary. These duties included
purchase of supplies • subscriptions, advertisements, book-
keeping and expedition. In larger publications there was a
14* Kotlyar, Newspapers , pp. 14-7*
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secretariat which divided these responsibilities in the sane
way that section Leaders divided the work of making up the
issue*
The most important of the technical services was expedl-
tion upon which depended dissemination of the paper* For a
morning publication the process began the night before or
early in Hie morning* after the corrected format had been set
in type and the press run begun* Provincial copies had to be
*S the railroad and postal-telegraph agencies by daybreak to
et to their subscribers* The evening paper was not under
such pressure since it served only the local area*
Subscription for the individual paper was also handled by
the technical staff , but for the most part subscriptions were
not gathered at the paper or by its staff* Instead party,
soviet and postal-telegraph organizations and rabselcors
gathered subscriptions in the localities* In the period 1917*
1924 these ranged from five kopeks to 20,000 rubles for indi-
vidual issues, the latter reflecting the extent of inflation
during the 1922 crisis, while the former indicated the success
that had attended party efforts to cheapen the press during
lt|*# ^tl 'ti^U revived its eveatftg edition U 1923.
Content and Format
$h pre*
Format of Individual papers remained largely unchanged
from the day of inception with the single exception of adver-
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tisements which became part of every paper by 1922. For the
most part Soviet publications were morning papers, although
just after the October revolution some evening editions exis-
ted. These first evening papers disappeared in 1918-1919 due
to the newsprint shortage , but by the 12th congress others had
been created or the old ones resurrected. 1 "* In 1918 it was be-
lieved that evening papers were destined for more attentive
readers* Because of this their news had to be more laconic
than the morning paper » easier to read and giving fresh infor-
mation. But Kerzhentsev felt that most evening papers could
not meet this standard t being almost exact replicas of their
16
morning brothers , and this was their downfall. Content was
less important in their demise during the Civil War however
than the newsprint crisis*
Evening papers had. according to contemporaries , a high
measure of news and apparently employed reporters in the wes-
tern sense of the word. Their material* was lighter and more
concise? they paid the best wages and ran at a profit because
they catered to their readers in a way that morning publica-
attea*
15. Krasnala gazeta revived its evening edition in 1923.
and Vechernlala Moskva began to appear at the same
time. Kotlyar, Newspapers , p. 20, notes the existence
of evening papers in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and perhaps
Rostov and Tiflis, equating their existence with high pre-
revolutlonary paper standards.
16. Kerzhentsev, V., Gazeta , Moscow, 1919, p. 110.
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ttons could not match. Partially this distinction existed be-
cause the morning paper was disseminated to a far wider audi-
ence. Another reason was the non-party*offIclal status of the
evening paper that was not saddled with compulsory sections.
Kotlyar noted that the revived evening papers were not party
or soviet creations , but a concession to the people which,
although scorned by the party, continued to flourish. 1 ^
But the overwhelming majority of Soviet papers were
morning publications, Initially undlf ferentlated, but at the
end of 1924 divided Into types and levels according to party
pronouncements. The basic types were worker, peasant and
military with a hierarchy of central, oblast, gubernla, uezd
and wall papers. Each type by 1924 Included a section devot-
ed to the other two, but In the years preceding the 12th
party congress, the press was with very few exceptions worker
oriented. Following the 12th congress this excluslveness
stopped, and greater stress on the neglected peasant papers
attempted to establish links uniting town and country, worker
and peasant.
The different levels reflected the party's attention to
various strata within the state and focused the attention of
17. Kotlyar, Newspapers . pp. 21*2.
18. Military papers had predominated during the Civil War,
but this Is the only exception.
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the given publication on Its area of competence. The leading
central papers had no limit to their coverage, and It was at
this level and only at this level, except for the very first
years of the Soviet Government, that there was extensive
reporting of foreign news. Pravda
. Izvestlia and Bednota
printed materials on all subjects that were Important to the
leading ranks of the state, but they paid for this by their
Isolation from the local scene and their Inability to print
more than a few of the vast number of letters which were sent
to them. Additionally, as has been noted, these papers set
the tone and provided the models for their lower counter-
19parts.
The three leading papers had by the end of 1923 settled
Into a basic format that varied little from Issue to Issue
except on those occasions when a party congress or other major
event necessitated larger or revised editions. Basically they
were destined for party, workers and peasantry, respectively,
but this distinction Is one of emphasis. Both Pravda
and Iavestlla were worker oriented, yet each covered other
19. The number of soviet papers declined after October. In
their original form none probably survived Into the nextdecade, becoming worker papers by the end of the Civil War
If not before. The terms soviet and worker are synonomous
for the press.
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topics. Of the two Iavestlla had more material on foreign
policy, while Pravda was the stronger with respect to the
Comintern and ideological questions* No perceptible time dif-
ference appeared in their reporting of the same event.
On the other hand Pravda had a consistently higher level
inn of e*agr*M*t ftMft g Eftsti WLfux called winfc teemet
of party contributors than either of the other two central
papers* In terms of coverage Izvestiia was the most diversi-
fied, having in addition to $he standard sections on party,
worker and trade union life, regular columns on science and
technology, art and literature, sports, books, chess and the
bourse* Political cartoons were also regular features and
Igvestila+a reportage on current events was more extensive*
While Bednota and Pravda had some of these sections, neither
had them all* Their predominance lay In the area of party
> ....
. 20
and peasant policy and problems*
At the next two levels of the hierarchy, the oblast and
gubernia papers, the amount and extent of topics considered
shrank, but for most of the period under study publications
like Rabochala Moskva * Lanlnsradgkala pravda and Rabochli put'
20* Both Pravda and Izvestlja instituted peasant sections
after the 12th congress, while Bednota and Izvestlia had
sections on party life* It is interesting to note that
Trotsky, Preobrazhensky and the opposition were attacked
in Pravda from the end of 1923, but not in the other two
central papers until the end of 1924*
287
covered on a smaller scale all the events attended to by their
putative leaders including foreign affairs. Only at the end of
1923 did foreign coverage decline noticeably and shift from
the front of these publications to the back.
In a similar manner extensive* almost verbatim report*
ing of congresses and conferences was curtailed with respect
to that given by the central organs* This contraction was
accompanied * in response to various directives of the Cen*
tral Committee, by an impressive expansion of the amount of
material devoted to the local area, and by format diversity
during 1922 in a frantic effort to attract readers* At this
level variety exceeded even Izvestiia , including fashions and
race results* The most notable difference was the stress on
printing local letters* answers to inquiries and frequently
lists of upcoming events in all areas of provincial life*
On the gubernia level* at least in Moscow and Petrograd*
some of the trends observed generally in the Soviet press*
did not obtain. The press crisis of 1922 failed to effect
Rabochaja Moskva or Krasnala aaaeta . While central and other
provincial publications were forced to reduce their format*
both of these papers expanded from six to eight and then to
21
ten pages* Three explanations of this paradox are possible*
____________
21. petrogradskala pravda also resisted the trend toward
smaller editions* but did not expand its format in 1922.
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Both publications cannibalized local uezd papers* The use of
these resources probably accounted for the ability of the two
gubernia papers to expand v and the nearly total collapse of
uezd nets in the two cities which necessitated greater local
coverage certainly provided the material for expansion*
Another possibility was their proximity to the population*
Certainly their content was less official or theoretical and
more factual even before the change to cost accounting, making
them more conducive to the masses than was the case with Pravda
and Izvestlla . Additionally because of their reading public it
was easier for these papers to solicit ads, which meant ready
and immediate financial support that was not available to the
central publications.
Another peculiarity was the almost complete absence of
23
columns devoted to party life* While Krasnala gazeta was the
Petrograd Soviet publication, which might explain its lack of
party coverage, Rabochala Moskva was the organ inter alia of
the Moscow Committee and should have been an obvious candidate
22* Support for this theory lies in the fate of "Plant-fac-
tory* in Rabochala Moskva which became a regular section
in 1922 when the uezd press was cannibalized, and then
gradually disappeared as the uezd papers revived in 1923*
A similar development occurred in Krasnala gazeta *
23* The generality of this statement is open to some question*
Only three papers existed in extensive sequences for this
period, Krasnala gazeta * Petro^radskala pravda and Rabo-
chala Moskva * and they all showed this tendency* A far
greater sample would be required to confirm this theory*
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for a "Party Life" section. Perhaps the proximity of Pravda
made it seat unnecessary* The gubernia paper also avoided the
proclivity of the central papers for frequent articles on the
peasantry after the 12th party congress* Political cartoons
and press photos, which did not appear in the central press
until 1921 » were among the early innovations of the gubernia
papers. Finally these publications conducted a variety of
competitions and contests* awarding prizes of Lenin 9 s collect-
ed works to the winners 9 and with the idea of responding bet-
24
ter. surveyed their readers 9 interests and needs.
At the gubernia tier of the hierarchy the problem of
special correspondents becomes even more unclear. Some page
one articles bore the interpolation "from our correspondent 14
in another city, and Petrogxadskaja pravda had its own cor-
respondent in Berlin. But generally the composition of the
reportorial cadre is obscure, and most of the short articles
and features had no indication of their source.
The trends in content noted at the gubernia level were
more pronounced in uezd publications. By 1924 they had re-
nounced their earlier attempts at worldllness after repeated
orders from the center, and had become locally oriented papers.
24. Petroftradakala pravda continued the black border obituary
habit first adopted by Pravda in 1917* Except for the
death of the most prominent party members, this practice
had disappeared from the rest of the Soviet press.
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Increasingly they became peasant sheets in response to the
directives issued at the 12th congress i their reportage of
foreign events and central or all-union congresses was cur-
tailed and compressed* The former were soon covered by ROSTA
telegraphic summaries and the latter by abridged reports pre-
pared in the press section of the Central Committee and de-
livered to provincial subsections for inclusion in local
papers. The space devoted to correspondence , however , had
increased significantly even over the gubernia level. At the
lowest level of the hierarchy stood the wall paper
,
complete-
ly oriented toward the enterprise which it served, yet occas-
ionally devoting space to a particular event or decree of
national or international importance which affected that in-
stitution.
The format of all papers down to the uezd level varied
little* Individual sections and content on the lower levels
had been regulated by Central Committee decrees in 1921 and
1922* On the higher levels, while the basic sections had been
dictated, there remained some scope for change, but in prac-
tice none occurred. By the end of 1924 the average central
paper had eight pages. Beneath the title line which gave its
name and the publishing organisation, were printed the edi-
torial and several lead articles that had the force of decrees
and divulged the basic party line on a particular problem.
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These articles were usually signed and in the central papers
2*5
were written by prominent party and government officials*
Two other kinds of material appeared on the front page*
First was the reportage on foreign events
,
garnered by
correspondents of the paper or more frequently of ROSTA.
Political events in Germany, France and the United Kingdom
were the most prevalent and comprehensively covered, although
the situation in Turkey for the whole period and in China for
261923-1924 were well documented also. Increasingly in 1924,
and by the end of that year, nearly all the time, foreign
news was shifted to the second and third pages of the leading
papers except for editorial comment, and domestic materials
took its place.
If the remainder of the front page was not devoted to
foreign affairs either because of the absence of something
noteworthy, or because of more important domestic problems,
it was filled with material on the present press campaign*
25. In Pravda the editorial was unsigned, but not usually
*n Izvestlla or Bednota * The level of articles by the
party hierarchy was higher in Pravda except for foreign
policy in IzvestlLa and peasant policy in Bednota .
26, At this point in their development the central papers
were not set up days or even weeks in advance as they are
today. Nor could it be claimed that there was no news in
them* In many cases there were sections devoted almost
exclusively to the latest developments, and important
events deemed of concern to the masses were quickly and
extensively covered* A more accurate description would
be that not all the news was reported*
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Following the Civil War these campaigns became regular occur-
rences
,
describing the famine and its relief, the development
of civil aviation or the growth of the peasant press. Election
campaigns, the harvest and various congresses were also dealt
with in this manner. These campaiiyis represented a reversion
or vestige of Civil War agitation, urging, cajoling and plead-
ing with the masses to strive harder, work beyond their capa-
bilities for the benefit of the particular Issue, and recording
successes and failures* Any other space on the first page was
then filled with short articles or a table of contents which
appeared and disappeared in response to seme unknown directive.
The next several pages of the central papers varied too
much to risk generalisation. Generally the obligatory sections
on party life, worker life, local news, which was probably
used to provide lessons for the country with respect to the
particular issue illustrated, peasantry, economics, the Red
Array, youth and women appeared on these pages. By the end of
1924 the sections devoted to worker life, party life and local
news covered a whole page*
Toward the end of the paper came the official section,
largest in Izvestlia , where the most important decrees and
laws were printed. The cultural section also appeared at the
back of the publication with notices on the arts and occasion*
al bibliographical items. The most important feature at the
end of the paper was letters to the editor and it needs some
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consideration. Like the editorial a letter w*s used to indi-
cate a role that the masses should play, except that it did
not have the force of a decree* Sources for letters can be
divided into two categories and the number of printed epistles
grew as the hierarchy was descended from top to bottom.
The first type came from obscure party members of govern-
ment officials, and illustrated a posture which the party
wanted to hold up for the population as exemplary* The fol-
lowing example from Isvestlla illustrates the point
t
"Since 1905 I have been a member of the Menshevik
RSDWP. For belonging to the party 1 was convicted in a
Tsarist military court and sent to jail.
Finding that at the present time the Mensheviks are
carrying out a ruinous policy and that the real worker
party in Russia is only the RCP, 1 consider It necessary
to state, that from 1920 I have broken off all party
ties with the Mensheviks*
L.L. Monisov* 27
This letter and others like it were used by the center to
point out the propriety of renouncing former non-Bolshevik
party ties and to Indicate that the Communist Party was the
only real friend of the Russian worker* By printing such
messages to the editor* the party showed the masses what
attitude they should strike with respect to a particular
problem* Analogous to it were similar letters In Pravda
27. Igvestlia , December 15, 1923, p* 5* There were also a
number of disavowals of S.R. party ties at the same
time*
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during 1924 , denouncing the opposition fractions in the party
and showing the readers that the proper posture was to support
the Central Committee*
The second variety was written by prominent party or
soviet members. In this case the letter indicated not how
someone had gone wrong and was correcting his attitude , but
stated a positive position of approval or requested something
that was not sufficiently important to warrant an editorial or
major article* These letters often proclaimed the successes
of minor campaigns throughout the state* In one case Pravda
printed a letter from Trotsky, asking for copies of several
9 Bdocuments relating to the 1905 revolution* Of the two types
the former, baring the soul of comrades who had gone astray,
was by far the more prevalent with the latter seemingly re*
served for very minor items* . f ; o
Below the central paper, the pattern changes* Letters
became increasingly frequent occurrences as the ladder was
descended* On the gubernia level their scope was more limited
than at the center, since gubernia publications were restrict*
ed in their coverage by the various decrees of the center
and since their readership was defined in local rather than
national terms* In the Moscow and Fetrograd press letters
28* Pravda . October 25 , 1924, p* 6*
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tended to consider municipal problems and events 9 the party
at that level , and occasionally the peasantry. Presumably at
the uefsd level the number of letters published was even
greater while their scope was mere restricted*
The last page or pages were filled with ads, which had
begun to appear at the end of 1921, when the press changed to
cost accounting* By 1922 they had taken over the last page
of all the central papers and were spreading to the penulti-
mate page. In 1923 many Issues of Igvestlja had four of its
eight front page columns devoted to ads* As central papers
expanded their circulation # however * their dependence on ads
declined and by the end of 1923, when these publications
began to turn a profit, the number and frequency of their
notices fell off sharply.
The variety of ads was legion, ranging from personals for
all types of services to institutional plugging the sale of
Qosizdat publications. In the special holiday issues such as
May Day and the October Revolution, they filled eight to ten
pages. As the economic need for ads declined, the personal
variety disappeared, ridding the central publications of the
worst aspect of this bourgeois habit. On the gubernia level
this state of affairs had not been reached, or at least the
personal ads had not vanished by the end of 1924. Probably
the reason for this difference lies in the more local reading
public and perhaps in the inability of the gubernia papers
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to meet their expenses without such ads.
In this early period of the Soviet press two systems
were employed to determine policy, at least In theory. The
first was the discussion article and the second was the edi-
torlal flat. The procedure in the first system involved the
publication of an article by a relatively insignificant
party or soviet official, usually on page one of the central
papers, concerning a subject about which no decision had been
reached. An editorial footnote at the end informed the read,
tng public that the article was for discussion and Invited
reactions to It. In some cases other articles commented on
the Initial piece even If It were not so Indicated. The prob-
lem was then reviewed and examined In the light of the re-
sponse to the attitude taken by the first article, sometimes
In succeeding articles In the same paper, sometimes in other
leading or lower papers, and undoubtedly through letters to
the paper.
Concerning the press a number of such Instances can be
pointed out, beginning with the discussion which followed
Lenin's article on the press In 1918 and continuing after
the Civil War with the discussion of Krest'lanskala gazeta .
and the treatment of rabselcor persecutors. At seme point In
the discussion the center would decide what the correct
position was and end the dialogue with a definitive article
such as that by Sosnovskii defining the relation between the
two central peasant papers.
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Analogous to this system was the use of papers to resolve
disputes within the party* In this period the press was no
more monolithic than the party, and papers reflected the views
of various factions on particular problems* Illustrative of
this is the heated dialogue that arose between the Central
Organ and Lenlngradskaja pravda over the question of selecting
rabselcors Instead of employing the voluntary principle. The
contest that was joined over this issue continued beyond the
period of this study and was not finally resolved in favor of
Pravda until 1926.
Even within a paper, such as the Central Organ of the
party , discussion of particular Issues occurred. Trotsky's
theory of revolution and the proposals of the 46 at the end of
29
1923. both sparked heated debate in the Central Organ. In
this type of discussion however, the central press was used as
a weapon, in the manner prescribed by the Central Committee,
to reveal the deviations from the party line, defeat any
opposition to the center, and indicate the correct approach
for the local organizations.
The second method of indicating policy in the press was
the editorial decree by a high party member or the editor of
the paper. After 1922 the editorial was officially recog-
29. Since this is not the place to review party policy, but
Illustrate the uses of the press, it suffices to say that
in both of these cases the show of impartial discussion
was maintained in Pravda . but the opposition's view was
attacked viciously with barely a pretense of support.
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nized as a decree by all lower party eschelons which were
expected to repeat and execute the policy advanced in It.
During these formative years this was apparently not under-
stood at the lower levels or central control was still not
sufficiently established in the provinces. Conditions out*
side the cities made the execution of a dictated policy un-
reasonable or impossible in many cases* The continued com*
plaints about the failure to carry out central directives
and the reiteration of already stated policies concerning
the press, alone indicate that the force of editorials was
not felt in the provinces*
Thus in the period after the 12th congress* the staff,
format and content of the Soviet press became fixed in re*
spouse to various party decrees or based on the experience
gained in the years following the Civil War. The staff was
predominantly » but not exclusively party in composition, a
trend that would continue until all editors and secretaries
were party members* Format had developed in response to
decrees of the Central Committee as had content, but there
remained a certain flexibility for publications at the top
of the hierarchy because of their importance, and at the
bottom because control remained weak in the provinces. The
room to manuever at both ends would be increasingly cur*
tailed in the second half of the decade when rigorous disci-
pline and direction would eliminate any deviation from cen-
trally established norms*
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CHAPTER X
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE
SOVIET PRESS
From 1917 to 1924 the basic organizational structure of
the Soviet press was laid down by the communist party. In
terms of development this era divides Into two time periods i
from the February revolution to the end of 1922, and from the
end of that year to December 1924. The former was a time of
trial and error In which the party tried various approaches
to the press and In which the very existence of Soviet papers
was called Into question. During these Initial years the press
served as an agitational weapon to which the party paid scant
. i War tmm All tth« P*£*y CMttsAfcmtted aa Mirh— ~ maattention until the end of the Civil War. Lenin's few pro-
nouncements during the hostilities showed his desire to fit
the press Into the party* s ideology and make It an economic
tool, but his efforts were premature at a time when the main
concern of the regime was survival.
Despite the general sterility of this period for the
actual development and expansion of the press, the Ideas
generated by the lower eschelons of the party who dealt
with Soviet papers during the Civil War, although tem-
porarily unworkable, provided blueprints for the establish-
ment of the press In more normal conditions. At the same time
the Central Committee created the apparatus and Institutions
300
within the party through which the press net would operate
when peace prevailed* The Instruments for this exploratory
work were the first two congresses of journalists and the 8th
party congress*
1917 had offered little opportunity for developing a di-
versified press net* But despite the slender resources which
obstructed general expansion of the press, even before Octo-
ber the Bolsheviks had experimented with the three types of
rsSHWQ ci Brie v? we^^HTm wmtm h f m if***^w^t- *« *»w»^ ^^17
papers Sh*t eul$ed their needf aad weald efattaae t« bi the
basis for the Soviet press* Initially completely worker » the
party eventually created military and later peasant public*-
tions* Neither of the two additional types received much
attention in the inter-revolutionary period or until the
Civil War began as the party concentrated on worker papers.
The initial unimportance of the military press was fol-
lowed by a period in which the Red Army meant the difference
between the success or failure ef the revolution, aal during
the Civil War military papers became the majority of the
Soviet press* The worker press was relegated to the second
spot, while the few peasant papers » except for that part of
the military which catered to the semi literate peasant sol-
diers • were obliged to fend for themselves* The increased
size and importance of the military press occurred without
benefit of a conscious decision at the center and against
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the ideas expressed in Pravda and Izvestila that there was no
need for special Red Army papers.
As for the rest of the press, its fate Inevitably was
decline* Proliferation of military papers drained resources
from the center where the already acute newsprint shortage had
made life for the central and gubernia press extremely diffi-
cult. Probably the cadre and material-technical base would have
been unable to support extensive proliferation in the early
post-revolutionary period, but the Civil War exacerbated the
situation by channeling the major portion of printing resources
into the burgeoning military press* This caused numerous clo-
sures and a corresponding decline in circulation of the cen*
tr^JWIWW* ***** ***** ******** i*»
In the same period discussions were initiated concerning
the press levels that would serve the state and the mechanism
of their control. Molotov had begun this discussion in the
abortive attempt to establish a separate paper for the Petro-
grad organisation. By the October revolution an embryonic
hierarchy had been established by Pravda passing judgment
on other Bolshevik papers and by its status as the Central
Organ of the party* Concurrently the party asserted its leader*
ship, directing the rest of the press to follow the example
and line of Pravda .
However, not until the post-revolutionary period was any
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sort of hierarchy actually developed* Uncontrolled prolifera-
tion bred scores of papers that had to be organized into a net
to serve the masses • The party began consideration of this net
at the first congress of journalists in 1918 and decided to
construct a press net consisting of leading and mass papers*
This decision* taken despite the arguments for a completely
mass press, was never realized because of the Civil War, and
the net that tended to develop followed the hierarchy of
party and to a lesser extent soviet organizations* In practice
this meant a central press followed by gubernia, uezd and even
some volost papers* Their creation is difficult to trace,
because of the confusion of the Civil War* but the net must
have developed along these lines since the party focused its
attention on these levels when it began to consider the press
following the hostilities*
Party leadership of the press up to 1921 also fluctuated *
varying from direct control between the revolutions to indif-
ference and preoccupation in the Civil War. 1917 and the first
six months of 1918 witnessed firm leadership by the individual
party committee since the press was an important weapon in the
assumption and consolidation of power* At this time the editor
and staff were the leading members of the local committee* and
though the press was not monolithic or even completely respon-
sive to the Central Organ* it was controlled by the party*
Preoccupation with the war stripped these early party collabor-
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ators from the press in large numbers. The removal of the
old cadre left the press in untried and inexperienced hands,
and at the same time ended its direct control by the local
committee which had turned its attention to other tasks.
The congresses of journalists, recognizing this devel-
oping vacuum, attempted to establish leadership and control
of the press through self-imposed institutions • But Tsentro
3uro and Tsekomzhur both assumed powers that they were inca-
pable of executing and unlikely to exercise once the party 9 s
attention returned to the press* Neither allowed appropriate
party leadership and only in the conditions of the Civil War
could they have been conceived* The party on its side was too
busy fighting the war to devote proper attention to the press.
Only Lenin in articles at the beginning of the hostilities
called upon the press to perform new functions* But the pos-
sibility of concentrating on economics was swept away in the
turmoil of the fighting * and the only creations that survived
into the post war period were the servicing institutions such
as ROSTA and Tsentro Pechat*, that functioned haltingly in
the war, but were not crippled by lack of attention*
Following the Civil War the party's attitude changed* Its
achievements in the next two years proved ephemeral because
of the press crisis, but they continued the experiments and
approaches of the previous years* Content was elaborated in
the programs on the local press, and the hierarchy that emerged
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at the and of the fighting was taken as the basis for future
organisation* At about the same time the party created its
own internal structure that would attempt to direct and control
the press from the center. Initially beginning as a division in
one of the five subsections of the agit-prop section , the press
was elevated into a full section of the Central Committee in
the course of four years. In that time span the section initi-
ated a variety of publications to assist the Soviet press and
developed its own branches within the party down to the guber-
nla, and in some cases, on local initiatlve v to the ralon
level. Through these institutions the party attempted to con-
trol the press. Their literature and trained cadre were sent
out to insure its proper performance. At the end of 1924,
aided by a constant stream of Central Committee directives
and various articles in Pravda . the press section had succeed-
ed In establishing a generally acceptable worker press, while
other parts of the Soviet press were less satisfactory.
Begun in 1918 at the first journalists* congress, the
various attempts to delineate the state paper net failed be-
cause they were so rapidly overtaken by events. In the winter
of 1921-1922, the most Important of these, which had the sup-
port of the Central Committee and the party secretaries, came
to naught when the press crisis made a shambles of the effort.
Previous attempts had been rendered inoperative by the Civil
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War, and following the press crisis attention was directed to
differentiating the press instead of delimiting the number of
papers at any one level* Implicit in this change was the belief
that the existing hierarchy would satisfy the needs of the
state and that wall papers 9 the newest and lowest part of the
system, would prove amenable to party control* Only part of
this belief was correct* The needs of the state were adequate*
ly served by the existing hierarchy * but the proliferating wall
papers In 1924 still eluded the control which the party be-
lieved necessary*
The differentiation, started after the change to NE? and
the press crisis • was not a new idea. Molotov, Vardln and Trot-
sky had all proposed or supported it before* but for various
reasons their suggestions had not been accepted* Holotov had
been unable to win approval in 1917 because of the scant press
resources} Trotsky* s commission in 1921 recorded the failure
of diversification for similar reasons i while Vardln 9 a propo-
sals at the journalists 9 congresses had been unrealizable due
to the Civil War*
By the fourth press workers 9 congress these obstacles had
disappeared or been overcome and the initiative begun with
Vardln 9 s attack on the role of Pravda became party policy* The
fact that the party chose that moment to focus on the develop-
ing struggle in the countryside was fortutitous and guarran-
i
:
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teed that the initiative would not fall for lack of atten-
tion at the center.
Once this decision had been taken the party did not stint
in its support of the program* The mixed paper was denounced
as Incorrect and the peasant press developed, on the lower
levels often at the expense of uezd worker publications* At
the same time the center imparted the importance of the press
to its local organizations, and their changed attitude sub-
stantially strengthened the forces at work for the press.
Additional support came from the rabselcors. This amorphous
and rapidly expanding movement provided the eyes and ears of
the party in the localities, taking subscriptions, gathering
information and disseminating the press into the farthest
reaches of the state* Despite the inability of the party to
control and guide the rabselcors 9 this convergence of forces
was largely responsible for the tremendous expansion of the
peasant press in 1924 and for the further advances made by
worker papers in the same year*
While worker and peasant papers had developed along the
lines prescribed for them by the state, the other parts of
the Soviet net had not been so successful. The deficiencies
of military, youth and national press were the results in one
case of a premeditated plan of neglect by the center, while
in another the papers suffered from a lack of attention
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which was coming to an and in 1924* The Military press had
fallen on hard times following the Civil War. The return to
the barracks had insured its continuation t but the 190 publi-
cations of 1920 declined to a mere doaen, and only in 1923
did a formal plan for military papers win approval. Youth and
national publications had never aspired to the heights which
had been the military's in the Civil War. They began to emerge
from the shadows in the period following the 12th party con*
gross. Initially undifferentiated* by the end of 1924 they
were about to depart on this process and began to draw steady
party support. Each faced its own special problems however.
Youth papers lacked cadre and a widespread reading public,
while the national press needed a better technical base,
especially types in the local languages* for its further ex-
pansion except in those areas which had had journalistic tra-
ditions before the revolution.
The upper levels of this net were well established by
the end of 1924. With the majority staffed completely by par-
ty members « they responded to the center's directives on the
press. Although not totally in agreement with it over all
matters concerning the party line* they did adhere to the
Central Committee's decrees on format and content. Below the
guhernia level and in most of the peasant press . the situation
was not so bright. These publications were not staffed by
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reliable communists or receptive to the center 9 s direction*
Partly because of poorly developed party organisations in the
countryside and partly because local conditions demanded more
flexibility at the lower levels » the center had not yet gained
full control over these eschelons of the Soviet press . and
they were regarded as unsatisfactory by the press section of
the Central Committee*
Within the limits imposed by the organisation and extent
of the Soviet press 9 the party tried to define the message
which Its papers should deliver and how the press could best
be used as an institution. The underground and exile jour-
nalistic experience of the Bolshevik leaders from their en-
trance into the revolutionary movement helped to determine
the utilisation of the press, while the party's experience
with the bourgeois press and the course of events in the
first years of the Soviet state Influenced the molding of the
message which its mouthpiece propagated*
Most party leaders had in the years before the revolu-
tion edited or contributed to the various papers of the Rus-
sian Social Democratic movement or had published their own
ideas in pamphlets or books* The revolutionary press was the
arena in which ideological battles were fought* and papers
became a medium through which the several factions vied for
leadership of the Russian workers* When a party member became
involved in such a dispute, he offered to and expected from
his opponent no concessions or compromises* The reluctance
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of a publication to espouse particular ideas could split the
oovouu it. Lenin' 8 withdrawal from Iskra . when it would not
support his point of view, is the best example of the uncom-
promising attitude toward the press and of the Bolshevik's
high estimation of it as a weapon in the revolutionary move*
*WfHks had *•«& t*««lr ndfcll m l mil injprmime<r §md husrifpj
At the name time party members were expected to write
regularly for their paper, cefenaia& its positions and refut-
ing or attacking the opposition, a tradition that has remain*
ed an integral part of Soviet journalism* While none of the
party leaders initially specialised on any topic, they became
accustomed to contributing to their press and using it to
disseminate the prescribed line on any subject. The party
expected the pre-revolutionary activity to continue after the
Bolsheviks had taken power, and the continued exhortations by
the center for members to be continual contributors to the
press f reflected the survival of this legacy.
Implicit in the use of the paper to show the party line
was the concept that the press was a weapon in the struggle
for the victory of Socialism, In the pre-October years, the
Bolsheviks had employed the press to attack, ridicule and
vilify established authority or rivals in the contest for
worker allegiance* In the two years of its legal publication,
1912-4, Prmvda had continually claimed that the Bolsheviks
were the only true friend of idle working class, while re*
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veallng the decadence of the Autocracy and Irrelevance of
other political parties*
This background inevitably played an Important role in
the utilization of the press after the seizure of power and
in the party's attitude toward opposition papers. The Bol-
sheviks had seen their publications suppressed and harassed
by the authorities before the revolution* Adding this ex*
perlence to the belief that the press should reflect a class
view sealed the fate of non-party papers. But the assumption
of power demanded changes in the use of the press, since the
Autocracy and Provisional Government had disappeared t and a
consideration of its function in the now Soviet state.
Reporting of news as such was not its mission nor was
the press regarded as a commercial venture to yield a profit
for its owners* Rather papers should promote a particular
set of values in terms of party and class* They would serve
as the main weapons in the struggle for the new society, as
tools to construct a better life, to influence the masses,
secure the allegiance of the workers and suppress the coun-
ter-revolution. Freedom of the press was conceived from the
very first as the freedom of the working class to express
its ideas, and the party became the guardian of this liberty,
defining and explaining what it constituted.
This definition and the Ideological bent of the party de-
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aand«d that Soviet papers see the world as the party saw it*
Those that did not would be closed* Yet for the first years
of its existence the press , judged by the frequent complaints
from the center f failed to realize this ideal, merely con-
timing bourgeois journalistic habits, and was unable to
generate a new message* Worldliness and erudition were flaunt-
ed at the expense of information useful to the masses or ex-
pressing the party line* Lenin's repeated dictum about print-
ing economic material instead of political sensationalism
fell on deaf ears, until the party could spare time to con-
sider the press carefully. Only after the Civil War did these
complaints cease,
-
Yet the Civil War was not a completely sterile period.
Despite the inability or disinclination of the localities to
execute Lenin's directives, the party developed some guide-
lines that became integral parts of the operation of every
newspaper. The most important of these was the concentration
on party and worker life* Sections devoted to these subjects
had been central features of the Soviet press since the re-
organization of Fravda in August 1917. The decision Co in-
stitute "Party Life" sections throughout the Soviet press was
taken during the Civil itar and confirmed in Che jro^^aB on
the local press in 1921, 1922 and 1924, but party life was
less fully illustrated than worker life especially in the
lower eschelons of the press* This concentration on party and
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worker Life was a natural response to that part of the popu-
lation from which the Bolsheviks drew their support and de-
monstrated the class orientation of the Soviet press. Later,
as the revolutionary struggle extended into the countryside,
more and more space would be devoted to the peasantry*
Since the press was a weapon aimed at the masses, it
played a number of roles in the creation of a new life* The
paper was both the mouthpiece of the party and the organizer
of the class it served* This duality involved the flow of
information in two directions* The press would report what
was happening among the masses, their feelings, needs and
demands* while at the same time it would organize and lead
them, outlining the attitude they should take toward any pro*
blem* The party would feed selected information to the masses
in an attempt to make them respond as it wanted, while anti-
cipating and channeling their expectations into the press*
In that medium they would be lauded when correct, or Ridi-
culed, pour encourager lee autres . when incorrect*
The 8th party congress added a new vignette to these ideas
when it expanded the functions of the press to include influ-
encing the masses* Organizing the workers apparently was an
economic function* Influence pertained to the political out-
look of the population* The former concentrated the efforts
of the proletariat on socialist construction, while the lat-
ter involved molding the masses, conditioning them to think-
3L3
ing ae the party wanted t allowing them to see the world only
through the Ideological prism provided by the Soviet press,
presenting life in the black and white of party doctrine in*
stead of the messy grays of bourgeois thought* In this way
the Bolsheviks hoped to rally the population behind the par*
ty and extirpate opposing points of view by closing bourgeois
papers and flooding the masses with the party line defined in
the press* The newspaper became the vehicle by which the party
delivered its concept of life to Russia* Having accused the
Capitalists of deceiving the workers through their papers*
the Bolsheviks proceeded to use the press for exactly the
same purpose*
Their success by 1924 was not spectacular* Limitations
of circulation and titles impeded the extension of party in*
fluonce into areas that were not already susceptive to the
Bolsheviks* Although blanketing the country with the party
message was Impossible due to the small number of papers, the
monopoly of the printed word assured the Central Committee
that no other party would be able to compete with the Bol-
sheviks. Yet despite this monopoly the Soviet peasant press
was so divorced from reality in its first years that it was
refused by the mushlks* Only In 1924 did peasant papers begin
to influence the vast majority of the Russian population, ex-
panding their circulation and changing their approach to of-
fer agricultural information and articles that had practical
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application in the countryside. Tha party showed its aware-
ness of this situation by constantly reiterating Its demands
for influencing tha masses from the first program on the lo-
cal press in 1921 to the Central Committee decree of February
IMfcftl*** . uMtoofcMLp la ft** pre** < defined
While the ability to influence the masses was only begin-
ning in 1924, the organizational side of Soviet journalism
had had better success. Organising the masses was Intimately
linked with the function of critic. Together the two by the
time of Lenin's death had succeeded in executing a wide val-
ety of campaigns that were undoubtedly instrumental in the
revival of the economy. Before the revolution the role of
critic hao pitted the party press against the Tsar, Provi-
sional Government or other revolutionary parties, but had
not examined its own publishers.
With the seizure of power all these functions changed.
The part devoted to attacking other parties or potential ri-
vals remained intact and continued to operate as before. But
that section which had attacked the government was retooled
to reveal the errors and irregularities, mistakes and cor-
ruption of socialist construction. While the organizational
function of the press recorded the successes or failures of
various campaigns and exhorted the masses to struggle for
victory on different domestic fronts, as a critic the paper
disclosed the obstacles within party and state that Impeded
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the orderly procession to Socialism. Not all the party ac-
cepted the idea of criticism without demur, and its extent
and depth is difficult to judge* If the irregularities in-
terfered with the evolution of approved party campaigns and
policies
,
they undoubtedly appeared in the press. Defined
and initially limited to the press and its information ga-
thering tools by Lenin in 1918, the role of critic was sup-
plemented following the Civil War by the proliferating ranks
of the rabselcors who, better acquainted with local condi-
tions, exposed situations that might have escaped the press.
This was the area in which criticism had its greatest effect
and the persecution of correspondents shewed the success of
the press in revealing opposition to the party's policies.
From critic of socialist construction to guardian of
party doctrine was no great step, but this role was reserved
in theory for the Central Organ. That Pravcja defined party
policy had been decreed in the first days of 1917. It was
repeated in Lenin's articles and on press days, becoming
commonplace by the end of 1924. However attacking those who
strayed from the Central Committee's line was not designated
as a role of the Soviet press until the 12th party congress,
and then it became solely the province of Pravda . The Cen-
tral Organ thus became the oracle of party and press purity.
The deviations of a party organization inevitably meant
the delinquency of its paper, and any attack on a particular
organization by the Central Committee would sooner or later
316
entail Pravda's assailing its publication* Presumably the
rest of tha press would than rapport the Central Organ* This
was the theory* It assumed a compact homogeneous net of pa-
pers which did not exist* In 1924 tha Soviet press was no
more monolithic than the party and not only did various pa*
pars disagree an many aspects of Soviet life, but even with*
in a particular paper there might be differences* w»
In addition to organising and influencing the population,
tha prass then* was the repository of approved behavior*
Guarding the party line and exposing the deficiencies of so-
cialist construction* the prass played the role of high priest
of tha Soviet cult* passing Judgment on all phases of life.
This meant that definitive statements on every subject were
manifested on its pages, and tha leading members of the pub-
lishing organisation provided them in the form of editorials
and articles* Such pronouncements appeared in every issue
and furnished guidelines for tha people* Again however, the
theory proved less than perfect* The coming struggle for suc-
cession would reveal that press unanimity existed only when
the leaders of the party ware in basic agreement, or whan one
of them waa able to bend the rest to his will*
These two functions, organizer and critic, limited the
press to a domestic role, although the isolated position of
the Soviet Union and the need to consolidate support within
the country influenced its concentration* The campaigns*
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articles and sections of the paper were all destined for par*
ticular parts of the population. Additionally differentiation
had guaranteed that each layer of the masses would have an
appropriate paper, and the snail circulation relative to the
total population should not obscure this fact. That parts of
the net were weakly developed is indisputable, but by 1924
the center had taken steps to secure for each part of the
population a circulation commensurate with its needs and
those of the party. In the first seven years of power the
Bolsheviks had established levers among each segment of the
people with which it was attempting to manipulate and influ-
ence the masses t winning them over to the party line and
assuring their support.
Given these aims, the press reported news that fit the '
picture which the party wished to paint, in foreign affairs
it was one of hostility to Russia, In domestic reportage the
Soviet paper wanted to direct the activity of the masses
along the lines indicated by the party* This made the press
into a newsmaker rather than a reporter* It is true that
various meetings, conferences and congresses were extensive-
ly reported* But the number of articles and editorials which
damnniled a certain posture on a given problem indicated that
in 1924 the Soviet paper had become a newspaper by providing
guidelines for human behavior, by explaining what the party
expected from the masses, and equally important, what acti-
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vltles and attitudes were unsatisfactory or counter-revolu-
tionary.
All of which meant that the Soviet citizen, unless he
were privy to Information not distributed for the press or to
publications not available to the public , obtained only the
Information which the party saw fit to print. He was also
the object of an Intensive campaign to mold him Into the new
Soviet man. Undoubtedly reportage In this period Included a
greater variety of subject matter than would be available
later In the decade. NEP forced a certain catering to the
reader In an attempt to make the paper acceptable to the pub-
lic, and gubernla and evening publications purveyed material
which the Bolsheviks certainly regarded with suspicion. But
party control of the press In 1924 had not been consolidated
to the point where it could curb all deviations from central
norms •
The pressure for complete control however, was growing.
One Indication of the effect of this was the change In gen-
oral press coverage. In the period before the revolution
editors had been denounced for concentrating exclusively on
local affairs at the expense of revealing the significance of
the revolutionary situation. In the years after the seizure
of power this trend was reversed as the party demanded again
and again that the lower papers restrict their coverage to
the locality, leaving the larger picture to the central pub-
319
lications. In 1924 this demand had succeeded to the point
that even gubernia papers were locally oriented.
By the end of the period under study the Soviet press was
qualitatively satisfactory to the party at the top levels and
becoming so at the lower levels. This had been achieved with
the aid of frequent directives from the center. Circulation
was still low and insufficient to meet the needs of the state,
but it had expanded steadily since the resolution of the press
crisis in 1922, and In ail areas the number of titles and
copies continued to grow. The supporting branches of the
state had also achieved a semblance of respectability, al-
though the dissemination apparatus would work Irregularly for
several years and ROSTA would be reorganized in 1925 to serve
the state better.
The massage which this weapon delivered was destined for
consumption largely by the working masses. The circulation of
peasant papers was rapidly overtaking that of worker publlca.
tlons, but at the end of 1924 the Soviet press was still pro-
letarian. During Its development this press had played a
variety of roles* weapon of the party, transmitter between the
masses and the center, critic of socialist construction, and
guardian of party purity.
But the weapon was far from the perfect responsive tool
that the party wanted. Some parts still eluded party control
and others failed to respond to the directives from the cen-
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tor. In a period whan the party was about to undergo a di-
visive struggle for power » the press was run by as many dif-
ferent people as there would be factions in the coming con-
test* This meant that the Soviet press by the end of 1924
had not yet assumed a completely subservient role to the par-
ty and that its readers were still able to secure information
that would be completely unavailable later in the decade.
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